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ABSTRACT 
 
Platonic Cosmopolitanism. (August 2010) 
Daniel Vincent Betti, B.A., Mary Washington College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Cary J. Nederman 
 
 
 What is the content of a meaningful cosmopolitan theory?  Contemporary 
cosmopolitanism offers numerous global theories of liberalism, democracy, 
republicanism, and postmodernism, but is there anything of the “cosmos” or “polis” 
within them?  I argue these theories, though global, are not cosmopolitan.  Ancient 
Greek philosophy holds a more meaningful, substantive conception of cosmopolitanism.  
From Homer to the Stoics and Cynics, ancient Greece was a hotbed for thinking beyond 
the confines of local tradition and convention.  These schools of thought ventured to find 
universal understandings of humanity and political order.  Conceiving of the world as a 
beautiful order, a cosmos, they sought a beautiful order for the association of human 
beings.  Within that tradition is the unacknowledged legacy of Platonic 
cosmopolitanism.   
Rarely do political philosophers find cosmopolitan themes in the dialogues of 
Plato.  Correcting this omission, I argue that Plato’s dialogues, from the early through 
the late, comprise a cosmopolitan journey: an attempt to construct a polis according to an 
understanding of the cosmos.  The early dialogues address questions of piety, justice, 
iv 
 
 
and righteous obedience.  More than that, they inquire into why a good man, Socrates, is 
persecuted in his city for nothing more than being a dutiful servant of the gods and his 
city.  The middle dialogues construct a true cosmopolis, a political association in 
harmony with the natural laws of the world.  Furthermore, they explain why those who 
know how to construct such a polis live best in such arrangements.  In the late dialogues, 
Plato revises his political plans to accord with a more developed understanding of 
cosmic and human nature.   
Platonic cosmopolitanism constructs a true polis according to the beautiful order 
of the cosmos.  Such a feat of philosophy is remarkable in the Greek tradition, and 
inspires contemporaries to rethink their own conception of what is truly cosmopolitan 
versus merely global. 
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DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents: tens of thousands of dollars spent on twenty-five years of 
schooling and now you have to read this dissertation.  Was it really worth it?  At least 
you can tell people your son is a doctor… (sure, a Doctor of Philosophy!) 
 
To all: Don’t store your treasures upon the earth, with moth and rust, where 
thieves break in and steal, for we live in but a shadow of the real- Mt. 6:19 
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CHAPTER I 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO COSMOPOLITANISM  
Contemporary Cosmopolitan Thought 
 Cosmopolitanism as a topic of study is rising to the forefront of political theory. 
One can find any number of books and articles generically titled “Cosmopolitan 
Democracy,” “Liberal Cosmopolitanism,” or even “Global Liberalism.”1  The very titles 
are the first clue something is wrong in the literature of cosmopolitanism, as 
“cosmopolitan” and “global” appear to be mere synonyms.  In fact, the terms 
“cosmopolitan” and “global” correspond to a political system that encompasses the 
entire human population- everyone on the planet Earth.  Is that all the term 
“cosmopolitan” conveys, a political system for entire the population of the globe?  One 
can make a joke and ponder whether humanity will need “galactic” political theory to 
replace its cosmopolitanism once a colony is established on the moon or Mars.  Sarcastic 
speculation aside, contemporary work in the area of cosmopolitan theory has limited 
understanding of what the term cosmopolitanism means and an expansive view of its 
political corollaries. 
 To elaborate, let us discuss four prominent and closely-related branches of 
political theory that pursue a cosmopolitan system of government.  Liberalism focuses 
on the creation of a global system of just distribution.  Moral and capability theory 
ruminates on the global distribution of material resources necessary to secure equal 
                                                          
 
 This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Politics. 
1
 More specifically, Darrel Moellendorf’s Cosmopolitan Justice, Archibugi and Held’s Cosmopolitan 
Democracy, and Patrick Hayden’s Cosmopolitan Global Politics.  
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opportunity for all individuals to develop their inherent human capabilities.  Democratic 
theory advocates a global system of political participation in the affairs that concern 
humanity as a group.  Critical Constitutionalism (or republicanism) pursues a global 
system of peace and cooperation among liberal-democratic republics and their 
constitutive peoples.  Each one of these branches raises a particular value as the global 
priority and considers a system of global institutions necessary to secure the prioritized 
value.  Most are explicitly political, meaning they propose a set of global governmental 
institutions to fulfill the elevated value of the theory.2     
 Evaluating this literature of contemporary cosmopolitanism, the overriding 
concern is that the prioritized global value of each school of thought (liberty, democracy, 
morality…) conflicts with the others within the institutions of their proposed 
cosmopolitan government.  The institutions of global liberalism threaten democracy and 
republicanism.  A global democracy threatens the just distribution of global resources, 
individual rights, and the rights of peoples.  Respecting the rights of peoples precludes 
global democracy, undermines the just system of resource distribution, and is contrary to 
the principles of global moral equality.  These branches of cosmopolitanism find 
thorough and recurrent conflict without apparent solution.       
Of interest, each branch of cosmopolitan theory endorses one facet of the 
Enlightenment to the detriment of others.  One principle, whether the just resource 
distribution of the liberals, the democracy of democratic theory, equal moral concern, or 
the autonomy of peoples, is elevated above the others.  None of the theories entirely 
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 Moral and Capability theorists are less prescriptive about the political institutions necessary for their 
purposes.  Of course, their theory has political corollaries, but they are less concrete than the others.  
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rejects the other principles, but subordinates them to the primary value.  The disharmony 
among these Enlightenment theories is disconcerting upon analysis.  Liberal theorists 
raise equality as their principle.  Every individual should receive equal access (under 
realistic and rational conditions) to material and political resources.  Justice demands 
that everyone possess equal opportunity to pursue and enjoy their liberty, their view of 
the good life.  Democratic theorists primarily value the individual’s right to participate in 
government.  They will not allow a technocratic or distant government to overrule this 
basic human right.  Moral theorists seek to enshrine universal principles of morality to 
preclude the power, influence, and prejudice of limited groups of human beings or any 
other non-universal principles of morality.  In contrast, global republicans look to protect 
the right of peoples and nations to their sovereignty, but within a stable and peaceful 
league of liberal-democratic republics.  These values are all recognizable as descendents 
of the Enlightenment, and contemporary theorists now pit one against the rest. 
 The scenario too closely resembles the old tale of the blind men describing an 
elephant.  Each branch of cosmopolitanism descends from the Enlightenment, but only 
grasps one facet of the broader philosophy.  And now, sitting together, they each 
describe a part of the philosophy- liberty, equality, morality, democracy, republicanism- 
but cannot reconstruct the whole thing.  These branches take one universal value from 
the Enlightenment as primary; the others are secondary.  Having been separated, 
attempts to reconcile these individual universals create less of a coherent philosophy and 
more a power struggle among contending principles. 
  Another branch of contemporary theory ventures toward a cosmopolitanism quite 
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different from the Enlightenment variants.  Postmodernism argues for a peculiar global 
system, one that is no system at all.  Postmodern cosmopolitanism rejects any system of 
politics or thought that raises one value as authoritative.  Postmodern cosmopolitanism 
embraces a global exchange of principles and values.  The concepts of fluidity and 
hybridization form the essence of postmodernist cosmopolitanism.  The global, human 
community should allow the free-flow of ideas and encourage the mutability of 
contemporary principles and values.  All power centers (private and public, individual 
and group) should allow local customs to meet distant ones and not interfere with the 
organic interaction that follows.  Postmodern cosmopolitanism accepts that no principle 
is sacred or primary.  No authority may raise fixed ideals.  On the contrary, a 
postmodern cosmopolitanism encourages the creation of new ideals, hybrid ideals, and 
fluid ideals.  
Cosmos and Polis 
Thinking about the aforementioned branches of thought, I am struck by the lack 
of meaning in contemporary cosmopolitanism for the core concepts of that theory, 
“cosmos” and “polis.”3  Old Diogenes of Sinope, the dog himself, is recorded as coining 
the representative phrase of cosmopolitanism, “I am a citizen of the world,” or to 
rearrange the Greek, “My polis is the cosmos.”4  The attitude reflects a rejection of the 
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 Throughout this dissertation, I use both cosmos and the transliterated kosmos.  By cosmos, I mean an 
understanding of the natural world.  Different thinkers have varied understandings of that natural order.  
When using the transliterated kosmos, I am referring to how Plato is discussing the concept in the 
particular dialogue under investigation.  Similarly, I use both polis and polis.  By polis, I mean a 
legitimate, sovereign political community.  By polis, I mean something closer to the Greek, and especially 
Platonic, understanding of a sovereign community of differently-skilled individuals living according to a 
common law.  
4
 From Diogenes Laertius (1950, 65). 
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narrow loyalty to one’s local community and its conventional laws in favor of the 
natural, universal principles that reign over physical reality.  Diogenes’ phrase reflects 
an understanding of the natural world as law-like and orderly above the conventions that 
small groups try to impose on themselves in the form of political laws; the cosmos reigns 
supreme regardless of what laws exist in any particular polis.  Unlike Diogenes, 
contemporary cosmopolitanism has no concept of the cosmos.  The “cosmos” in 
contemporary cosmopolitanism is interchangeable with “global.” 
The cosmos to Diogenes, and many other Greek thinkers, was far more than the 
giant rock we call Earth.  The cosmos was an ordered thing, a divine thing, even a living 
thing, and certainly not merely one of the planets traversing the galaxy on which 
humanity happens to exist.  When Diogenes claimed political attachment to the cosmos, 
he removed himself from the local prejudices of an arbitrary community and removed 
himself to the source of universal standards and imperatives.  The cosmos as universal 
was the antithesis of the polis as particular.  With a small qualification, there is no 
cosmos in contemporary cosmopolitanism.  
Only postmodern cosmopolitanism employs a concept of the cosmos in its 
theory. Postmodernists view the universe, the “cosmos,” as containing no fixed ideals for 
humanity and being in a state of natural flux and change.  The world is constantly 
changing, turning, and shifting with neither higher purpose nor fixed end guiding its 
motions.  Their global system is an attempt to align political reality to this cosmic 
reality, to breakdown centers of power and allow change to happen at an individual level 
across the globe.  Postmodern cosmopolitanism does have a politically-charged 
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understanding of the cosmos, but not one friendly to the idea of a polis.  If the polis 
means a limited group of citizens living under a common, authoritative law, then the 
postmodernists certainly reject it.  They favor a decentralized, non-authoritative political 
system, something that respects the flux of the cosmos and facilitates a similar fluidity in 
the values and principles of the individual. 
 Historically, cosmopolitanism has been heavy on the idea of the cosmos and 
rather light on that of the polis.  The philosophy of cosmopolitanism affirms the rational 
individual and the rational world, the one who adheres to the universal standards of the 
cosmos rather than the conventions of a limited polis.  Indeed, the Greek polis was a 
highly communitarian structure of relations.  The polis raised its citizens to be loyal to 
the greater whole.  The expression of Diogenes is at once an affirmation of universal 
ideals and individualism; the polis affirmed the priority of the group and viewed the 
independent, ambitious individual with suspicion.  Cosmopolitanism, from ancient 
Greece and Rome through Enlightenment Europe, has been a philosophy of the universal 
and the individual against the strictures of group artifice and convention.  
Platonic Cosmopolitanism 
 In terms of political association and government institutions, cosmopolitanism 
has reached different conclusions.  The ancient cynics generally approved of a 
humanistic rejection of government.  They believed natural law was rational, universal, 
and superior to any local authority.  People needed only to use their reason to understand 
natural standards and peacefully coexist with others.  Stoics, on the other hand, did apply 
their universal standards to the function of imperial government.  They sought to forge 
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all humanity into one rational and natural community through a system of empire.  
During the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant argued for a global league of 
republics to ensure peace among peoples.  These republics cooperated according to 
universal Reason, but still possessed a measure of domestic sovereignty as separate 
nations.  All these cosmopolitans subordinated local communities and political 
associations to the idea of universal humanity, universal empire, or a universal republic 
of nation-states.  Historically, cosmopolitans reject the polis, the limited, self-sustaining, 
and highly independent community, in favor of universal associations of one form or 
another. 
 The dialogues of Plato present an intriguing twist to cosmopolitan thinking.5  
Instead of raising the individual out the polis to adhere only to universal standards of the 
cosmos, Plato raises the polis out of convention and grounds it in universal standards.  
Understanding the cosmos as a hierarchy of order, Plato’s dialogues inquire into how a 
polis, a local and limited community, might institute laws that reflect universal 
standards.  The polis, he argues, should be reflective of the cosmos.  Truly, Plato rejects 
the idea of imperial government; neither does he endorse the apolitical, Stoic community 
of universal humanity.  To live well, Plato argues the individual must live in a polis, and 
to provide happiness for its citizens, the polis must reflect the order of the cosmos.  
Platonic cosmopolitanism, from the early dialogues to the late, is the construction of this 
hierarchy of cosmos, polis, and individual. 
 Calling Plato a cosmopolitan is something new, but I am not applying any novel 
                                                          
5
 English quotations of Plato’s (1997) dialogues are from John Cooper’s edited collection.  When 
transliterating from ancient Greek, I rely on Plato (1913; 1925; 1926; 1929; 1930; 1935; 1952) in The 
Loeb Classical Library collection. 
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interpretation to the dialogues to produce this reading.  Indeed, I am almost embarrassed 
by the simplicity and orthodoxy of my interpretation strategy.  I will admit many of the 
dialogues are brilliant, but I cannot agree with Leo Strauss (2001, 5) when he writes, 
“There is nothing superfluous, nothing meaningless in a Platonic dialogue.”  Plato is not 
perfect.  Plato, being human, is subject to the frailties inherent in humanity.  His 
philosophy is a reflection of genius and many of the dialogues are a pleasure to read, but 
they are not free of quandaries, perplexities, and even mistakes.  Furthermore, I do not 
apply esoteric analysis as a strategy of interpretation; frankly, I can only understand 
esoteric analysis as a kind of distortion applied to the text.  Whether that distortion is 
preconceived or a reflection of the interpreter’s stream of consciousness is unknown.  
Some of those analyses are interesting and engaging reads, others are not, and all elevate 
the interpreter above the text.   
Across the dialogues, I find Plato asking similar questions about the nature of the 
cosmos and polis, about virtue and knowledge, and the life well-lived.  However, he 
employs different methods of inquiry and reaches different conclusions regarding these 
questions.  I agree with a general division of Plato’s work into early, middle, and later 
periods.  In these divisions, scholars have reached no authoritative consensus about the 
proper assignment of each and every text.6  One can find a slew of arguments placing 
dialogue A, which everyone else judges to be in period x, to be more appropriately dated 
to period y or z.  Consequently, I do not spend much time engaging in these matters as 
my ordering of the dialogues is neither revolutionary nor dogmatic.  I order dialogues 
                                                          
6
 A vast literature exists on the chronology of Plato’s dialogues.  Recent works include Kahn (2003), 
Poster (1998), Young (1994), Brandwood (1990), and Theslef (1982).  One can venture back to 
Lutosawski (1905) and beyond. 
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according to general consensus and the interrelation of their content to the other 
dialogues. 
Since I read Plato as pursuing a continuous project, I must disagree with a 
particular, and popular, trend to divide the Socratic from the Platonic in Plato’s dialogue.  
A number of interpreters of Plato’s dialogues have separated the early, Socratic 
dialogues from the rest of the corpus in their construction of a democratic theory.  From 
these dialogues, they construct a Platonic/Socratic philosophy more favorable to both 
ancient Athenian democracy and contemporary democratic theory.  I find that this 
strategy of disconnecting a group of dialogues from the rest allows interpreters to impose 
a controversial, narrow, and highly modern reading of Plato’s main character, Socrates.  
Like the esoteric analysts, these democratic interpreters violate the integrity of individual 
texts by data-mining for evidence and they do injustice to the author by removing 
individual dialogues from a broader philosophy.     
In short, my interpretation of the dialogues is neither controversial nor inventive.  
I find myself in agreement on a number of issues with prominent scholars of Plato.  
What, then, is the contribution of this dissertation?  I will argue my dissertation offers a 
broad contribution to the history of political thought and a more specific contribution to 
cosmopolitan thought.  Plato offers an inventive philosophy of cosmopolitanism in his 
hierarchy of cosmos, polis, and individual.  He may be the only philosopher to embrace 
the idea of the Greek polis within a cosmopolitan theory.  Tracing cosmopolitanism to 
the present, contemporary cosmopolitan theorists might look back at Plato’s dialogues 
and find a source of thought to assist their efforts to unify the enlightenment virtues in a 
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cosmopolitan system of government.  Studying Plato as a cosmopolitan, one who 
constructs a true polis according to the standards of the cosmos, enriches our 
understanding of the idea of cosmopolitanism, yields a more complete history of 
cosmopolitan thought, and may assist contemporary work in cosmopolitan thought. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONTEMPORARY COSMOPOLITANISM 
On Modern Cosmopolitanisms 
Strands of cosmopolitan thought pervade contemporary political theory.  One 
thread employs the moral imperatives of Kantian heritage to guide global institutional 
reform.  Another expands Rawlsian liberalism to break the bounds of closed societies 
and create a just system of political and economic relations among all people (and not 
among “peoples”).  In democratic theory, plans for a global assembly are laid to solidify 
a cosmopolitan democracy.  Critical theorists put forward the model of constitutional 
cosmopolitanism and ideal of communicative action to resolve disputes between 
constitutional republics.  Postmodernists enter the fray, arguing for a cosmopolitan 
culture of fluidity and hybridization.  The advocates of moral, liberal, democratic, 
critical, and postmodern cosmopolitanism each argue for the primacy of their different 
first principles, but all toward the same end of articulating a cosmopolitan theory.    
 These modern cosmopolitans all reflect a common problem among their theories: 
the absence of ontology for either the cosmos or the polis.  Instead, the theories center on 
universalizing a concept of the individual.  Whether the individual is primarily moral, 
liberal, democratic, critical, or postmodern is the object of contestation, but the heart of 
the theory is the individual.  Once the theory has its universal individual, logic dictates 
global institutions, whether moral or political.  The sentiments and attachments of 
particular individuals and the irrational motivations of groups of particular individuals 
no longer enter into the political calculus.  The ontology of the cosmos is not a part of 
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these cosmopolitanisms.  “What the world is” is left to other disciplines.  When 
addressing the concept of the polis (again, broadly understood as the legitimacy of 
distinct, sovereign communities), modern cosmopolitan theories run into intractable 
problems.  Beginning with the universal individual, contemporary cosmopolitans 
produce a radical re-conceptualization of the polis.  The only legitimate political 
community among separate and distinct individuals is the community of all individuals.  
Logically, any subset of the total population is necessarily secondary to the full set of 
individuals.  Whereas the absence of the cosmos in cosmopolitanism undermines the 
meaning of the term itself, the re-conceptualization of the polis undermines the 
subsequent theories themselves- except in the case of the postmodernists.    
Moral and Capability Cosmopolitanism 
 Martha Nussbaum stands at the forefront of the revival of cosmopolitan theory.  
Beginning with a theory of moral cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum argued for the universal 
value of the human individual and the equal value of every human being.  Early 
articulations of the theory created some intractable problems.  First, Nussbaum could not 
reconcile a theory of universal moral consideration with the fact of unequal human 
sentiments and obligations.  Second, the theory, rooted in Stoic and Kantian philosophy, 
could not maintain essential teleological, theological, and cosmological elements of 
those philosophies.  Working with common purpose, Nussbaum and Amartya Sen 
rethought moral cosmopolitanism, and founded it anew as a theory of human capability 
and freedom.  Moral cosmopolitanism remains beset with problems; prime among which 
is the inability to defend its call to universal and equal moral consideration. 
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 Should an individual give moral priority to a limited group of persons or to all 
people equally?  Moral cosmopolitanism argues for the latter, and Nussbaum (1996) 
argues for moral cosmopolitanism.  Invoking the memory of Diogenes of Sinope, 
Nussbaum argues that people should consider the whole world their home, not any 
particular and limited patch of land.  Accordingly, country, tribe, ethnicity, and other 
“accidents of birth” should not affect moral considerations.  On the contrary, Nussbaum 
(1996, 7) contends that “we should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its 
fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.”  
The moral capacity to treat all people as equals and overcome the widespread preference 
for local favoritism does not come easily. 
 Nussbaum (1997a), in Cultivating Humanity, proposes a course in cosmopolitan 
education to inculcate her moral universalism.  In a complex, interdependent, and plural 
world, the prevailing morality of local preferences is not sufficient to maintain peaceful 
coexistence between peoples.  Nussbaum’s educational program cultivates humanity by 
liberating the mind from the strictures of habit and custom.  It creates a disciplined and 
rigorous faculty of reason within the individual to question the irrational or limited 
maxims of traditionalism.  Based on classical philosophy, and broadly incorporating the 
Stoic tradition from Socrates and Diogenes through Marcus Aurelius, the cultivation of 
humanity looks to break free of postmodern relativism without enshrining a particular 
truth (1997a, 38-40).  Yet, these historical foundations are problematic, and demonstrate 
the fundamental weakness of Nussbaum’s project of moral cosmopolitanism. 
 Nussbaum (1996, 6; 1997a, 52) often includes Diogenes’ famous saying, “I am a 
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citizen of the world,” as a concise expression of the cosmopolitan attitude.7  Herodotus, 
Plato, and Aristotle may have begun cross-cultural studies, but Diogenes began 
cosmopolitanism and the Stoics developed his philosophy in the following centuries 
(Nussbaum 1997a, 53-58).  Nussbaum recalls Diogenes, Seneca, Cicero, and Marcus 
Aurelius from the pages of history to testify in defense of cosmopolitan morality.  
However, the testimony of these witnesses is incomplete, as certain aspects of their 
philosophy, including immaterialism, the defense of slavery, and indifference to 
suffering, cannot be taken seriously in the modern consciousness (Nussbaum 1997b). 
Problems arise as Nussbaum rejects these Stoic beliefs while reaffirming others, i.e. 
universal moral concern.  The concept of reason in Stoic philosophy is central to this 
selection process.  Stoic Reason, in the capitalized sense, is a connection to the divine.  
Reason is how the mere mortals who comprise humanity can reach the point of divine 
order and come to understand and accept their place in the universe (Hill 2000; Lu 
2000).  This facility of Reason leads individuals to be indifferent to material suffering, 
because the material world is ultimately not important.  And for Nussbaum (1997b, 17), 
this faculty of reason is philosophically untenable.  When discussing Kant’s debt to the 
Stoics, or such prominent Stoics as Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero, Nussbaum 
recognizes they relate their concept of reason to an understanding of divinity.  When 
Nussbaum rejects such a relationship, calling it indefensible in modern discourse, she 
removes the cornerstone of their philosophy.8 
                                                          
7
 Diogenes of Sinope famously coined the term, cosmopolitan, as recorded in Diogenes Laertius (1950, 
65). 
8
 Hill (2000) and Lu (2000) argue this point at length.  Nussbaum (2000; 1997b) is cognizant of this 
problem, but does not reply to it at length. 
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 Critics of Nussbaum’s moral cosmopolitanism have pointed out the tenuous 
validity of its historical heritage (Berges 2005).  Nussbaum favors the Stoic conclusion 
of universal moral concern, but not the Stoic cosmology and theology that justify the 
interrelationship of reason, order, and divinity.  Critical of Nussbaum, Sandrine Berges 
points out that her defense of reason as a common human faculty and the basis of 
morality (and thus morality should be as common as reason) fails specifically because 
the proposition is only a fragment of Stoicism.  In Stoic philosophy, reason and morality 
are intricate human faculties that connect the individual to the order of the cosmos and 
the divine.  Without their cosmology and theology, the common human faculty of reason 
does not entail necessarily a universal moral concern.  As Berges (2005, 7) succinctly 
notes, “After all, we do not expect that all cats should live peacefully in a big 
brotherhood of cats, even though they are all cats.”  Without Stoic cosmology and 
theology, reason is just another common human faculty, and is no more a defense for 
universal morality than any other common human faculty. 
 Moral cosmopolitanism is a theory that hopes to resolve the differences of a 
plural world in a reasonable manner.  Moral cosmopolitanism connects its contemporary 
cause to the ancient Stoics, but without adopting the Stoic conception of reason or its 
cosmology.  The absence of a transcendent faculty of reason creates problems for moral 
cosmopolitanism that have not gone unnoticed by Nussbaum and her detractors (Pogge 
2002a; Scheffler 1999).  Under scrutiny, moral cosmopolitanism divides into strong and 
weak forms.  Ultimately, it cannot assert a universal moral imperative, and concludes 
with a moral platitude.  Strong cosmopolitanism, the preferred theory of Nussbaum 
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(1997a, 9), dictates “the ideal of a citizen whose primary loyalty is to human beings the 
world over, and whose national, local, and varied groups loyalties are considered 
distinctly secondary.”  Weak cosmopolitanism, regrettably admitted by Nussbaum 
(1997a, 9) as the more admissible, “allows a variety of different views about what our 
priorities should be.”  Nussbaum (1997a, 9) defends a weak cosmopolitanism that 
recognizes “the worth of human life wherever it occurs” and compels individuals “to see 
[themselves] as bound by common human abilities and problems” despite the distances 
between them.  Nussbaum remains torn between these versions of cosmopolitanism.  
Strong cosmopolitanism apparently rests on an impossible foundation, and in reality is 
impracticable, and even somewhat repellent.9  The problem with weak cosmopolitanism 
is that it succumbs to platitude and subjective preference (yes, all people deserve moral 
concern, but my people, family, and friends deserve more in this case).  As much as 
Nussbaum wants to champion strong cosmopolitanism, she simply cannot defend it. 
 Strong cosmopolitanism denies the reality of everyday human life, that most 
individuals have families, friends, and neighbors who need attention and demand priority 
action.  The problems of people hundreds of miles away, much less across continents, 
are beyond the scope of their moral concern and action.  But the problem of weak 
cosmopolitanism is that its moral imperatives likely will collapse when they are put to 
the test.  When weighing the merits of action, local concern will count more for a 
number of reasons, not the least being that local reasons are more understandable, closer 
to self-interest, and closer to reasons of family, friends, and community.  Nussbaum 
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 Particularly troublesome is the implication that one is equally responsible for raising the children of 
others (Nussbaum 1997a, 8).   
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accepts the central criticism of strong moral cosmopolitanism, the implausibility of 
universal and equal moral concern, yet still tries to massage weak cosmopolitanism into 
its strong form.  The project of Cultivating Humanity is to teach people “to see 
themselves not simply as citizens of some local region or group, but also, and above all, 
as human beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern” 
(Nussbaum 1997a, 10).  Moral cosmopolitanism becomes confused as Nussbaum rejects 
the foundation of strong cosmopolitanism and acknowledges the need for a less 
universal morality, yet still pursues a moral universalism.  A prime example of this 
confusion is the anecdotal example of Anna the cosmopolitan. 
 As the exemplar of moral cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum (1997a, 50-52) describes 
the character of Anna.  An American businesswoman working in Beijing, Anna must 
learn the cultures of the various people with whom she works, primarily Americans and 
Chinese, as well as international business law and norms.  A problem arises when Anna 
adopts an orphaned girl in Beijing, as Anna’s American ideas about raising an infant are 
vastly different from the infant’s Chinese nurse.  Anna’s mother even enters the scene 
offering to raise the child herself.  Here Nussbaum (1997a, 52) explains that the goal of 
the educational plan of Cultivating Humanity, and of moral cosmopolitanism, is to create 
a certain individual like the fictional Anna:   
[The] sensitive cross-cultural interpreter, [who] is able to negotiate between 
mother and nurse and devise some plan for the baby’s development that is 
agreeable to all.  To do this (Anna) has to think hard about the nonuniversality 
and nonnaturalness of such small matters as playing with a baby.  But (Anna) has 
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also had to think of the common needs and aims that link her with the nurse, and 
the nurse with her own mother.  
The problem is that no negotiation between these positions is apparent or necessarily 
natural.  The rearing of infants is an important task to those who undertaking the venture, 
and yet Nussbaum dismisses a fundamental disagreement on the task between the two 
cultures.  The suggested solution is to call these differences trivial, or “nonuniversal and 
nonnatural,” and focus on the common needs between the agents.  This situation 
exemplifies how weak cosmopolitanism ends in platitude- to find what is common and 
compromise over what is different.  But if the nurse has good reasons for her child-
rearing practices, and the adoptive mother good reasons for hers, then how exactly are 
they to compromise?  Nussbaum does not suggest an appeal to science, which may at 
least draw reliable conclusions about the effects of each practice on the infant’s 
development.  The appeal is simply to compromise, which is all that moral 
cosmopolitanism can do absent a faculty of reason that can appeal to universals and thus 
resolve such differences of custom.  But why compromise if you are right? 
The problems of moral cosmopolitanism have not escaped attention, and 
Nussbaum has worked with Amartya Sen to develop a revised theory of 
cosmopolitanism that secures an individual’s freedom to fulfill common human 
capacities.  Each thinker has brought a complementary approach to the project.  
Nussbaum (2006) focuses on conceptually clarifying what the common human 
capacities are and why everyone has a right fulfill them.  Sen (1999) has provided 
economic reasons why this cosmopolitanism is both morally just and materially 
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productive.  Nussbaum and Sen’s work creates a cosmopolitan capability theory that 
argues a central point: everyone should have the intellectual freedom and material 
capital to develop their natural and common human capabilities.  Ultimately, the theory 
endorses a certain kind of human life, a long one of peaceful appetite satisfaction.  It is 
the opposite of immaterial and meditative Stoicism. 
 Sen’s work, Development as Freedom, puts forth a philosophy of free market 
economics that targets for reform the “unfreedoms” constraining rational choice and the 
free interaction of people.  Freedom is indeed the central concept, both the end and the 
means of the argument.  The individual must have freedom to produce and trade, and the 
free exchange of production is the goal.  Nussbaum adds in Frontiers of Justice an 
exposition of the concept of capability.  Every individual has a set of capabilities, and 
the goal of a just system of production and distribution is to provide each individual with 
at least a minimal level of access to the resources necessary to fulfill their capabilities.  
Nussbaum and Sen have worked to organize a cosmopolitan theory against the 
prevailing economic priorities of GDP growth or utilitarian distribution, and also against 
the prevailing theories of cultural relativism.   
Despite efforts to shore up moral cosmopolitanism into the capability theory, the 
work of Nussbaum and Sen has not escaped criticism, even from within the liberal 
camp.10  The main criticism is that neither Sen nor Nussbaum fully explain the 
universalism that underlies their cosmopolitanism (Cameron 2006, Chhachhi 2006).  In 
Cameron’s (2006 1274-1275) surmise, Sen suggests only a “hesitant relativism” of 
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 See especially Pogge’s (2002b) critique of the “Capability Approach,” the fusion of Nussbaum’s moral 
theory with Sen’s economic thought. 
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production, meaning everyone should be free to produce and everything produced in 
freedom is good, and Nussbaum offers a “hesitant universalism” of capabilities, that 
some capabilities are so common they are the criteria of universal species membership.  
Neither of these positions defends a strong and clear universalism, but constitutes a 
western, pragmatic, and materialistic approach to cosmopolitanism. 
Liberal Cosmopolitanism 
 The moral cosmopolitanism of Nussbaum and Sen is broadly liberal, and some of 
its harshest critics are the fellow liberals constructing alternative theories of 
cosmopolitanism.  Whether calling it liberal cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan liberalism, 
or global liberalism, a group of post-Rawlsians have sought to transcend Rawls’s own 
liberal internationalism, developed in The Law of Peoples, to create a just distribution of 
resources within and across state borders.  After showing the need for a global system of 
justice, liberal cosmopolitanism constructs the institutional arrangements to secure fair 
resource access and political opportunity for all individuals regardless of national 
location.   
 Charles Beitz (1979) forged an early and prominent argument in favor of 
expanding liberalism from a national and international theory into a cosmopolitan one.  
With a Rawlsian background, Beitz reflected on the phenomenon of globalization and 
argued against a key assumption of Rawls’s (1996, 12; 1999, 4) own theory of 
liberalism: “Let us assume […] that a society is a more or less self-sufficient association 
of persons.”  Beitz (1983, 595) contends that in our modern world economy:  
The membership of the original position should be global rather than 
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national because national societies are not, in fact, self-sufficient: the 
system of global trade and investment, organized within a structure of 
international institutions and conventions constitute a scheme of social 
cooperation in Rawls’s sense.    
Rawls’s assumption that members of a society form a self-sufficient unit is no longer 
tenable given the interdependence of modern state economies.  Thus, given the reality of 
globalization, it is not fair and therefore not just for exclusive groups to claim the 
resources of a proscribed territory.  In short, the principles of liberalism supersede the 
boundaries of the state.  
Not long after Charles Beitz began his liberal reformation, another Rawlsian, 
Thomas Pogge, sought to revise the moral and institutional obligations of liberalism by 
expanding their saliency from national boundaries to the entire human race.  Proclaiming 
a theory of cosmopolitanism generated from liberalism, Pogge (1992) set forth three core 
principles to guide his creation.  Individualism, the first principle, proposes that familial, 
tribal, ethnic, religious, national, and state affiliations must factor beneath individuals in 
moral decision-making.  In short, “the ultimate units of concern are human beings or 
persons” (Pogge 1992, 48).  Universality, the second principle, dictates that every human 
being merits equal moral consideration.  The third and final principle, generality, calls 
for each individual to recognize all other individuals as ultimate units of concern (Pogge 
1992).  With three brief principles, Pogge framed a grand theory of liberal 
cosmopolitanism.  
Along with delineating the principles of liberal cosmopolitanism, Pogge argued 
  
22 
for institutional changes to the international system of governance.  In defense of 
Rawls’s own principles of justice, Pogge (1994, 196) contended that Rawls’s theory of 
international liberalism crafted in The Law of Peoples fails in three ways:   
It fails to give members of different peoples roughly equal chances to 
influence the transnational political decisions that shape their lives; it fails 
to give equally talented and motivated persons roughly equal chances to 
obtain a good education and professional position irrespective of the 
society into which they were born; and it also generates international 
social and economic inequalities that are not to the maximum benefit of 
the world’s worse-off persons.      
Pogge (1992, 197) criticizes Rawls for employing the vague concept of “a people,” 
arguing it is not “clear enough and significant enough in the human world to play the 
conceptual role and to have the moral significance that Rawls assigns to it.”  Beitz and 
Pogge have argued that liberalism faces a choice between truly raising its universal 
principles, which cannot take into moral account the concept of peoples, or maintaining 
a notion of communitarian self-sufficiency and local priority.  Whereas Rawls worked to 
ameliorate the liberal-communitarian divide, Beitz and Pogge began to set the standards 
for liberal cosmopolitanism.  The reality of globalization undermining Rawls’s self-
sufficiency assumption, the three core principles, and the need for institutional reform to 
entrench and enforce the three principles endures in scholarship on global liberalism. 
 Beitz (2005; 1999b; 1999a) and Pogge (2005a; 2005b; 2002a; 2002b; 2001) have 
worked diligently to advance liberal cosmopolitanism, but have not been reiterating their 
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defense of global distributive justice in isolation.  Works on liberal cosmopolitanism 
have multiplied, but the central principles of the theory have not changed (Hayden 2005; 
Heater 2002; Moellendorf 2002; Anderson-Gold 2001; Carter 2001; Gowan 2000; Kuper 
2000).  In these works, liberal theorists declare that the reality of global economic 
interdependence invalidates Rawls’s Law of Peoples and that the core principles of 
liberalism, individuality, universality, and generality, apply to all persons regardless of 
group affiliation.   
Two problems remain prominent and unresolved in the literature.  First, liberal 
cosmopolitans dispute the saliency and legitimacy of group identities, complicating 
plans for global governance.  Some liberals (Kymlicka 1995; Miller 1995; Tamir 1993) 
have argued that group identities are legitimate elements of human life and must be 
factored into moral and political reasoning.  By accepting the legitimacy of group 
identity, liberal cosmopolitans must reconcile it with the principle of individualism (Tan 
2004; 2002; Miller 1998).  Unfortunately, attempts at reconciliation are not satisfactory, 
and have talked past the issue more than resolved it.  For example, Tan re-conceptualizes 
group identities to avoid their communitarian implications, in effect massaging the 
intractable concepts of national and cultural identity into forms of civic patriotism.  But 
that civic patriotism cannot be the raising of something local over the greater whole.  
Calling civic patriotism “liberal nationalism,” these group identities no longer threaten 
cosmopolitan institutions.  Simply put, liberal cosmopolitanism cannot take group 
membership as morally or institutionally salient without violating the individualism at its 
core; it either denies the importance of group identities or massages them into 
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manageable liberal concepts. 
 Liberal cosmopolitanism is a theory of global individualism; it takes its well-
established concept of the universal individual and expands it across the globe.  Indeed, 
global liberalism is confident in its concept of the human individual and the individual’s 
rationality; thus, the problems of cross-cultural interaction or incommensurable reasons 
ought not to register within liberal thinking.  Rather, the main problem is how to expand 
liberal institutions across the globe, and most writing deals with various plans to that 
effect.  Global liberalism follows Rawls by using the logic of rational choice to scrub 
problematic interactions out of the human experience.  Every individual is 
fundamentally a selfish individual actor and can reach a rational accommodation with 
every other rational actor given enough information and mutually agreeable rules to the 
game (fortuitously provided through the veil of ignorance device).  The 
“cosmopolitanism” of liberal cosmopolitanism becomes a synonym for globalism; the 
theory devises a system of political liberalism for the total set of individuals in the 
world. 
Democratic Cosmopolitanism 
 The main architects of cosmopolitan democracy are Daniele Archibugi and 
David Held.  These two authors and others have sought to expand the political principles 
of the western, liberal-democratic tradition across the globe, but especially focusing on 
the value of democracy.  They argue the process of globalization is creating both a 
global community and global problems, both of which provide reasons to construct a 
global parliament.  The cosmopolitan theory faces widespread criticism, both of a 
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practical and theoretical nature.  Still, democratic cosmopolitanism prioritizes the 
enduring principle of democracy, which other cosmopolitanisms neglect.   
 Archibugi (2002) has argued that two ancient concepts, demos and cosmopolis, 
are colliding in our times.  Demos, or democracy, “is the power of the many and, 
internally, the rule of the majority” (Archibugi 2002, 24).  It is a pragmatic ruling 
principle more than an abstract concept, and can work only where the demos is a close-
knit community.  Cosmopolis, or cosmopolitanism, has been an abstract and rare ideal, 
usually reserved for the travelers and intellectuals who learn of “lands, cities, and people 
outside their own native communities” (Archibugi 2002, 24).  Historically, the two 
concepts have represented opposite political leanings, but Archibugi argues that 
globalization has brought these two concepts together.  Western democracies, the drivers 
of globalization, have been introducing democracy, with varying degrees of success, all 
around the world in the course of opening a global market that interconnects national 
economies and undermines the sovereignty of the traditional state.  Archibugi (2002, 28) 
writes, “The project of cosmopolitan democracy can thus be expressed very simply: it is 
the attempt to reconcile the phenomenon of globalization with the successes of 
democracy.” 
 Much of the argument for cosmopolitan democracy revolves around the 
declining legitimacy of the nation-state and the rise of global political problems.  The 
homogenous nation-state is no longer a reality, if it ever was.  The forces of 
globalization have led to worldwide migrations without any necessary cultural 
assimilation.  States are now so internally diverse and multicultural that Archibugi 
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(2003, 4) questions whether they will be able to meet the needs of their citizens.  As the 
state struggles with the demands of a diverse citizenry, it likewise finds that 
globalization is restricting its ability to act as a sovereign and independent entity.  State 
economies are growing increasingly interdependent and subject to the rules and 
regulations of a global market and international regulatory agencies.  Furthermore, 
globalization is creating problems that do not stop at state borders.  States are finding 
that they cannot fight problems such as environmental pollution and the spread of 
diseases in isolation.  Cosmopolitan democracy recognizes that globalization is creating 
new communities, both smaller and larger than existing states, that necessitate new 
forms of representation and governance.  The traditional nation-state is no longer a 
viable entity for fulfilling the ideals of the Enlightenment or for addressing the problems 
of a global community. 
 In league with Archibugi, David Held (2005) has written of cosmopolitan 
democracy’s historical legacy and modern principles.  Cosmopolitan democracy owes a 
debt to both Stoic and Enlightenment thought, the former for substituting the concept of 
cosmos for polis as the ultimate sphere of obligation and the latter for emphasizing the 
concept of the weltburger, or world citizen.  In these traditions, Held has explicated a 
number of principles for cosmopolitan democracy, including equal and individual moral 
worth, active agency, and the right to vote.  Held (2005, 16) admits that in a diverse 
world, we cannot expect consensus on every issue, but he argues these principles reflect 
the desire to solidify “the moral status of persons, the conditions of agency, and [the 
methods of] collective decision-making.”  Prior to these principles, Held (2005, 16) 
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assumes people desire “ground rules for communication, dialogue, and dispute 
settlement […] precisely because all people are of equal moral value and their views on 
a range of moral-political values will conflict.”  Furthermore, “the aim of modern 
cosmopolitanism is the conceptualization and generation of the necessary background 
conditions” to actualize its own principles (2005, 16).  Here the argument becomes 
circular: cosmopolitan democracy puts forth its functional principles assuming the 
background conditions necessary for those principles to flourish previously exist, so that 
the principles will create the background conditions necessary to support the functioning 
of the principles (Scheuerman 2002).  Cleary, something is awry in this logic.   
The arguments for cosmopolitan democracy raise a number of questions.  If the 
background conditions necessary for the functioning of the principles are absent, must 
the principles be kept in force to effect a change in background conditions?  A specter of 
authoritarianism lurks here: who is to keep these unpopular principles in force?  How 
can this be democratic?  If the background conditions are present, then what prevents the 
adoption of the principles?  Presumably some authoritarian force must be overcome.  
Are the background conditions absent, is something preventing the principles from 
becoming law, or are the principles simply not popular?  Again, something is awry.         
The recurring problem of cosmopolitanism rears its head here, in that the 
universal principles of cosmopolitanism clash with the diversity of values across 
cultures.  The background conditions of cosmopolitan democracy, if evident, are not 
dominant.  Individuals often assert the superiority of their own cultural values, whether 
ignorant or knowledgeable of other value systems.  Held confronts this problem of 
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strong/weak cosmopolitanism, but not with resounding success.  He (2005, 18) “affirms 
principles which are universal in their scope,” but clarifies “that the precise meaning of 
these is always fleshed out in situated discussions.”  This position leaves ample space for 
people with differing values to reach accord through constructive dialogue, and it leaves 
an equal space for people to manipulate universal principles for the service of their local 
values.  Though Held favors the former, he cannot explain fully how to avoid the latter. 
Beyond the troubles of strong/weak cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan democracy 
seems beset with additional criticism of a practical nature.  Cosmopolitan democracy 
points to the success of state and local democratic governments as evidence that 
democracy should be implemented for the global community.  Geoffrey Hawthorn 
(2003) has criticized this position as naïve, arguing that local and state democracy is not 
such an obvious success story.  Cosmopolitan democrats have attacked the legitimacy of 
the state and international system, but do not seem to consider the full implications of 
this approach, for the destruction of state sovereignty also undercuts the legitimacy of 
current international law (Chandler 2003).  Nor has cosmopolitan democracy fully 
considered the potential of the global assembly turning into a global leviathan.  A global 
parliament threatens to become more of a distant government than a representative one, 
and more of an oligarchy than a democracy.  Further, the problems of a global world, 
and the solutions to those problems, threaten to become so complicated that only a 
global technocracy, rather than democratic assembly, can address them (Urbinati 2003, 
Pogge 1997).  The simple critique that all the inhabitants of the globe are too many and 
too diverse to find representation in one assembly carries substantial persuasive force 
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against which the cosmopolitan democrats have not provided equal counter-argument.   
The final problem of cosmopolitan democracy in practice is one of borders, 
constituency, and representation.  If state sovereignty is no longer a legitimate principle 
of organizing a polity, then cosmopolitan democracy undermines the existence of 
borders; however, it still asserts the right of peoples to retain their culture and administer 
their own affairs.  How, then, does democratic cosmopolitanism define a legitimate 
constituency?  After the era of state sovereignty, may any community, however defined, 
become an independent entity?  Should every community, however small, have a 
representative in the global assembly?  This is the problem of constituency: the inability 
to establish a rule for legitimate self-determination.11  Once every community has a right 
to self-rule, how do we apportion representatives in the global assembly?  Does every 
community get a representative, or are people divided into anonymous districts of equal 
population?  The latter recreates global equality, the former communal equality.  Evident 
in cosmopolitan democracy, more so than liberal cosmopolitanism, is the attempt to deal 
with global diversity and the plurality of value systems among peoples.  What is not 
evident is a solution to the problem of diversity in a project of universalism.  The failure 
to elaborate the very universalism that underlies the project is a likely source of the 
problems that plague democratic cosmopolitanism in practice.    
Constitutional Cosmopolitanism 
Another broad approach to cosmopolitan theory is patriotic or constitutional 
cosmopolitanism.  An array of theorists has sought to modernize Kantian cosmopolitan 
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ideals and create a peaceful and global order among peoples.  These theorists offer two 
paths toward reconciling the universal right versus local value problem.  Both paths are 
works in progress. 
 Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006; 1997) has defended the idea that a certain 
cosmopolitan sentiment can reconcile the disputes of values and ideologies between 
cultures.  The proposal is that cosmopolitan patriots may remain attached to a specific 
place or culture, but still respect the cultures of others.  Appiah acknowledges the reality 
that people live in specific cultures and lands, and grow fond of them.  But the true 
patriot knows that cultures are not static things, and will change and develop internally 
and through global interactions.  Cultural travel accustoms an individual to the goodness 
of other cultures, and also reveals the flaws within one’s own culture.  However, 
globalization must be neither a unilateral force nor an assimilating and homogenizing 
thing.  The cosmopolitan sentiment is distinct from and antagonistic to the homogenizing 
force of global liberalism.  Just as individuals in a liberal society will pursue different 
conceptions of the good, societies in a cosmopolitan world must be free to develop their 
own cultural practices and conceptions of the good.  Interventionism must be a cautious 
thing.  Ultimately, the cosmopolitan sentiment rests on acknowledging that all people 
feel a certain pride in their country, simply because it is theirs.  Therefore, all patriots 
can feel a certain respect toward each other, and hopefully this sentiment of 
cosmopolitanism can lead to more peaceful interactions between patriots. 
 Cosmopolitanism as a sentiment of respect between patriots retains weaknesses 
in crucial areas.  First is the general weakness of sentiments as guides to political 
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relationships.  The cosmopolitan sentiment threatens either to dissipate at the first true 
clash of principles or only emerge after a difficult reconciliation of principles.  If the 
cosmopolitan sentiment is essentially a live-and-let-live mentality, it may not endure a 
real conflict between patriotic peoples, or at least it may not prevent the violent 
resolution of a conflict.  The principles at stake may overwhelm the sentiment.12  Other 
the hand, the sentiment may only arise after two sides have worked through the 
difficulties that divide them.  For example, the modern friendship between the United 
States of America and the Great Britain emerged only after a long period of wars, near-
wars, distrust, and finally the desperate alliances of the World Wars.13  A sentiment of 
patriotic cosmopolitanism may exist among many Americans and Britons, but only after 
a long period of conflict.   
A second problem is that the sentiment remains unclear about how cosmopolitans 
are to interact with distinctly non-liberal peoples.  Appiah clearly believes that a liberal 
ought to tolerate the many different ways other liberal individuals and liberal societies 
pursue their conceptions of the good, and rightly so.  However, he does not suggest they 
should tolerate non-liberal ways of living, nor does he suggest how the sentiment of 
cosmopolitanism resolves this problem.  Are non-liberal societies simply off-limits to 
the cosmopolitan traveler?  That way, the cosmopolitan would neither support an 
oppressive society nor risk a violent conflict with its ruling authority.  Does the 
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cosmopolitan attempt to engage the non-liberal society and potentially risk lending 
support to its tyrannical regime?  Might engagement hazard an outbreak of war?  The 
sentiment of cosmopolitanism is problematic because it appears to be an 
epiphenomenon.  Something must lie deeper within it, or else it may dissipate should it 
face a conflict of implacable principles. 
 Another form of cosmopolitan patriotism, better phrased constitutional 
cosmopolitanism, addresses the conflict between peoples while still recognizing a 
people’s legitimate desire to live under a common government formed by their shared 
principles.  Jürgen Habermas (2001a; 2001b; 1998; 1997) has worked to fulfill the 
promise of the Enlightenment, particularly the Kantian legacy of a global peace among 
republican peoples.  Habermas takes seriously the diversity of local customs and 
lifestyles but wants these to reflect the universal values of the Enlightenment.  Rather 
than relying on a sentiment, Habermas argues for the resolution of conflict through 
cultural communication, specifically through the processes of dialogue he has 
championed.  Thus, communicative agreement is how individuals with differing 
conceptions of the good will establish just constitutions amongst themselves and 
likewise how various peoples will reach just accommodations with other peoples.   
 The Habermasian project is an attempt to attune distinct groups, meaning 
communities in which individuals share a bond in their ways of living, with a greater 
cosmopolitanism.  The goal is that each distinct group will construct a constitution that 
embraces the particulars of their patriotic community but also will reflect the universal 
values of the Enlightenment found in dialogue with others (Fine and Smith 2003).  This 
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project is just that- a work in progress.  Some (Bellmay and Castiglione 2004) have 
criticized the project as mere justificatory tool for supranational institutions (the 
European Union) as they replace sovereign states.  The criticism is true superficially, as 
the project looks to replace both the sovereignty of states and class conflict with a 
politics of rational and consensual constitutionalism (Fine 2003).  The project works 
toward the broader end of a union of constitutional republics and cosmopolitan peace, 
not merely the E. U.    
One criticism of constitutional cosmopolitanism strikes at the heart of the 
Enlightenment project itself.  Some (Rosenfeld 2007) have pointed out that the 
emergence of global terrorism presents a challenge to communicative ethics, in that 
communication may not be possible with those who believe in violent forms of 
fundamentalism.  If these violent fundamentalisms are ultimately the manifestations of 
solvable economic injustice, then constitutional cosmopolitanism can overcome them.  
However, if fundamentalists hold their beliefs deeply and regardless of economic 
relations, then reasonably they will set out to eradicate non-fundamentalist individuals 
and societies, and communicative discourse will have found the limits to its no longer 
universal values.  Constitutional cosmopolitans will be forced to acknowledge the limits 
of dialogue and will be thrust into violent conflict with various fundamentalists.  The 
argument suggests one possible outcome if communicative actions faces a limitation.  
Another group of cosmopolitans follow the denial of universalism with a far different 
cosmopolitan theory.                      
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Postmodern Cosmopolitanism 
Theorists of postmodern cosmopolitanism are a diverse lot who find a few 
common points of intersection.  Primarily, they are critics of universalism.  They reject 
any attempt to expand a particular principle into a universal as they reject the legitimacy 
of any one principle becoming the foundation for a dominant theory.  Taking this 
position, they immediately come into conflict with the aims of the modern 
cosmopolitans.  Many look positively at globalization, seeing in it the potential for 
limitless interaction.  Given the absence of universalism, globalization provides the 
space and opportunity for many competing peoples, principles, and ways of living to 
interact with each other.  Globalization is not necessarily all positive, however.  
Postmodern cosmopolitanism contends that the threat of globalization is that one 
particular entity will dominate others or that the espousers of universalism will not cede 
their claims.  Absent these threats, one will not be able to avoid interaction with the 
other in the global world.  This inescapable interaction will lead to hybridization of 
forms and fluidity of principles, expanding the possible methods and modes of life.  In a 
way, postmodern cosmopolitanism is the antithesis of the previously discussed 
Enlightenment cosmopolitanisms.  It holds no underlying universal (reason) and does 
not seek to put forth a single principle (morality, justice, democracy, communicative 
action) as superior to others.  Postmodern cosmopolitanism accepts and facilitates the 
flux of identities, values, and principles. 
Critiques of the West’s pursuit of universalism abound in postmodern 
cosmopolitanism.  As expressed by Pollock et al. (2000, 582), “The cosmopolitanism of 
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our times does not spring from the capitalized ‘virtues’ of Rationality, Universality, and 
Progress; nor is it embodied in the myth of the nation writ large in the figure of the 
citizen of the world.”  Indeed, the postmodern cosmopolitans analyze the idea of 
cosmopolitanism historically to find an absence of continuity to the very theory itself 
(Toulmin 1990)!  Stoics, Kant and Kantians, and religious thinkers have defined 
cosmopolitanism differently to accord with their belief systems.  Secular moderns 
likewise have used the idea of cosmopolitanism with a view to their own beliefs and 
purposes.  If we are to have a cosmopolitanism, the postmodernists argue, it cannot be 
the simple assertion of one particular cultural value as a universal principle to determine 
the political organization of all peoples.  Indeed, the postmodern cosmopolitans have 
argued against the (primarily western) imperialism that masquerades as universal values 
and cosmopolitanism (Woodiwiss 2002).  To find principles that approach universality, 
western individuals must engage in creative synergy with non-western ideas; universal 
principles will not be an indigenous discovery (Featherstone 2002).     
Postmodern cosmopolitans do not pursue such a universal; regardless, they do 
argue for cultural interaction and engagement.  Globalization has thrown different 
cultures together, often forcing interaction between the strangest of strangers.  
Postmodern cosmopolitanism embraces this climate of interaction (Giri 2006; Stevenson 
2003; 2002; Mehta 2000).  The coming together of different peoples compels an 
individual toward a self-critical reflection that breaks down the presupposition 
(unconscious or not) that one’s values and principles are universal, true, and good.  This 
reflection, along with the experience of other ways of living, leads an individual to adopt 
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a fluid conception of principles and discard the inflexible dogmas of particular cultures.  
Furthermore, as these cosmopolitan individuals continue to travel and learn of new ways 
of living, their fluid principles are apt to hybridize after encounters with the new 
principles of the “Other.”  Globalization fosters this type of cosmopolitanism (a world of 
interaction, fluidity, and hybridization that create new ways of living) provided that no 
one entity comes to dominate (Pieterse 2006; Brennan 1997).  In fact, before the modern 
era of globalization, frontier lands, the geographic areas in which no sovereign 
government could restrain or mold behavior, provided an example of this.  In the 
frontier, individuals from different cultures learned from their interactions and often 
hybridized their values; however, they did come into violent conflict, which state 
governments exacerbated when they came to assert hegemony and sovereignty (Tomasi 
2003).  In short, postmodern cosmopolitanism advocates for a process of globalization 
undirected by hegemonic, global institutions or universal principles of political 
organization.  Such an open phenomenon will allow individuals to become self-critical, 
to learn from others, and to create infinite ways of living.   
The History of Cosmopolitanism 
No one yet has written a comprehensive history of cosmopolitan thought, nor is 
my intention to write it here.  For the purposes of this project, to show that contemporary 
cosmopolitan thought is disconnected from classical cosmopolitanism in its concepts of 
cosmos and polis will suffice.  A few historical accounts of cosmopolitanism do exist, 
mainly focusing on the Enlightenment and ancient Greece (Schlereth 1977; Baldry 1965; 
Hadas 1943; Harris 1927).  Rarely do these include Plato as a cosmopolitan thinker, and 
  
37 
when included, Plato is of marginal importance. Contemporary cosmopolitanism begins 
with a concept of the individual, abstract and universal, and builds its global political 
order from that concept.  The variants of contemporary cosmopolitanism connect only 
partially and tenuously with historical antecedents.  The cosmos, regardless of its own 
order or disorder, is not a factor in these theories.  Platonic cosmopolitanism is the direct 
opposite.  It begins with the search for what the cosmos is, and whether it can provide a 
source of order and stability for political thought.  Depending on the ontology of the 
cosmos, one may be able to construct a political constitution, and thus align the “polis” 
to the “cosmos,” completing a truly cosmopolitan theory.  The heart of my project is to 
show that Plato’s political philosophy is the attempt to ground a political order within 
the structure of a greater cosmic order.  Plato’s cosmopolitanism is one that first searches 
for order in the world, the cosmos, and then accordingly designs the polis.  
 Moral cosmopolitanism presents itself as the most historically grounded of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism’s branch, finding a place in the broad traditions of 
Stoicism and Cynicism, as well as Kant and the Enlightenment.  However, historical 
studies (Kleingeld 1999; Moles 1996) show the lack of congruence of contemporary 
moral cosmopolitanism with its forebears, specifically with the concept of Reason.  
Among Stoics, Cynics, and German Enlightenment philosophers, criticism of the polis 
did not imply that true political membership is rightly global or universal.  They often 
suggested that truly moral behavior is universal and stems from the natural world, the 
cosmos.  The Greek idea of the cosmos is not equivalent to the modern and non-
normative terms “universe, world, or globe.”  For Stoics and Cynics, the cosmos was the 
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container of all things, animate and non-animate, divine and mortal.  Human beings, 
with their peculiar faculty of reason, had the ability to understand the ordering of all 
things in the cosmos, and thus found themselves with a special place within that order 
(Hadas 1943).  Just reading Hadas’s brief account shows how distant moral 
cosmopolitanism is from its historical antecedents. 
 Greek cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and Cynics was a rejection of the primacy 
of the polis.  Regardless of whether the polis claimed divine or conventional origin for 
its laws, Cynics and Stoics challenged it, and found the source of human obligation in 
the broader- in fact the all inclusive- cosmos.  Individual poleis were not set against one 
another by gods or nature, but all individuals were set beside one another possessed of 
the same natural affections under the same cosmic order.  Contemporary 
cosmopolitanism has little, if anything, to say about the cosmic order.  The cosmopolitan 
interrelationship of all human individuals is something to accomplish because it is the 
end some humans have chosen, not because it is something inherent in the cosmos.  The 
structure of the cosmos is a subject for other disciplines, and their discoveries neither 
have necessarily influenced the choice of ends for human beings nor contemporary 
cosmopolitanism’s concept of an end itself.   
But the Stoics and Cynics were not the only cosmopolitans in ancient Greece.  
The center of my argument is that Plato is a cosmopolitan thinker sufficiently different 
from his own contemporaries, and far different from the cosmopolitans of the present 
age.  From the cosmos to the polis, Plato seeks to understand what philosophy is, how 
one comes to know, and how that knowledge informs the constitution of the polis.       
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CHAPTER III  
ANCIENT GREEK COSMOPOLITANISM 
Ancient Cosmopolitanism 
 Diogenes of Sinope is both the founder of Cynicism and of cosmopolitanism; at 
least Diogenes Laertius attributes to him the founding phrase of cosmopolitanism.14  
However, cosmopolitanism has deeper and broader roots than Diogenes the dog-like.  In 
the epic poetry of Homer, humanity faces the common fate of death.  Mortality unites all 
human beings.  Homer therefore contributes an early understanding of the universality of 
the human condition.  In the pre-Socratic era, Pythagoreanism and Orphism reshaped the 
Greek understandings of the soul, nature, and the divine.  Together, Pythagoreanism and 
Orphism developed the concept of the soul from the Homeric shade to the immortal 
psychē.  Nature and the divine were understood as patterned and guided by intelligence.  
Local variations in the grander order of nature were less significant than the general 
laws.  Also in the 6th and 5th centuries, the conventional laws of the city, the constitution 
or nomos, fell under criticism from sophists, rhetors, and statesmen. After Socrates and 
Plato, cosmopolitanism explicitly took form in two schools of Greek philosophy, 
Cynicism and Stoicism.   
Again, no one has written a comprehensive history of cosmopolitan thought, but 
a few scholars have written accounts the main moments of cosmopolitan thought, 
including Enlightenment Europe and ancient Greece.15  This chapter will illuminate the 
different ways the ancient Greeks approached the ideas of universal humanity and the 
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 See note 4. 
15
 On Greek cosmopolitanism, see Baldry (1965), Hadas (1943), and Harris (1927); on Enlightenment 
cosmopolitanism, see Kleingeld (1999) and Schlereth (1977).  
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ordered, natural world before bringing the two together into a philosophy of 
cosmopolitanism.  Important to note is that the finished products of Stoic and Cynic 
cosmopolitanism differ greatly from the political philosophy of Plato.  Generally, 
Stoicism views all humanity as existing under the common, but hierarchical, order of 
reason.  Stoic cosmopolitanism includes three varieties of human association, all of 
which ultimately reject the Greek polis.  Cynics tend to reject all forms of limited 
political association and conventional laws as well, and are less inclined to establish a 
new political association in place of the old.  Cynicism embraces a simple, ascetic life of 
reason and nature; it is fundamentally anti-political.  Neither Stoic nor Cynic 
cosmopolitanism attempts to found a Greek polis, a limited political association of 
differently-skilled individuals, in harmony with the greater laws of the cosmos. 
The Universal Order in Homer 
 In an underappreciated article, Hugh Harris (1927) searched for the roots of 
cosmopolitan thinking long before Diogenes the Cynic, the Stoics of ancient Greece, or 
Alexander the Great.  He found four separate roots of what would grow into 
cosmopolitanism: the poetry of Homer, the religious faith of Orphism and 
Pythagoreanism, the natural philosophy of the pre-Socratics, and the historical inquiries 
of Herodotus.  The short article is a fount of research into cosmopolitanism.  Indeed, one 
can find in Homer a certain poetic cosmopolitanism, but not a rational or divinely 
ordered one.  Homer’s epic poetry imagines a world of conflict, among both the gods 
and human societies.  Still, Homer sees that human beings share a certain end regardless 
of national origin.  No matter one’s polis, no matter one’s place in the polis, everyone 
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shares the fate of mortality.  Whether Trojan or Greek, man or woman, Homer identifies 
all human beings as mortals, and thus introduces a crucial aspect of cosmopolitan 
thinking: the universality of the human condition. 
 That an epic poem displays a cosmopolitan flair should not be a huge surprise.  
Epic poetry, such as Homer’s Iliad, is a work of imagination.  It recalls a mythic event 
from a distant time and among distant peoples.  Portraying these distant peoples requires 
the use of “imaginative fancy.”  Homer’s epic poetry (and epic poetry as a form of 
historical mythology) “enabled its followers to look away from their native heath to the 
horizon beyond” (Harris 1927, 2).  The reader finds a parade of peoples in the Iliad, and 
Homer by no means paints them negatively, nor even as inscrutable “others.”  
Ethiopians, Phaeacians, and the Abii of the North all pass through Homer’s account.  
Readers of the Iliad may find Homer’s sympathies, and their own, fall to the Prince of 
Troy, Hector, more than the hero of Greece, Achilles (Harris 1927, 3).  Whatever 
particularities he notes among the physical appearance, land of origin, or special fame of 
peoples, Homer dispenses universal human qualities and virtues (justness, 
blamelessness) without prejudice.   
Encountering many different peoples, the essential nature of humanity is 
common to all its members.  The Homeric world is not one of Greek versus barbarian, 
but of all peoples in the greater Mediterranean world existing under the rule of the 
Olympian deities (Voegelin 1953).  Of course, that rule is in a state of disorder and war, 
but the conflict of the Iliad is a war among the divinities as much as a conflict among 
peoples.  Achaeans and Trojans war on the earth as Zeus and Hera battle in the heavens.  
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Indeed, the gods use Greeks and Trojans as proxies for their infighting.  The world is in 
a state of disorder, from the gods’ civil war, to Paris and Helen’s egregious breach of 
custom and tradition, through Achilles otherworldly rage (Vogelin 1953, 494).  Reason 
cannot bring to heel the enormous power of desire among humanity and the gods 
themselves. 
Homer’s epic poetry is only a beginning to cosmopolitan thinking.  It perceives 
that the world exists as one order, but that state is disordered in the poetry.  Homer lacks 
theology and cosmology; indeed, he lacks logos.  Neither the divine nor the mortal world 
is ruled by reason or logic; logos is only one motivation among others in the workings of 
the divine and the human realms.  Homer’s world is one of miracles and passions that 
subdue rationalism.  Homer is fundamentally “pre-Greek;” his concepts are prior to the 
discovery of the intellect, the rational mind (Snell 1960, 1-22).  However, lacking a 
universal understanding of logos, Homer does not lack a universal essence of humanity.  
For all the complexities of Homeric psychology, “one thing is really certain about 
Homeric man: that he must die” (Vogelin 1953, 515).  Human beings are mortal 
(thnētos).  Each and all share in the fate of death.  One of the overarching themes in the 
Iliad is the confrontation with mortality and the attempts to secure a measure of 
immortality.  Achilles famously seeks immortality in remembrance.  His heroic deeds 
will be so great, future generations will recall them forever.  Hector faces mortality 
differently.  He risks his own death to protect the life of his son and wife.  Hector seeks 
immortality in procreation.  Sadly, his efforts fail, but like Achilles, his deeds remain in 
memorial. 
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 Combining Homer’s humane portrayal of characters across the different sides of 
combat with his conception of the human being as mortal, the reader is lead to a proto-
cosmopolitan sentiment.  As much as the reader understands that Achilles is the hero of 
the tale, the sorrowful end of Hector is not cheered.  The subsequent appeal by the 
supplicant King Priam to Achilles for the body of his slain and mutilated son only 
deepens the reader’s understanding that the story is not one of Greek heroes against 
barbarians, but a tale of the human struggle against the common fate of death. 
Harris (1927) argues that Homer instilled a cosmopolitan flair to Greek poetry 
that would flourish in time.  Poetry as a medium of communication activates the 
imagination of people and wisps their thoughts from their locality to distant places.  
Though not based on scientific studies, philosophical contemplation, or distant travels, 
Homer’s epic poetry vicariously transported the Greeks from their parochial poleis 
across the Mediterranean world.  Describing the lands of Libya, Phoenicia, Italy, and 
beyond, the reader (or listener) of Homer learns of the people in those places and cannot 
help but to imagine their lives.  As Homer tells the tale of a violent war between Greece 
and Troy, his epic treats enemy and ally as equally human.  Indeed, the foreign 
characters of Hector and Priam often appear more heroic and sympathetic than their 
native counterparts of Achilles and Agamemnon.  According to Harris (1927, 3-4), 
Homer established a legacy in poetry (continued, for example, in Euripides’ Trojan 
Women and Andromache or Plato’s Ion) of humanizing distant, foreign peoples.  Poetry 
so often plays upon the imaginative soul, and Homer treated human beings as 
fundamentally moving toward the common fate of death.  Humanity finds their common 
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essence in mortality, not in local attachment. 
 Though Homer’s epic poem reflects a proto-cosmopolitan sentiment, it contains 
three obvious problems.  The first is the disorder among the gods.  The second is the 
existence of miraculous phenomena.  The third is the reliance on imagination as the 
foundation of the work.  The first and second problems do interact at times and certainly 
influence the resolution of the third problem.  Subsequent to Homer, the Greek world 
saw a slowly unfolding revolution in religious, scientific, and historical thought.  Each 
would contribute to the development of robust cosmopolitanism in the place of Homer’s 
imaginative, proto-cosmopolitanism. 
Orphism and Pythagoreanism 
In the 6th-5th centuries, two religious movements of universalism and 
individualism, Orphism and Pythagoreanism, seeped into the wider Greek 
consciousness.  The influence of Orphism, murky as that religion’s origins are, cannot be 
denied.  Orphism instructed individuals to be concerned primarily with the salvation of 
their souls.  This self-concern applied universally; all individuals regardless of their 
geographical birth or political association were ordered to take care of their souls.  
Pythagoreanism inspired similar concern for the soul and also developed a rational 
theology that encompassed the natural world, its abstract principles, and the immortal 
soul.  Divinizing nature and illuminating a fuller concept of the soul, Orphism and 
Pythagoreanism continued to develop the preliminaries of cosmopolitan thought by 
attaching the individual soul to an understanding of universal order.      
 Scholars (Kahn 2001; Philip 1966; Cameron 1938) do not deny the influence of 
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Orphism and Pythagoreanism on the development of Greek philosophy, but accounts of 
that influence paint only in broad strokes, typically revealing the doctrines of Orphism 
and Pythagoreanism in later, more extant, philosophers (in Plato, for example).  In 
studies of the development of Greek philosophy, research on Pythagoreanism and 
Orphism tends toward the vague.  For example, G. M. A. Grube (1980, 121) wrote that 
Plato’s conception of the soul originated in the east, but Grube does not draw 
distinctions among “those mystical teachers and prophets who are usually somewhat 
summarily lumped together as Orphics.”  In like manner, A. D. Winspear (1940) 
discusses the influence of eastern thought on Greek culture during and after the Homeric 
era.  Post-Homer, Winspear credits Orphism with introducing an antagonistic soul-body 
relationship to the Greek mind.16  His research also credits Pythagoras with the 
development of parallelism, the patterns of similarity between the individual, city, and 
cosmos.  However, Grube and Winspear produce only broad generalizations and lack the 
details of Orphic and Pythagorean influence.  Other scholars (Jaeger 1959; Vlastos 1952; 
Greene 1936; Guthrie 1935; Nilsson 1935) have noted, and disputed, the influence of 
Pythagoreanism and Orphism on Greek thought and philosophy as well, but in 
generalities rather than specifics.  Especially difficult is the separation of Plato from 
Pythagoras.  Uzdavinys’s (2004) anthology treats Plato as a Pythagorean, but reading the 
dialogues of Plato as evidence of earlier Pythagoreanism is not uncontested or 
unproblematic.17  At best, this research only demonstrates Pythagoreanism through 
Plato, not an unadulterated or primary source of material.   
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 In Homer, the soul and body were different elements in the unitary living being, but certainly not 
antagonistic.  Nor is the shade in Homer akin to the psychē of later Greek thought.   
17
 See Guthrie (1962, 173-175) for the short version, or Burkert (1972) for the longer argument. 
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Some research aims at a basic distinction of Orphism as the more mystical cult 
and Pythagoreanism as the more rational philosophy, but such a strict separation is not 
tenable.  Robbin (1928, 53-68) characterizes Orphism as a mystic cult of secret rites and 
Pythagoreanism as a more intellectual practice of philosophy, certainly with its own 
elements of mysticism.  Guthrie (1962, 141-142, 216-221) argues such a strict separation 
is not tenable given the complexity of those creeds and the paucity of evidence for 
either.  The path may be even more tortuous, as Robbin (1928, 55-56) and Guthrie 
(1962, 191-193) find evidence that Pythagoreanism split into two camps, one closer to a 
system of insular mystic rites and the other more intellectual, mathematical, and public.  
Thus, one might mistake mystical Pythagoreanism for Orphism.  Though difficult to 
disentangle the two, the combined influence of Orphism and Pythagorean inspired new 
understandings of the soul, nature, reality, and the good life.   
Obscure in its details, the influence of Orphism and Pythagorean is vibrant in 
broader strokes.18  The Homeric epics are famous for their idea of universal mortality 
and the soul as the shade of its former life.  Pythagoreanism introduced “a radical break 
from the Homeric view” with its idea of the immortal, migratory, and remembering soul 
(Kahn 2001, 18).19  Unfortunately, little evidence remains of a naked Pythagorean 
concept of the soul; most scholarship refers to Plato’s dialogues, especially the Meno, 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Timaeus, for source material on Pythagorean teachings 
                                                          
18
 Henceforth, I will refer only to Pythagoreanism instead of both Pythagoreanism and Orphism.  The 
source material for Pythagoreanism in the 6th and 5th centuries is questionable, but the source material for 
Orphism is even more opaque.  
19
 See also Bremmer (1983) and Rohde (1950).  For a more critical perspective, Claus (1981) argues for a 
less revolutionary and more developmental understanding of the soul from Homer to Socrates.  The idea 
of the soul did not spring ex nihilo from Socrates, nor was the Homeric soul exclusively a mere shade.  
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(Uzdavinys 2004; Kahn 2001, 49-62; Guthrie 1962, 206).  What can be gleaned from the 
general picture of Pythagoreanism is an understanding of the soul as the true self, 
immortal, and cognizant of true reality.  Pythagoreanism denied that the world consists 
solely of sense perception and that mortal life is solely the pursuit of appetite satisfaction 
and honor.  Living well requires knowledge of nature and ethical training, and the 
possessor of these will live better on earth and earn a reward in the heavens.  Not only “a 
doctrine of salvation” for the soul, Pythagoreans adhered to a life of ethical behavior and 
ritual purification in the hopes of avoiding mortal reincarnation (Riegweg 2002, 63-67).  
Metempsuchōsis, or transmigration of the soul, meant that those who fail to care for the 
soul do not receive the blessing of assimilation to the divine.  The Pythagorean concept 
of the soul shares an intimate connection with nature and the divine, which differentiates 
it from its contemporaries in natural philosophy. 
The 6th-5th centuries saw the beginnings of the scientific study of nature (phusis) 
across the Greek world, with the Pythagoreans and Ionians exhibiting a key difference in 
their natural philosophies.  Ionian natural science and Pythagoreanism both divinized 
nature, but the Ionians did not posit a principle of intelligence as the master of physical 
change until Anaxagoras’ philosophy (Guthrie 1962, 141-143).  Seeking a master 
element or ethereal substance to explain changes of physical matter, the Ionian natural 
philosophy was exceedingly materialistic (McLean and Aspell 1971, 21-22).  Even if it 
did divinize nature, there did not follow much of an ethical corollary for humanity 
(Vlastos 1975, 29-30).  Plato’s Phaedo (96a-99d) especially captures the sense that 
Ionian philosophy, and even Anaxagoras’ concept of Mind, did not study nature with an 
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eye to teleology and correlative purpose.  It studied physical causation and change 
without any notion of change-for-the-best.  Studying nature to understand generation, 
causation, and change-for-the-best is essential to Pythagoreanism.   
The Pythagoreans studied physical reality as a cosmos, a beautiful, harmonious 
arrangement of elements.  Pythagoras may even be the first to call the world a cosmos 
(Guthrie 1987, 22).  Pythagorean science revolved around the central importance of 
Number, meaning the principles of ratio, harmony, beauty, and universality among 
physical phenomena (McLean and Aspell 1971, 33-44).  Physical reality changed 
according to intelligible principles; abiding these principles, physical nature exhibits 
harmony.  Pythagoreanism freely attached ideas of harmonic principles to projects of 
aesthetic construction.  Though mystical in its numerology and astrology, 
Pythagoreanism forged a path of applied science in musical architecture as well (Guthrie 
1987, 11-12).  The world being a cosmos implied something else in Pythagoreanism: an 
ethical imperative. 
Number is the ruling principle for nature, but above Number are the Gods.  The 
cosmos being an arrangement, something must have done the arranging.  The hierarchy 
of reality in Pythagoreanism posits divinities supreme to physical nature that order 
nature according to number.  The link that traverses the hierarchical levels of reality is 
intelligence.  Pythagoreanism posited a supreme Mind permeating and ordering the 
world, and believed the human capability of intelligence could apprehend to an extent 
this Mind.  Furthermore, Pythagoreans turned the capability of knowledge into an 
imperative of good living.  The logic simply stated that living according to intelligence is 
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best.   
Guthrie (1962, 199) wrote of the Pythagoreans that, “Assimilation to the divine” 
is the “essential aim of human life.”  In other words, through the faculty of intelligence, 
human beings can escape their physical existence and ascend the ladder of reality toward 
the immaterial, immortal divine (Guthrie 1987, 12).  The hierarchy of Soul, Nature, and 
Mind led to universalistic thinking, but not a familiar kind of cosmopolitanism.  The 
code of living in Pythagoreanism, particularly the dietary restrictions, is a curious 
mixture of scientific investigation, introspective philosophy, and mystic rites that 
appears somewhat bizarre (Kahn 2001, 9; Guthrie 1987, 84).  This way of life is 
decidedly anti-political, but it was not anti-social.   
Pythagorean societies flourished in southern Italy in the middle of the 5th century 
before succumbing to popular political repression.  Given their peculiar beliefs, an anti-
Pythagorean political reaction is not surprising (Riedweg 2002, 104-106; Minar 1942).  
Pythagoreanism essentially espoused a scientific/philosophical aristocracy.  Its 
philosophical life was anti-democratic, anti-oligarchic, and antagonistic to the 
traditional, landed aristocracy.  Being a cult of knowledge, Pythagoreans looked down 
upon the ignorant masses of the democracy; equally, they deplored the materialism of 
the wealth-seeking oligarchy.  Challenging the old Homeric mythology, they likely ran 
afoul of the landed aristocracy and its claim to rule through a mythical, heroic lineage.  
Making enemies with all three major classes of society, Pythagoreans were not long for 
political power, much less political coexistence.  Besides making enemies, the 
Pythagoreans also displayed pacifist tendencies due to their belief in the transmigration 
  
50 
of the soul (Robbin 1928, 68).  Even as they antagonized the main classes of society, the 
Pythagoreans’ own philosophy steered them away from the methods of power politics 
that might have preserved their authority.   
The actual amount of power wielded by Pythagorean brotherhoods in southern 
Italy is unclear.  Some evidence suggests that a Pythagorean elite, the politikoi, ruled the 
city of Croton for a time (Guthrie 1987, 31).  Actually holding power may have 
instigated the revolt against them, as the Pythagorean element of Croton’s community 
was driven out (Riedweg 2002, 104-106).  Rather than attain political power, 
Pythagoreans tended to form brotherhoods (Kahn 2001, 8).  They lived in social 
communion on the outskirts of town, both metaphorically and geographically.  With a 
philosophy that ran counter to normal life and antagonistic to the dominant classes of 
political society, Pythagoreanism veered away from politics and worldly engagement.    
Thus, Pythagoreanism is not a political philosophy in a stricter sense of the term.  
The Pythagorean brotherhoods are not political communities in the sense of 
incorporating different people under a common law.  They are associations of 
likeminded people.  The problem is that Pythagoreanism is ambiguous about the 
obligation of the learned to guide the ignorant.  The individual certainly benefits from 
the cultivation of the soul.  Happiness being conformity to natural harmony, one lives 
best by understanding and adhering to natural order.  The obligation or compulsion to 
rule others is not a necessary corollary.  Truly, Pythagoras is said to have eschewed 
wanton cruelty because of the doctrine of transmigration of the soul, but acts of restraint 
are different from positive acts of good.  Though Pythagoreanism could support the 
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political philosophy of a knowledge-based aristocracy, it need not.  It might even support 
a kind of cosmopolitan theory.  Conceivably, Pythagoreanism could argue for the rule of 
the wise over the ignorant to instill order in society.  Questions might still remain about 
the appropriate size of the political community.  Should the polis remain or should 
political society be larger?  Ultimately, Pythagoreanism is a philosophy of the 
individual’s pursuit of knowledge of Mind and harmony with the cosmos.  The status of 
a political community is ambiguous.  
Cynic Cosmopolitanism   
 The 5th century BC was hardly an epoch of cosmopolitan thinking in mainland 
Greece.  A more accurate generalization is the many poleis of the Greeks became more 
aware of their common “Greekness” and of others as barbarian.  However, the era of 
polis supremacy and Hellene identification would see the development of a 
cosmopolitan response.  The 5th century witnessed the expansion of travel literature 
among the previously parochial Greeks, awakening them to the diversity of peoples and 
customs across the Mediterranean world and beyond, and the products of historians, 
sophists, and rhetors all contributed to the growing nationalist movement in the Greek 
world (Baldry 1965, 16-24; Hadas 1943).20  Even as Greeks primarily identified with 
their local polis, a broader nationalist sentiment took hold in the popular imagination; 
Greeks possessed a common culture that stood opposed to all other barbarian peoples.  
                                                          
20
 To examine the complete philosophical and political spheres of activity in 5th century Athens, much less 
the wider Greek world, would comprise a book in itself.  For examples of such work, see works such as 
Munn (2000), Finley (1975), and Havelock (1957).  See Sabine (1937, 3-28) for a brief account of the 
importance of the polis as a form of association, nomos as the engine of political harmony, and the 
influence of expanded cultural knowledge in the 5th century.  To stay focused on the topic of 
cosmopolitanism, I gloss over the deeper divide of nomos and phusis in non-cosmopolitan philosophy and 
politics.  
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The two invasions of the Persian Empire into mainland Greece probably ignited the 
Greek nationalist sentiments as well.  Certainly, Greek victory inflamed the love of 
country.  Works such as Herodotus’ Histories contributed to the acceptance of the 
principle that custom, or nomos, unites a people and differentiates peoples.  Though a 
universal order permeates Herodotus’ thought (the pattern of koros-atē-hubris), his vivid 
portrayal of the diversity of custom across the world is more overt than his subtle, 
overarching framework for all humanity (Euben 1986).  The primary loyalty to local 
custom and convention that typified membership in polis and the broader division of the 
world into Greek and barbarian generated a number of philosophical responses, 
including the Cynic and the Stoic.           
 Whatever Cynicism is, whether a lifestyle, doctrine, or philosophy, it is not 
conventional.  The foundational principle of Cynicism is the rejection of all convention 
that does not accord with nature.  Embracing all that can be observed in or learned from 
nature, the Cynics ruthlessly criticized the refinements and embellishments of civilized 
life.  Until the Cynic way of life is clarified, the term “cosmopolitan” and Diogenes’ 
famous phrase are easy to misunderstand.  The Stoics worked more formally to construct 
a philosophical school of thought than did the Cynics.  They found the common element 
of reason, logos, in the individual soul, the whole of nature, and the divine, and argued 
for a certain kind of rational community instead of the traditional, conventional polis.  In 
different ways, both the Cynics and Stoics developed theories of cosmopolitanism; yet, 
neither attempts to construct a genuine polis in harmony with the cosmos.   
 Even calling the Cynics a school of thought is not uncontroversial, as A. A. Long 
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(1974), writing on the development of Hellenistic philosophy, largely subsumes the 
Cynics into Stoicism.  Reviewing early Cynicism, Long (1974, 4) acknowledges Cynics 
like Diogenes had a significant point to their acts of “exhibitionism and deliberate 
affront,” but the historical record of their thought is spotty.  A better description than 
“school of thought” is that Cynicism is the imitation of Diogenes (Branham and Goulet-
Caze 1996, 2-3).  But even the claim that Diogenes is the first Cynic is not 
uncontroversial.  Grote (1973, 149-172) begins his analysis of Cynicism with 
Antisthenes, but never did Aristotle acknowledge Antisthenes as a Cynic.  Aristotle, as 
Long (1996, 31-32) points out, calls Diogenes the first Cynic.  Skeptical of the “master-
disciple” relationships later philosophers imposed on the historical record, Long (1974, 
109-111) does not draw a straight line from either Socrates to Zeno or Antisthenes to 
Diogenes to Crates to Zeno.  Given the uncertainty of determining who is a Cynic and 
who is not, we should not be surprised at the problems of delineating the lineage and 
influence of Cynicism on Stoicism.21  Cynicism, mainly through the paradigmatic 
exemplar of Diogenes, does demonstrate a rejection of social artifice and convention and 
an embrace of natural individualism.  Whether it is a political theory or an anti-political 
theory, Cynicism is a shade of cosmopolitanism in its adherence to a kind of 
universalism. 
 I use obtrusive qualifiers for Cynic cosmopolitanism (shade, kind of) because it 
is exceedingly different from what we normally consider cosmopolitanism, both 
compared to ancient and contemporary conceptions.  Tarn (1939) harshly chided those 
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 See Fisch (1937) for the similarities between Cynicism and Stoicism and Tarn’s (1939) thorough 
critique.  Also, on the lineage of Cynics see Grant (1980, 24-25) for an argument against Antisthenes as 
the first Cynic and Guthrie (1969) for a conciliatory position between Grote and Grant.  
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who even call it “cosmopolitan.”  He argued Cynicism was not a school of thought.  
Cynicism was not a philosophy, “it was a way of life, a mode of thought, and was 
entirely negative” (Tarn 1939, 42).  In Tarn’s (1939, 42-44) analysis, Diogenes, the 
ostensible founder of “cosmopolitanism,” is really saying with his famous quip that he 
rejects all poleis, all conventional law, and all claims of lineage to authority.  The 
expression, “my polis is the cosmos,” means that Diogenes can live anywhere in the 
world because nature and the natural life is universal.  He needs no convention, no 
family lineage, and no home.  This is certainly not an endorsement of a world-state or 
global citizenship; it is the total rejection of all political particularism and the 
identification of the natural and universal with the fit and suitable.  Tarn’s analysis 
remains substantially valid in the literature and leaves us with a curiously un-
cosmopolitan Cynic cosmopolitanism. 
 Still, a few points and qualifications can be raised against Tarn’s account.  Long 
(1996, 34-36) points out that Diogenes is not arguing against all convention, but only the 
conventions against nature and, more importantly, the sophistic doctrine of natural 
pleonexia that rose in the wake of attacks against convention itself.  Typified by 
Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, arguments against convention in the 5th and 4th centuries 
often endorsed a doctrine of pleonexia, meaning the individual should expand the 
appetites and use all methods and means of acquiring satisfaction.  Diogenes’ example 
actually upholds an extreme form of self-control and moderation, exactly opposite of 
those who argued against convention. 
 Another qualification is that Diogenes is not entirely negative in his statements 
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about the polis and cosmos.  Moles (1996, 108-113) makes the argument that his famous 
attributions in Diogenes Laertius affirm that he is a citizen of the whole world and that 
the only good government is that of the cosmos itself.  He is not denying citizenship 
entirely or good government, but his affirmation is certainly not the cosmopolitanism 
familiar to moderns or his own contemporaries.  Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism is the 
freedom to live according to natural laws everywhere under the cosmos.  As a “citizen” 
of the cosmos, Diogenes shares a polis with any other wise citizen, wisdom being 
conformity to natural, cosmic law.  Attachment to this cosmopolis is a moral and natural 
one, not one of birth or necessity as in a traditional, political association.   
  Despite these minor qualifications, Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism, and Cynic 
cosmopolitanism more generally, is a radically anti-political theory of human 
association.  Finley (1968, 89-101) harshly criticized Diogenes as a homeless beatnik 
who would accept and endure man-made oppression rather than establish a just system 
of law and politics.  Nor are Finley’s condemnatory remarks without some accuracy.  
The primary virtue of Cynic life was autarkeia, or strict self-control and physical 
endurance.  Autarkeia meant rational autonomy and asceticism: stark necessity in the 
satisfaction of only the most basic and natural desires and detachment from all non-
natural concerns (Rich 1956).  Living so simply and detached from normal human 
concerns, Cynicism finds no place for political life and all its convention, superficiality, 
and artifice. 
 Cynic autarkeia, under further examination, is a fascinating concept.  Aristotle 
(Pol. 1235a) famously wrote that only gods and beasts are self-sufficient creatures.  
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Human beings need the polis to live well.  The point captures Aristotle’s argument for 
man’s essentially political nature.  The Cynics offer a different take on the idea that only 
gods and animals are self-sufficient.  If gods and animals are self-sufficient, and self-
sufficiency is a virtue, then logically humanity should imitate the gods and animals to be 
more virtuous.  Diogenes was called the dog not without reason; he observed animal 
behavior and imitated it.  Being closer to self-sufficiency, Cynicism rearranges the 
traditional “divine-human-animal” hierarchy into divine-animal-human (Goulet-Caze 
1996, 61). 
 The primary virtue of Cynicism being autarkeia, political association is rejected 
as a vice (Branham and Goulet-Caze 1996, 9).  The polis was both an admission of self-
insufficiency and an embrace of particularistic law.  The Cynics declined both and 
therefore put themselves outside membership in any polis.  The records of the Cynics 
show that they flouted conventional law, endured physical hardships, and ultimately 
valued ascetic living and self-sufficiency.  That they would live this way anywhere in the 
world affords them the opportunity to call the whole world their home, but in any 
particular community they will find no permanent attachment.  The cosmopolitanism of 
the Cynics is the rejection of association and the elevation of autarkeia.  The cosmos 
itself decrees that individuals must be self-sufficient and adhere only to the general laws 
that apply to all humans.  This, curiously, is a eudaimonist theory of human happiness, 
but one that explicitly finds the polis and political life antagonistic to fulfillment (Sayre 
1945).  In total, Cynicism is curious twist on a number of Greek philosophical principles, 
but its cosmopolitanism is definitely anti-political and a strange mixture of the divine 
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and the animal. 
Stoic Cosmopolitanism 
 Stoicism and Cynicism share some common philosophical roots, but certainly 
reflect substantial differences as well.22  On the surface, Stoic cosmopolitanism shares 
distinctive features in common with Cynic cosmopolitanism.  Both stress control of the 
emotions and a certain indifference to material circumstance.  Analysis of more depth 
shows that Stoicism is different in its conception of humanity, reason, and the cosmos.  
Still, Stoic and Cynic cosmopolitanism reject the idea of the polis, the local association 
of differently-skilled individuals under a common law. Depending on how one interprets 
the evidence, Stoicism raises an isolated society of the wise, the worldwide society of 
the wise, or the Cynic-like citizenship to the cosmos.  The unwise are not included in a 
truly human community. 
 The most basic distinction one can draw between Stoicism and Cynicism is that 
the Stoic sought a basis in logos for phusis; or the lengthy version, the Stoics pursued a 
rational philosophy of logic, order, and harmony to explain natural phenomena and 
human ethics whereas the Cynics accepted less rigorous standards of natural and animal 
examples (Long 1974, 107-108).23  In terms of their political thought, some differences 
are salient.  The Stoics did not consider animals more akin to the divine than humanity.  
The Stoics identified the faculty of logos in the human being as elevating humanity 
above the animals.  Stoicism returned to the familiar divine-human-animal hierarchy.  
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 For clarification, when using the term Stoicism I mean early Stoicism.  Any reference to later Stoicism 
will be explicitly labeled as such. 
23
 One can find more elaborate discussions of broader Stoic philosophy in Vogt (2008), Ierodiakonou 
(1999), Long (1996), and Reesor (1986), among others.    
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Identifying logos as the highest function of the human mind, the Stoic polity is one 
based on reason and nature.  In theory, the best polity will be a community of the wise 
that assimilates to nature, or the cosmic-divine.  However, Stoic writing, or at least 
interpretations of those writings, disagrees on the construction of this rational and natural 
cosmopolis.  Research into Stoic political thought reveals three versions of the 
community of the wise, the cosmopolis, one of which greatly resembles Cynic 
cosmopolitanism. 
 The first Stoic cosmopolis stems from Zeno’s famous society of the wise.  A 
significant stream of research interprets the scant evidence for Zeno’s Politeia as the 
blueprint for an isolated community of rational, self-ruling individuals- a Sparta for 
sages (Schofield 1991; Baldry 1965; 1958; Chroust 1965; Tarn 1948).  Rowe (2002), for 
example, argues that Zeno’s Politeia is a Socratic critique of Plato’s Republic.24  Plato’s 
ideal city famously includes three classes, two of which are not fully rational.  Rowe 
(2002, 300) reads Zeno as applying a strict understanding of Socratic intellectualism to 
political association and concluding with the exclusive society of the wise- no 
ignoramuses allowed!  If Rowe is correct, and Zeno was a Socratic, the later Stoics who 
disavowed Zeno’s work as Cynicism and not in keeping with their Socratic tradition 
certainly owe him an apology (Schofield 1991, 9-21).   
 Zeno’s Politeia as the society of the wise is strange sort of cosmopolitanism.  
The society of the wise is a city in the sense of being a geographically-bound place and 
encompassing a number of individuals under a common way of life, but it is a city of 
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 Rowe’s argument is certainly interesting, and spawns numerous and intricate questions.  Primarily, the 
argument suggests Zeno is more Socratic than Cynic or Stoic; indeed, he is more Socratic than Plato!  In a 
different work, I would certainly pursue these issues at greater depth.  
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only one type of person, the philosopher.  The society of the wise, as the name suggests, 
is an exclusive arrangement.  Human beings who fail to exhibit rationality, who fail in 
their self-control, are not welcome in this cosmopolis.  Zeno’s city is one in which the 
wise separate themselves from the ignorant to live in friendship according to nature and 
reason.  The city is a group of individuals living in one place according to natural, 
rational standards, so we may call it in fairness a cosmopolis.  However, the exclusivity 
of the city is not to be overlooked.  The society of wise is not a Greek polis in the sense 
of encompassing a variety of differently-skilled people.  It is a cosmopolitan theory of 
great exclusivity. 
 Interpreting Zeno’s society of the wise as the exclusive city for sages causes 
continuity problems with later Stoicism, which argued for a more expansive, imperial 
cosmopolis.  Sellars (2007) directly challenges the interpretation of Zeno that produces 
the society of the wise and argues for a more continuous, cosmopolitan Stoicism.25  
Zeno, Sellars (2007, 13-14) argues, is not calling for the retreat of the wise into their 
own society, but positing a conditional: if all people were sages, then the all the cosmos 
would be a city of concord and fulfillment.  In a world of rational, autonomous 
individuals, everyone would act according to nature.  Conventional law would be 
superfluous; conventional association would dissipate.  Local political organizations 
would lose their meaning and purpose as every individual considered every other 
individual an equal, rational being wherever they met. 
 In the second interpretation of Stoic cosmopolitanism, the polis yields to the 
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 Interestingly, Sellars uses Cynicism to make Zeno and Seneca into a more coherent tradition.  The 
evidence for the Cynics and early Stoics is opaque; I do not pick sides in these interpretation battles, but 
merely spell them out to so they can be compared to Platonic cosmopolitanism.  
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cosmos.  Geographical cities may remain, but their conventional laws succumb to the 
advance of reason, nature, and autarkeia.  Like the first interpretation, the second is not 
unproblematic.  Clearly, it is utopian, and excessively so.  The first interpretation takes 
notice of humanity’s ignorance and encourages the wise to segregate themselves.  The 
second interpretation looks forward to the time when all human beings are equally wise 
and autonomous.  Whether I am feeling cynical right now or merely recalling history, 
the expectation that all humanity will realize the capability of autarkeia and reason 
strikes me as far too utopian.  However, this interpretation stands as one of the 
paradigmatic examples of cosmopolitan thinking; all the cosmos will be as a polis, an 
association of equals, but equal in reason and nature instead of convention.   
 The third Stoic cosmopolis reflects the influence of Cynicism tempered with the 
rationality of Stoicism.  Instead of an isolated community of sages or the eventual 
triumph of reason in the minds of all human beings, the Stoic cosmopolis is the 
citizenship of the wise according to the cosmos (Vogt 2008).  Essentially, only the truly 
rational are acting according to cosmic law; only the rational are citizens to the true 
source of law, the cosmos.  This cosmopolis is not a society of sages bound by a 
geographic location, nor is it the world-state of a rational humanity.  However, anyone 
who reaches rational self-rule acts according to the laws of the cosmos.  Wherever the 
rational individual exists, they adhere to the cosmopolis.  This interpretation is cognizant 
that all humanity exists in the cosmos, but only some are truly aware of the rational laws 
that bind all in the cosmos.  Those who come to understand the natural laws of the 
cosmos are truly citizens to the highest law, but many human beings will not come to 
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this realization.  They will continue to live in states of ignorance as citizens under an 
irrational, conventional law.  This third Stoic cosmopolis is the city of divinity and 
rational humanity; it is an individual state of awareness and inter-subjective accordance 
more than a physical city of sages or an end-of-history world-state.  As the wise live 
according to cosmic law, irrational humanity will remain in their conventional political 
associations outside the full citizenship of the cosmos. 
 In these three cosmopoleis, the faculty of reason motivates political societies of 
unanimity rather than harmony.  The wise individual is in harmony with the cosmos and 
with other wise individuals, but not with irrational humanity.  The first cosmopolis 
simply removes the wise from general humanity into their own exclusive society.  Since 
the rational and the irrational cannot be friends, the rational must separate from the 
irrational and essentially reclassify themselves as a new type of human being who merits 
a new society.  The second cosmopolis contains the seeds of ultimate perfection.  
Eventually, reason will take hold in all people, and the whole world will live in one, 
harmonious state.  This means differences of skill, craft, or class will be insignificant 
compared to rational uniformity.  The third cosmopolis accepts that some/many people 
will remain ignorant and the wise can do little to cure them or escape from them.  
Instead of separation or ultimate victory, the third cosmopolis elevates the idea of 
citizenship from membership in an exclusive political community to adherence to the 
laws of the cosmos.  The wise belong to a super-state, the cosmos, and treat lesser 
communities as conventional and essentially ignorant.  Though subject to conventional 
law, the Stoic is indifferent to such circumstances, concerned only with living according 
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to divine standards for the sake of their soul.  None of these Stoic cosmopoleis end with 
a polis that brings fundamentally different people together into a harmonious unity.  
None unite the craftsmen, soldiers, and philosophers into a single, limited political 
system.  None establish a genuine polis that mirrors the cosmos.           
Platonic Cosmic Ethics 
Between the eras of Pythagorean and Stoic cosmopolitanism, Plato wrote his 
dialogues.  Though clearly influenced by Pythagoreanism, Plato is not considered a 
cosmopolitan thinker.  Baldry (1965, 76-77) discusses him in the development of 
cosmopolitanism, noting that in Plato’s thought the same bonds that hold the cosmos in 
harmony will hold the soul and city in order.  But Plato’s thought is treated as an 
interlude to the truly cosmopolitan Cynics and Stoics.  Only recently has one author, 
Gabriela Carone, defended Plato’s philosophy as a kind of ethical cosmopolitanism.  
Carone (2005) argues that Plato’s late cosmology is the driving force behind his ethical 
thought.  The rational world-soul, itself immanent in physical reality, provides an 
observable standard of order.  All human beings can perceive true order with their 
physical senses.  Thus understanding natural order, all people can become rational and 
ethical.  Carone’s interpretation of Plato’s late cosmology and ethics is sharp divide from 
his early, aristocratic notions of knowledge, virtue, and philosophy, and closer to the 
Stoic idea of a world-polis and universal, rational humanity.  In addition to 
disagreements about her interpretations of Plato’s cosmology, her argument is not 
political, but ethical.  The political outcome of the ethics is unclear.  
Carone (2005, 8-13) interprets the late dialogues as a return to Socratic 
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philosophy after Plato’s elitist turn in the middle dialogues.  In the middle dialogues, 
including Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic, Plato is an ontological dualist and political 
elitist.  Reality is divided into eternal, intelligible, and otherworldly Forms and 
observable, perceptible reality.  The Forms provide the standards of order for changing 
reality.  In this dualist ontology, human happiness, or eudaimonia, consists in 
contemplating the intelligible, otherworldly Forms.  Only the philosopher is happy.  
Furthermore, only the philosopher has the knowledge to rule a community.  The majority 
of human beings do not have the intellectual capacity for happiness or autonomy in 
Plato’s dualist ontology and elitist political philosophy.       
Carone is not satisfied with either Plato’s dualism or his elitism, and she argues 
neither is Plato.  Plato’s late cosmology, especially in the Timaeus, Philebus, Statesman, 
and Laws, shows a radical break with his earlier thoughts on dualism and elitism.  
Carone’s argument is intriguing, but not entirely convincing (Betegh 2007; Carelli 2007; 
Johansen 2007).  The late dialogues, she argues, show the immanence of intelligence in 
the natural world, thus making education a matter of sense-perception.  Education 
through sense-perception instead of philosophical contemplation opens the pursuit of 
knowledge to all.  Of course, natural order includes human virtues, not just physical 
laws.  Thus, Carone sees in the late dialogues a more democratic and worldly Plato, but 
one of sense perception and ethics more than philosophical contemplation and politics.  
The late Plato shares much in common with Stoicism.   
The main pillar in Plato’s late cosmology is the immanence of order.  Carone 
seizes upon the rational world-soul, a concept undeveloped until Plato’s later dialogues, 
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as a replacement for the philosopher-king as the exemplar of reason and order (Carone 
2005, 12-13).  Specifically, Carone (2005, 42-52) argues the world-soul is identical to 
the demiurge and immanent in physical reality.  This cosmology uses the cosmic soul as 
a direct link between observable phenomena in nature and the intelligible Forms (Carone 
2005, 70).  The removal of the barrier of philosophical contemplation to knowledge is 
crucial to Carone’s conclusion of a more democratic, ethical Plato, as the immanence of 
intelligence allows all people to learn from the observable, natural phenomena.        
Carone argues that Plato’s late cosmology yields a more individual and universal 
ethic.  Because intelligence is immanent in nature, the observer of the natural world can 
find abundant examples of order, harmony, and reason.  The planets and stars, for 
example, exhibit orderly motion across the heavens and are a prime tool of learning 
(Carone 2005, 70-78).  The visible world becomes for Plato’s late ethics what the 
philosopher-king was to his middle politics: the ideal standard and instructor of virtue.  
Again, Carone (2005, 53-62) reads mind (nous) as immanent in the cosmos and the order 
of the cosmos as visible in the consistent, regular motions of the heavens and earthly 
seasons.  Whereas the philosopher kings of the Republic would only acquire knowledge 
from the contemplation of the Forms (and be the only people to acquire true knowledge), 
everyone can observe the motions of the stars and the cycles of the seasons.  Anyone can 
observe cosmic order and become knowledgeable and virtuous.    
Carone’s interpretation of the late dialogues supports a system of ethics driven by 
a cosmology which supersedes political association.  The cosmos provides the model for 
happiness and each individual can learn from it without the necessity of political 
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association.  Carone (2005, 121-122) reads in the late cosmology a turn away from 
limited political associations and toward recognition of the cosmos as the standard of 
right and good action.  The individual best pursues a life of rational autonomy by 
imitating rational, orderly intelligence, not becoming entangled in limited associations of 
conventional laws (Carone 2005, 141-145).   
Overall, Carone reads Plato’s cosmology as providing the basis for individual 
human ethics, but the political outcome is uncertain. There is no reason to form a limited 
association of particular individuals in this cosmology; in fact, there is no reason to form 
any sovereign association.  Carone’s interpretation most likely leads to something like 
the Stoic world-polis.  Every person, once they understand the natural, rational laws of 
the cosmos, behaves accordingly wherever they happen to be.  The whole world is 
container of ethics, and so every rational person will be ethical everywhere in the world.  
There is no need or reason for political associations to establish parochial codes for a set 
of people or a limited geographic area.  If there is to be some coercive authority, they 
would only have the authority to educate, as education is the path to knowledge and 
virtue.  Again, there is no reason for substantially different educational programs, as all 
education is observation of the natural world.  One observes the motions of the heavens 
no differently in Mongolia than Montana.  Ultimately, I disagree with Carone’s 
interpretation of the late dialogues, which Chapter VI will show in greater depth.  
Conclusion 
Tracing the development of cosmopolitan thought among the ancient Greeks 
reveals a number of approaches to the broader idea of universal humanity.  From the 
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epic poetry of Homer to the philosophical discourses of the Stoics, the Greeks conceived 
of humanity as sharing a similar fate without necessary political attachments, and also of 
humanity as living within a universal, natural order with certain political implications.  
What is missing in the history of Greek cosmopolitan thought is the incorporation of 
Platonic political philosophy.   
 In Homer’s epics, humanity exists under the Olympian order.  Whether Greek or 
Trojan, the Olympian deities rule over lives and fortunes of human beings and their 
political associations.  Humanity, despite variations in culture, color, and language share 
the common fate of death.  Every human is mortal; the best look for alternative means 
(procreation, great memorials) of immortality.  This fundamental similarity does not lead 
to common political associations, but does influence the interaction among different 
peoples.  Both Achilles and Priam can lament their ultimate fate of death, even as they 
wage a brutal war of annihilation against one another.  Homer is not, strictly speaking, a 
cosmopolitan thinker.  He certainly contributes to the understanding of humanity as 
existing under a universal order, and universalism is the fount of cosmopolitanism. 
 Between Homer and the more overt cosmopolitans of the 5th and 4th centuries, 
Pythagoreanism and Orphism influenced Greek civilization in ways difficult to discover 
or differentiate.  The evidence suggests a few innovations.  Pythagoreanism and 
Orphism introduced a new concept of the soul, more rational and immortal than the 
Homeric shade.  Along with the soul, these mystic cults, especially Pythagoreanism, 
studied nature as a rational, harmonious, and mathematical whole.  Bringing their 
conception of the soul into harmony with the cosmos, the Pythagoreans appear to 
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construct a preliminary cosmopolitanism.  However, Pythagoreanism, and Orphism for 
its part, is not truly political.  Both tend toward an immaterialism and mystic rationalism 
that drive them away from associations with non-Pythagoreans and non-Orphics.  The 
actual associations formed in Pythagoreanism are better described as a society of the 
wise than a political association.     
Explicitly cosmopolitan, Cynicism coined the very phrase that began the theory 
itself.  Diogenes of Sinope rejected all establishments of irrational custom over universal 
nature.  The conventional laws of the polis, he argued, were not binding upon him unless 
they happened to accord with the universal laws of nature and development.  Despite 
coining the phrase, “I am a citizen of the world,” Diogenes’ thought is less than political.  
More accurately, he is rejecting the conventions and luxuries of civilized life 
characteristic of political association.  Diogenes looked to nature for guidance, and 
modeled his behavior according to a strict criterion of self-sufficiency and autarkeia.  If 
a behavior required the assistance of another human being, like political engagement, or 
some non-essential material pleasure, then Diogenes rejected that behavior.  Cynic 
cosmopolitanism is the affirmation of ascetic self-sufficiency, and truly an anti-political 
cosmopolitanism.    
When contemporaries think of ancient cosmopolitanism, Stoicism tends to be the 
source of their thought.  However, the Greek Stoics were not a unified lot.  Stoicism 
reached different conclusions about humanity’s relation to nature, and human beings’ 
relationships with each other.  Greek Stoicism can support an insular society of the wise, 
a worldwide polis, or a worldwide society of the wise.  Each of these is cosmopolitan in 
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different respects.  The insular society constructs a rational, geographical association of 
sages.  But it is hardly political; the city contains only one type of citizen- the rational 
individual.  The worldwide polis anticipates the time when all human beings fully 
develop their rational faculty such that everyone in every city acts according to the laws 
of nature.  Conventional laws will be replaced by natural ones, and political disputes will 
dissipate as rational individuals find agreement and coherence in natural harmony.  
Finally, Stoicism also offers the cosmopolitanism of the worldwide, rational elite.  All 
those who develop their rational faculty will live in harmony and friendship with each 
other, but since not all people are rational, the society of wise exists across numerous 
and various conventional societies.  Clearly, Greek Stoicism offers not cosmopolitanism, 
but cosmopolitanisms. 
Plato is rarely included in the tradition of Greek cosmopolitanism.  Most 
prominently, Plato is mined as a source of Pythagorean thought (indeed, he is the 
pinnacle of Pythagoreanism).  However, the dialogues of Plato, from the early to the 
late, address the fundamental issue of cosmopolitanism: is the world an order that 
encompasses political association?  Cosmopolitanism is above all a search for a standard 
of order to guide human behavior, both in the realm of interpersonal relations and natural 
desires.  The conception of natural order in the cosmopolitan thinker will determine what 
behaviors are appropriate for the individual and what associations are appropriate for 
groups of individuals.  Plato’s cosmopolitanism is the attempt to found a genuine Greek 
polis according to the standards of harmony in the broader cosmos.  What could be more 
cosmopolitan than a polis in harmony with the cosmos? 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE EARLY DIALOGUES 
Platonic political philosophy begins with his early dialogues, the Euthyphro, 
Apology, Crito, and Phaedo.  Lately, much research on the early dialogues divides into 
those deciphering the elements of genuine Socratic philosophy from the Platonic and 
those using the Platonic dialogues as source material for the historical Socrates.  This 
chapter pursues a different course, less concerned with separating Socrates and Plato, but 
viewing the early dialogues as the beginning of a longer course.  The early dialogues are 
examinations of difficult questions.  Should civil law be a reflection of divine law?  
What is divine law and how can one know it?  What is philosophy?  What do citizens 
owe their city?  Can the philosopher be a citizen?  Should one be?  Asking many 
questions, the dialogues do not present a coherent answer.  They are fundamental 
investigations with only preliminary and non-integrated solutions.  However, the early 
dialogues spell out the puzzle: the cosmos is orderly, but is the polis a part of that order?  
If so, what part does the philosopher play in the greater cosmic order and lesser political 
order?  
The Historical Socrates 
 The “Socratic problem” is a longstanding and contentious area of dispute about 
what researchers can know about the history and philosophy of Socrates; yet, many 
studies of the historical Socrates use Plato’s early dialogues as a source of information 
about the Athenian philosopher.  A quarrel I raise here with Socratic studies is that in 
mining Plato’s early dialogues for the gems of Socratic wisdom, they often ignore that 
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the early dialogues are Plato’s.  Undoubtedly, Plato’s conversations and experiences 
with Socrates influenced him.26  However, reading the early dialogues wholly as a 
container for the teachings of Socrates has two serious problems.  First, Socratic studies 
have not produced a consensus on the philosophy of the historical Socrates.  The 
opposite is true; the literature is filled with Sōkratai- multiple philosophers with multiple 
philosophies, all varying in slight or important matters but sharing the name of Socrates.  
Second, Socratic studies have a penchant for presenting the early dialogues as containing 
a complete, Socratic philosophy waiting for discovery by the skilled reader.  Against 
this, I argue the opposite is true; the early dialogues are merely the beginning of a 
philosophical journey.  Plato, after the death of Socrates, addresses general questions in 
writing for the first time.  The dialogues end tentatively or inconclusively without 
resolving the fundamental problem.27 
 Socratic studies divide into two main categories: one uses multiple sources of 
information to cobble together an account of the man; the other focuses on the character 
of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, filtering the Platonic from the genuinely Socratic.  The 
multiple sourced works are as fascinating as they are frustrating, for they contain no 
consensus on the historical Socrates.  For a demonstration, let us compare Chroust 
(1957), Winspear and Silverburg (1960), and Zeller (1962), who rely on Plato, 
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 Still, to say Plato “learned” what Socrates “taught” is too strong, as Socrates claimed not to teach at all 
in Plato’s own dialogues.  
27
 Hackforth (1928) argued long ago that the early dialogues represent Plato thinking through Socrates’ 
questions, not his reporting Socratic doctrines.  Indeed, Socrates has no doctrine, only the unexplained 
dictum that virtue is knowledge.  Gareth Matthews (2008) provides substantial evidence for Hackforth’s 
contention.  Matthews finds evidence of Socratic epistemology and metaphysics in the Meno and Gorgias.  
Are these dialogues Socratic or Platonic?  Is this Plato thinking through Socratic teachings, or Plato 
developing his own thought through the Socratic method?  The dispute finds no easy resolution.  
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Xenophon, Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch for accounts of Socrates.  Zeller’s 
(1962, 49, 119) Socrates has no formal doctrine; Socrates contributes to philosophy the 
search for knowledge and a general intellectualist position that virtue is knowledge.  Of 
course, one could argue that the equation of virtue to knowledge is at least the beginning 
of a doctrine.  Sharply different, Winspear and Silverberg (1960, 58-62) argue that 
Socrates developed from his early embrace of Anaxagorean materialism to his later 
adoption of Pythagorean beliefs in cosmic harmony and the immortality of the soul.  
Chroust (1957, 195-197) finds little evidence in Plato and Xenophon that Socrates 
actively participated in politics; Winspear and Silverberg (1960, 70) have little trouble 
placing Socrates as a partisan of the moderate oligarchic faction.  Interestingly, both 
agree that Plato and Xenophon idealize Socrates in their writing to elevate him above the 
fray of Athenian politics, thus tainting the historical accuracy of the two (Chroust 1957, 
195-197, Winspear and Silverberg 1960, 75).  Three studies of the historical Socrates 
only produce three different Socrates, demonstrating the phenomenon of the Sōkratai. 
 Before these relatively recent Socrates studies, Eric Havelock (1934) wrote of the 
paucity of evidence for the historical Socrates.  Criticizing two earlier attempts at 
discovering the historical Socrates, Havelock contends that the literary accounts of 
Socrates are not primarily containers of historical data, but dialogues that convey the 
philosophy of their respective authors, specifically, Plato and Xenophon.28  The only 
strong evidence for the historical Socrates, Havelock contends, is Aristophanes The 
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 Havelock criticizes A.E. Taylor (1954) and Arthur Kenyon Rogers (1971).  Havelock points out that 
Taylor’s Socrates is a scientist and metaphysician while Rogers’s Socrates is a moralist and mystic, again 
revealing historical Sōkratai more than the historical Socrates.  
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Clouds and Plato’s Apology.29  Havelock’s essay is a short critique of Socratic studies.  
Montuori (1992; 1981) supplies ample reinforcement.  Studying the treatment of 
Socrates through history, Montuori sees a wide gap between the historical man and the 
philosophy.  The captivating figure of Socrates compels seemingly every era toward an 
understanding of his teachings.  Throughout the history of philosophy, Socrates has been 
a heathen, a proto-Christian, a free-thinker, a martyr, and an anti-democrat.  Who 
Socrates becomes and the content of his philosophical message reflect the methods, 
sources, and culture of those who study him.  In a wide historical survey, Montuori 
concludes what Havelock (1934, 283) argued fifty years earlier, “Every interpreter is left 
free to pick out of the available material what he [or she] thinks is suitable to his [or her] 
own conception, and the portraits of Socrates which result are not history but subjective 
creations.”  If we cannot discern the historical Socrates from the source material, can we 
reliably discern what is Socratic from what is Platonic in Plato’s dialogues?  
 A second branch of Socratic studies aims to parse the philosophy of Socrates as it 
appears in the dialogues of Plato.30  This branch of study largely traces back to Gregory 
Vlastos (1991; 1994) and Terence Irwin (1977), with subsequent researchers (McPherran 
1996; Brickhouse and Smith 1994) following their lead.  As with historical inquiries, the 
philosophical separation of Socrates from Plato is not easy (Wood and Wood 1986).  
Vlastos (1991, 45-80, especially 53) contends the theory of forms and knowledge as 
recollection (anamnēsis) are sufficient to show a difference in philosophy between the 
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 Interestingly, Winspear and Silverberg (1960, 74-76) disagree with Havelock, arguing that the Apology 
is essentially propaganda, an attempt by Plato to idealize Socrates and extricate him from partisan political 
judgment.  Even Havelock’s small repository of historical information on Socrates is not uncontested.   
30
 This assumes that the dialogues can be neatly divided and that Plato never revised his early works, 
thereby infusing early Socratic dialogues with later Platonic thoughts.  Both assumptions are contestable.  
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early dialogues (Socrates) and the middle ones (Plato).  But the separation is not so clear 
cut.  Reasonably, the differences may reflect Platonic ignorance or uncertainty in his 
early works.  Looking at the issue more closely, Vlastos (1991, 81-106) portrays 
Socrates as rational and worldly; forms exist within people and rational self-analysis can 
come to understand them.  Plato argues for external universals and otherworldliness.  
However, these later differences may result from the working out of early problems, not 
necessary representing two different philosophies.  Vlastos (1991, 58-59) acknowledges 
that Socrates must hold some doctrine of the forms, only he does not defend it.   
Who is this Socrates?  In Vlastos’s account, he is hyper-rational, yet also a 
believer in traditional Greek religion; he is radically moral, but does not engage in 
theology (Vlastos 1991, 157-178).  Hyper-rationality was not the hallmark of traditional 
Greek religion and the gods were not paragons of a radical morality.  These features are 
integral to Plato’s grander political and theological reforms, especially in the Republic 
and later works.  The evidence of a distinct Socrates in the early dialogues may be only 
evidence of a young Plato still thinking through the problems of philosophy, theology, 
and political organization.  
 The creation of a Socratic philosophy from Plato’s early dialogues also includes 
the problem of subjectivism.  Vlastos (1991, 66-80), for example, argues that the Phaedo 
begins Plato’s movement away from Socratism by embracing an otherworldly theory of 
knowledge.31  Allen (1970) argues differently, that the goal of finding universals, 
however tentative, is present in the early Socratic elenchus.  The nature of the universals 
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 Klosko (1986) argues essentially the same, that the Phaedo is the transitional dialogue where Plato 
moves away from the Socratic psychology of pure rationalism to develop a theory of forms and 
immortality of the soul.  
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will develop through Plato’s dialogues, but Allen argues this early Socrates is not as 
worldly as Vlastos would have him.  The evidence for Allen’s argument is persuasive 
enough to cast doubt on the project of Socratic studies.  Ultimately, what these theories 
cannot do is conclude with a complete Socratic philosophy.  One can continually raise 
arguments about whether diverging doctrines in the Platonic dialogues reflect a truly 
Socratic teaching or just a change of Plato’s mind.  Even if all scholars agreed on what 
doctrines in the dialogues are Socratic, they cannot assume that Plato included every 
Socratic teaching in his dialogues.  Something crucial indeed may be missing.    
 No one is likely to argue that Plato’s early dialogues do not reflect at all Socratic 
thought or that some of Socrates’ philosophy cannot be found in Plato’s dialogues, but 
reading the early dialogues as a memorial to Socrates produces an ill effect: the 
explicitly subjective creations of literary Sōkratai.32  Plato’s dialogues often revolve 
around the character of Socrates.  A number of works have built studies around a 
particular issue and the character of Socrates as he appears in author-selected dialogues.  
The main problem with these dialogues is the lack of concern for philosophical context, 
much less chronological continuity.  The reader is left to wonder who Socrates is: a 
historical person, a character in Plato’s dialogues, Plato’s mouthpiece, or a composite 
character assembled by a contemporary scholar from multiple ancient authors?  A 
different, less contentious method of interpretation is to read the early dialogues of Plato 
as early and Plato’s.   
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 Looking for the ethics of Socrates, Gomez-Lobo (1994) bounces across dialogues with little concern for 
context or comprehensiveness, citing passages from the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and Republic.  The case 
is similar in Weiss (1998), Beckman (1979), and especially Nichols (1987), who creates a literary Socrates 
from Aristophanes, Plato, and Aristotle.  Brickhouse and Smith (1994) concede their uncertainty about 
whom or what, in terms of historical personage or literary character, they are studying in Socrates.  
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The Early Dialogues as Investigation  
 Human affairs, politics and philosophy especially, are in a state of disorder in 
Plato’s early dialogues.  The old religious mythology is fraught with contradiction and 
cannot stand as the foundation for piety or justice.  One particular Athenian, Socrates, is 
under civil prosecution.  His life has been service to the gods and his city, but one god 
has given Socrates a command that brings him into conflict with that city.  Socrates 
appears to care for following the commands of the gods regardless of the judgment of his 
fellow citizens, but alternatively refuses to ignore their verdict and break the laws to 
extend his life and divine mission.  Through the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, the 
reader may ponder whether the laws of the city must be contrary to the commands of the 
gods.  Is there not some way to reconcile the divine commands Socrates must obey with 
the political laws of Athens under which he lives?  Is there a way for Socrates to obey 
his divine calling without transgressing his polis?   
The Phaedo addresses these questions differently and with more complexity, but 
not at all completely.  Plato gives an account of the soul and cosmos, and the proper role 
of philosophy and the lifestyle of the philosopher.  In this dialogue, the philosopher 
ought not to care much about the city, but spend life in contemplative solitude or in 
limited community with other philosophers.  Despite tentative statements and differences 
in theory, the early dialogues ultimately spell out the challenges of cosmopolitanism: is 
there order in the cosmos?  What is its source?  Is there some form of orderly harmony 
among the cosmos, city, and citizen?  The dialogues do not propose a cohesive solution, 
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only raise questions and draw attention to the problems.33 
The Euthyphro 
 In the Euthyphro, Plato constructs a dialogue in which Socrates questions the 
eponymous fellow Athenian about his knowledge of the gods and how that knowledge 
guides his political action.  Euthyphro claims to know the commands of the gods, and on 
that knowledge he will charge his father with murder.  Socrates aims to reveal 
Euthyphro’s ignorance of the gods with the consequence that Euthyphro’s political 
action, the public accusation and trial of his father, is foolish.  Hold in mind that never in 
the dialogue does Socrates suggest that one should not base political law on divine law.  
The dialogue criticizes both the traditional mythology of the divine and the use of those 
tales as a basis for political action.  Positively, Socrates argues both he and Euthyphro 
could act confidently if they knew the divine, since nothing bad would occur if they 
followed the example of the gods. 
 The Euthyphro begins with Socrates telling Euthyphro that he faces an 
indictment as a corruptor of the youth and innovator of religion (Eu. 2c-3b).  Euthyphro 
sympathizes, thinking the charge stems from Socrates’ divine sign, and he relates his 
own troubles with prophesy.  Euthyphro fancies himself a seer; his predictions having 
never failed to come true and he expresses frustration that people still disbelieve his 
warnings (Eu. 3b-c).  Socrates, ever eager to learn from those who know, asks 
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 The secondary literature on Plato’s early dialogues is certainly frustrating among other things.  First, 
much of the literature does not read these dialogues as Plato’s and as early.  Second, many works are in-
depth studies of single dialogues.  They delve into a dialogue with more precision than my project 
demands.  Denoting all the disagreements between these works and mine, the project frequently would 
find itself sidetracked.  Like Rowe (1993) and Reeve (1989), I try to include references to secondary 
sources only for crucial points.  I intend to stay on the track of Plato’s cosmopolitanism. 
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Euthyphro to teach him his knowledge of the divine so he can refute the charges against 
him (Eu. 3d-e).  The dialogue continues with Socrates attempting to draw forth from 
Euthyphro his knowledge of divine things. 
 Since Euthyphro believes himself to possess knowledge of the divine, he is on 
his way to prosecute his father for impiety (Eu. 4a).  Astounded, Socrates asks 
Euthyphro again if he possesses the knowledge of the divine, of piety and impiety, to 
rightly prosecute his father (Eu. 4e).  Euthyphro reasserts confidence in his knowledge of 
such things (Eu. 5a).  Thus far, the dialogue has not expressed any disapproval of the 
proposition that political action follows from knowledge of the divine.  Socrates merely 
asks Euthyphro if he truly possesses such knowledge and if he will share it.  Socrates, of 
course, charged with impiety, would benefit greatly in his own trial if he could 
distinguish the pious from impious. 
  Desirous of his interlocutor’s wisdom, Socrates asks Euthyphro what godliness 
and ungodliness are, and piety and impiety.  Euthyphro prepares to cite “powerful 
evidence” for his claims, but his words fall flat upon Socrates.  The evidence is only his 
understanding of traditional Greek religion (Eu. 5e).  Because Zeus bound and castrated 
his father for his unjust acts, Euthyphro feels secure in the prosecution of his own father 
(Eu. 6a).  And why not?  If Zeus, “the best and most just of the gods,” can mete out such 
punishment, then Euthyphro is right to follow his example in prosecuting his father (Eu. 
6a).  Euthyphro uses a simple understanding of a traditional Greek myth to justify his 
prosecution, an uncomplicated application of divine example to guide social and 
political rules.  This basic comparison of divine and human action will carry the day in 
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court, so Euthyphro believes. 
 After Euthyphro reveals his compelling evidence, Socrates casually admits his 
own guilt.  He does not believe such stories about the gods, and because of this he is an 
innovator in religion (Eu. 6a).  Nor does he believe straightaway Euthyphro’s credulity, 
and asks him if he believes other stories, including those about wars and enmities among 
the gods (Eu. 6b-c).  Euthyphro assents to the veracity of these stories; Plato writes that 
Socrates should not find himself surprised (Eu. 6c-d).  Of course, Socrates is not content 
with the “compelling evidence,” and asks Euthyphro to clarify what piety is.34  With 
Socrates’ question, the Euthyphro turns from a conversation to the dialectic. 
 Euthyphro, at Socrates’ behest, states that “what is dear to the gods is pious, what 
is not is impious” (Eu. 7a).  Obviously, the reader can jump ahead and calculate the 
trouble Euthyphro has created.  If the gods are in a state of discord, of war and enmity, 
then they will not always agree on the piety of things.  Humans will find themselves in 
the awkward and doomed position of offending some gods with actions meant to please 
other gods.  If this is so, then Euthyphro’s action may indeed be pious and impious- but 
how does this help him know whether to prosecute or not? 
 Socrates points out to Euthyphro his statements on the definition of piety (Eu. 7a) 
and discord among the gods (Eu. 7b).  But what can cause such discord?  Not arithmetic 
or the calculation of numbers, nor measuring the large and small (Eu. 7b-c); only 
disagreement about the just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, and the good and bad could 
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 Here (Eu. 6e), Socrates asks Euthyphro to tell him what the form itself is.  Allen (1970) argues this is 
evidence of an earlier theory forms.  I agree.  Certainly, Socrates wants Euthyphro to think beyond 
individual examples of pious and impious actions, and he wants no more arguments from traditional 
mythology.  Socrates is urging Euthyphro to think of piety itself- the form, the paradigm.     
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cause such discord (Eu. 7d).  Socrates does not think that the gods should differ on these 
things, and Euthyphro agrees (Eu. 8a-b).  With this understanding, Euthyphro’s 
definition of piety fails.  Piety has become too expansive (as well as repulsive), 
including both what is hated by the gods and what is dear to the gods.   
 As Euthyphro maintains that discord exists among the gods, Socrates challenges 
him to find proof that all the gods would agree with his prosecution (Eu. 9a-b).  In this 
process, Euthyphro’s definition changes its grammatical voice.  Piety shifts from being 
what is loved to what the gods love (Eu. 9e).  Socrates’ train of thought leaves the station 
without Euthyphro on board.  Socrates examines the relationship of piety and the gods’ 
affections, animating Euthyphro’s arguments like Daedalus until they escape their maker 
(Eu. 10-12).  It seems Euthyphro has given Socrates only a quality of piety, not told him 
the nature of the thing (Eu. 11a-b).         
 Plato continues the discussion by introducing the topic of justice (Eu. 12d).  
Socrates inquires of Euthyphro whether piety encompasses all aspects of justice or if it 
only a part; moreover, what part of justice is piety?  Euthyphro’s argument races 
headlong toward full collapse; his knowledge of the divine will be exposed as nothing of 
the sort.  He argues that piety is the part of justice concerned with care of the gods (Eu. 
12e).  Again, he relies on traditional understanding of Greek religion and ritual.  Socrates 
will demolish these claims.  Euthyphro did not realize an implication of his argument, 
that human acts of piety improve the gods (Eu. 13a-13d).  He restates his meaning: pious 
actions are those of which the gods approve and use for their purposes.  Pious actions 
preserve domestic houses and the affairs of state; impious ones bring destruction (Eu. 
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14b).  Socrates simplifies this to mean that piety is knowledge of prayer and sacrifice, 
how to give and get from the gods (Eu. 14c-e).  Note that Euthyphro still retains a basic 
and traditional understanding of the gods.  The gods protect those who sacrifice properly 
and do good; they punish those who do not.  Regardless, Euthyphro’s restatement leads 
to the same conclusion: “the pious is once again what is dear to the gods” (Eu. 14b).   
The dialectic, conversation, and the dialogue end shortly after this restatement. 
 As noted earlier, Socrates is guilty of innovating about the gods.  In a short line, 
one can almost pass it over without notice, Plato writes that no good comes to humanity 
that is not from the gods (Eu. 15).  He has criticized unabashedly the notion that the gods 
are in a state of disharmony about piety- and about the good, beautiful, and just.  He 
implies with subtlety that the gods are not in disharmony at all, that bad things do not 
come from the gods.  On the contrary, only good things follow from the divine.  
Euthyphro has proven ignorant of the divine because of his acceptance of the old myths, 
despite their obvious contradictions.   
 With the contradictions exposed, Plato has shown that Euthyphro has no business 
charging his father with impiety, as he has no knowledge of what piety or impiety is.  
The dialogue is a refutation of the man who uses a mythology ridden with contradiction 
to bring public charges against a father and fellow citizen.  Still, nothing in the dialogue 
suggests that impiety is not a crime, or that political law should have no relation to the 
divine.  The implication is that true knowledge of divine would yield knowledge of 
piety, which is a part of justice.  Knowledge of the divine may be necessary yet for good 
political rule.             
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The Apology 
 Plato’s Apology reveals a Socrates in a stark dilemma.  Socrates has lived 
according to a specific command of the gods and the course of this task has led him into 
conflict with his polis, Athens.  Throughout his life, Socrates has refrained from public 
action, instead pursuing his divine mission in private.  Because his divine calling has 
precluded full political participation, Socrates the philosopher cannot be Socrates the 
citizen, but only a private interlocutor.  Admittedly, Socrates could not avoid all political 
responsibilities (he served loyally in the phalanx) nor does he state such avoidance as his 
own desire or part of his divine mission.  Socrates did judge that acting according to his 
divine command in public would bring persecution upon him.  Socrates understood that 
his divine mission conflicted with public action and so he minimally engaged in political 
affairs as he worked in private for the good Athens.  The dilemma is that Socrates will 
obey both the gods and his city, but the laws of the city are not in harmony with the 
commands of the gods.  Conflict between the two was inevitable and irreconcilable.     
 According to Plato’s less than specific account of the charges, Socrates stands 
accused of corrupting the youth and offending and/or disbelieving in the gods of the city.  
His very way of life is the cause of the corruption and source of the offense.  First, he 
must separate himself from other sophists, scientists, and philosophers of the era, some 
of whom did preach atheism.  Plato will explain the philosophical mission of Socrates 
and how it benefited Athens.  After setting out his mission, Plato tells why Socrates 
came into conflict with the city despite all the good he did for it.  Socrates is the servant 
of the gods, specifically, the god at Delphi.  What is interesting is that Socrates wavers 
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on whether his mission is to Athens exclusively or to humanity at large.  Socrates is 
attached to Athens, yet expresses the willingness to pursue his mission anywhere and 
with anyone.  One may inquire whether a philosopher belongs to a city or may he or she 
roam the earth to serve the divine at large. 
 Socrates first defends himself from his original accusers, those who associate 
him with atheist materialists (Ap. 18b-d).  He is no Anaxagoras, and must dispel the 
caricature of the philosopher as one who claims knowledge of “all things in the sky and 
below the earth” (Ap. 18c).  Socrates calls upon the god at Delphi as a witness, to testify 
to the kind of wisdom he possesses and to defend his actions as service to that god (Ap. 
20e-21a).  Plato’s first defense of Socrates is that he is a dedicated servant of the god at 
Delphi, a god sacred to all Greeks.  How can that be impious!  Singled out by the Oracle, 
Socrates is dumbfounded to learn that no one is wiser than he.  His attempt to disprove 
the Oracle only illuminates the message.35  Socrates searches for wisdom in others 
through private conversation.  He talks to statesmen, poets, and craftsmen.  In each 
group, Socrates finds a peculiar ignorance.  The statesman thinks himself wise, but 
Socrates does not (Ap. 21d).  The poets may write beautiful compositions, but through 
inspiration and enthusiasm rather than knowledge (Ap. 22-c).  Finally, Socrates finds that 
the craftsmen may know their craft, but they think they know so much more that, in fact, 
they do not (Ap. 22b-d).  The statesmen, poets, and craftsmen are ignorant and yet think 
themselves wise.        
  This search for wisdom in others is service to the god at Delphi, Socrates 
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 West (1979) accuses Socrates of impiety for not trusting in the Oracle’s message.  Reeve (1989) retorts 
that Socrates merely inquires into its meaning, a common practice for received oracles.   
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repeatedly confesses.  Though his examinations make him unpopular, Socrates persisted.  
“I must attach greatest importance to the god’s Oracle,” Plato writes of Socrates’ 
priorities (Ap. 21e).  Indeed, he routinely defends his work as divine service, an 
“investigation in the service of the god” (Ap. 22a).  He questions himself “on behalf of 
the Oracle,” and gives an answer to himself and the Oracle (Ap. 22e).  Socrates way of 
life is service to this Oracle, and even to the point of personal poverty (Ap. 23b) and 
neglect of public affairs (Ap. 31c-d).  In this dialogue, especially, one cannot understand 
Socrates’ philosophical life, his incessant questioning of others, apart from his service to 
the divine.36  
 Defending his life and acts as service to the divine, Socrates directly challenges 
an accuser, Meletus, to admit that he and the others bring charges against him not for 
spreading corruption or atheism, but for exposing ignorance in those who claim 
knowledge (Ap. 23-28b).  Unpopularity, not impiety, may condemn Socrates.  But 
neither unpopularity nor condemnation will deter Socrates.  Plato writes, “Wherever a 
man has taken a position that he that believes to be best, or has been placed by his 
commander, there he must, I think, remain and face danger” (Ap. 28d).  Socrates stands 
upon this principle; he obeyed the city’s orders as a soldier and the god’s orders as a 
philosopher (Ap. 28e-29a).  Moreover, Socrates will not cease his obedience.  He would 
not disobey the city and flee his soldier’s post.  He will not disobey the god and cease his 
philosopher’s mission, even if the city orders his death for it (Ap. 29a-e).  Plato writes of 
a hierarchy of obedience here.  One owes certain obedience to the city, but owes more to 
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 The critical-democratic school of Socratic studies, Markovitz (2008) Villa (2001), Monoson (2000), and 
Euben (1997), has neglected this feature.  Reeve (2000) and Brickhouse and Smith (2000) argue that the 
removal of the divine creates a more convenient Socrates for modern audiences. 
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the divine.  Socrates dutifully fulfilled his civic obligation to bear arms in defense of 
Athens when the city so commanded him, but the city is not authorized to override a 
command of a god.37  However, the Apology does not explain in full how one separates 
or harmonizes obedience to the city and the gods.  It does state, in no uncertain terms, 
that Socrates obeys the city’s just laws and the commands of the gods.  If a law is unjust, 
it compels no obedience.  
 A theological-political tension underlies Socrates’ divine mission and his 
obedience to the city.  Socrates confesses his negligence of public affairs, specifically in 
failing to speak at the Assembly.  His divine sign, an individual, enthusiastic check of 
his behavior, always stopped him from such engagements (Ap. 31c-d).  His private 
rebukes served the city in place of public speaking. Socrates states flatly that his pursuit 
of justice must be a private one; done in public, his method of inquiry will incite mob 
retaliation (Ap. 32a).  Contrasted with his life of private critique, Socrates tells of his 
strict obedience to the city’s laws.  Political law compels his very speech to the jury (a 
public speech he may prefer to avoid), so he speaks to the public in his private style (Ap. 
19a).  When he held a political position, he followed the law scrupulously, and opposed 
those who would break it to prosecute ten generals (Ap. 32b).  In this case, obedience to 
the law caused a public uproar against him.  When the Thirty Tyrants tried to implicate 
him in their nefarious deeds, Socrates declined, refusing to commit an “unjust or 
impious” act (Ap. 32d).  The hierarchy is clear: obedience to the gods above all; 
obedience to the city’s just laws second.  However, this hierarchy of obedience causes 
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two kinds of conflict with his fellow citizens.  They become indignant at the exposure of 
their ignorance and vengeful when someone stops them from violating their own just 
laws.  Socrates does not want conflict at all, so he refrains from public action as much as 
possible.  He cannot be a public (and thus full) citizen without shortening his life and 
mission, and that very mission is an outstanding benefit to the city. 
 Plato writes of the good Socrates had done for Athenians in his service to the 
god, but the philosopher is ambiguous about whether his service must be exclusively to 
Athens. Socrates boasts of his willingness to question, examine, and test his fellow 
Athenians, or anyone else, “young or old, citizen of stranger” (Ap. 30a).  He does care 
more for Athenians, as they are “more kindred” to him, but Socrates’ investigations are 
not necessarily for them alone, but for foreigners as well (Ap. 30a).  However, Plato 
thereafter includes three statements binding Socrates to Athens.  First, Socrates says, “I 
was attached to this city [Athens] by the god” (Ap. 30e).  Socrates then argues his words 
are not meant to prevent harm from coming to him because the lesser cannot harm the 
greater (Ap. 30d), but to prevent the city from harming itself by destroying god’s gift to 
it (Ap. 30e).  Socrates again declares that the god placed him in Athens, with the purpose 
of rousing the Athenians from their ignorance (Ap. 30e-31a).  The statements are not so 
clear, given further thought.  If Socrates is serving the god at Delphi, sacred to all 
Greeks, why is he confined to perform his service in Athens?  If they condemn him, 
might Socrates go to another city and continue his service?  Would he follow a foreigner 
back to a foreign city to continue an investigation?  Arriving in another city, would he 
remain to question those citizens?  Socrates’ relationship to his city and the god(s) is not 
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wholly lucid.  But it need not be, as this dialogue is an early work in a long career.   
The Crito 
 Is the Crito compatible with the Apology?  Do these two of Plato’s dialogues 
contain a coherent philosophy or a contradictory one?  Research differs on these 
questions.38  What the research misses is that the dialogues need not be coherent in their 
strict arguments.  Obedience, hierarchy, and priority are the concern of the two 
dialogues.  In the Apology, Socrates declares his first priority is to obey and serve the 
god at Delphi.  He will obey his city, Athens, when its laws are just.  Moreover, the 
Apology is ambivalent about Socrates’ relationship to his city of Athens; the Crito is not.  
Plato’s Crito portrays Socrates as wholly Athenian; its laws constituted and crafted him.  
With justice, he cannot leave it to pursue his divine mission elsewhere.  Socrates will 
obey his city’s order because disobedience to its laws is worse than death.  Plato’s 
argument may not convince, but the quality of the argument should not overshadow the 
purpose of Plato’s argument.  He is affirming the importance of obedience to one’s polis.  
Above all, three arguments should not be overlooked in the Crito: Plato denounces the 
opinion of the crowd, he rejects the opinion of the individual, and he affirms the law of 
the city as constitutive of the individual, thereby obliging obedience to a superior.  
 The dialogue begins with Socrates awaking to find his friend, Crito, at his prison 
bed.  Crito warns Socrates time is running short; he must escape now.  Crito’s initial 
argument reflects his self-concern in two ways (Cr. 44b-c).  He does not want to lose a 
great friend and he does not want people thinking he allowed a friend to be executed 
                                                          
38
 Especially, see Kraut (1984) and Allen (1980) for arguments that the two dialogues are philosophically 
coherent.   
  
87 
through failure to arrange his release.  Socrates first admonishes him on the second 
point, saying, “Why should we care so much for what the majority think” (Cr. 44c).  The 
many do not impress Socrates, as they can neither do great goods nor inflict devastating 
evils (Cr. 44d).  In this case, they are like a storm that must be weathered.  
 Plato reiterates in formal dialectic his rejection of the opinion of the many 
(Cr.47b-48a).  Whose commands merit obedience: the one with knowledge or the many 
without knowledge?  Of course, one should listen well to those with knowledge and 
disregard the many who possess no knowledge.  Just as one listens to doctors to find 
health, one listens to those who know justice and injustice to find truth and good living.  
Impending death is irrelevant.  One must do what is right, and worry little about how the 
many respond. 
 Crito’s first argument (Socrates’ death will be a great loss to him) reflects a 
strong sense of individualism.  Socrates is an adornment for Crito’s life, one that he does 
not want the many to remove.  Crito’s statement betrays ignorance of any greater 
purpose beyond the enjoyment of his temporal existence or any authority beyond 
himself.  Plato will remind his audience of an individual’s obligations to greater 
authorities.  In this dialogue, the city is the greater authority. 
 Socrates and Crito agree to a strict code of right action: one must never do 
wrong, nor return a wrong with a wrong (Cr. 49b-c).  Following from this, one must 
never cheat on a just agreement (Cr. 49e).  Thus, Socrates raises the question, “If we 
leave here without the city’s permission, are we mistreating people […]?  Are we 
sticking to a just agreement or not” (Cr. 49e)?  Because Crito says he does not know, 
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Socrates clarifies the issue with a dramatic encounter between himself and the laws of 
Athens.   
 What if the laws of the city, representatives of the very city itself, confronted 
Socrates?  Socrates, in escaping their judgment, is placing himself above the law (Cr. 
50a-b).  If every individual would do this, they would destroy the city itself.  The city 
would cease to exist, replaced with a collection of individuals who ultimately do what 
they choose without regard for the judgments and political ties of others.  Let us ignore 
for a moment whether this is a good and persuasive argument and focus on what Plato 
has put forth: the city is a good thing and must be preserved from radical individualism.  
Citizens cannot obey and disobey the courts as they see fit.  Citizens must obey the 
verdicts, period.   
 What if the courts have decided wrongly?  What if they are committing an 
injustice against a citizen (Cr. 50c)?  The laws speak again to Socrates, reminding him of 
all they have done in making him.  The laws sanctioned his parents’ marriage, allowing 
the legal birth of Socrates (Cr. 50d).  The laws provided for his education (Cr. 50e).  The 
laws of Athens create Socrates from his parents’ marriage to his birth; they nurtured and 
educated him from infancy to young adulthood.  This depiction is not a modern social 
contract between a free, rational individual and set of political rules.  The laws constitute 
Socrates before he even exists.  They make him into a citizen when he enters the world.  
They are his superior, above his parents and forefathers (Cr. 51a-c).  Socrates should 
revere his city, never do violence against it, and obey its commands after he has had the 
opportunity to persuade.  Socrates had his chance to persuade during his trial, now he 
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must obey the verdict. 
 Even after creating and educating Socrates, the city allowed him the opportunity 
to leave.  Athens asks its full citizens if the laws satisfy them, and raises no barrier 
should they decide to leave (Cr. 51d-e).  By remaining in Athens, Socrates expressed his 
approval of its laws and his determination to live according to them.  His decision to stay 
now obligates Socrates to obey Athenian law (Cr. 51e-52a).  The obligation falls 
especially on Socrates (Cr. 52a-d).  He has neither lived abroad nor left Athens’ limits 
except to serve it under arms.  He has begat and educated children under its laws.  He is 
the consummate Athenian citizen.39  If the city is to mean anything, he must obey its 
laws. 
 In the closing paragraphs of the Crito, Plato reveals the damage Socrates would 
do if he accedes to Crito’s wish for his escape (Cr. 53-54).  In total, nothing good will 
follow from Crito’s plan.  Acting for his selfish, individual purposes, Socrates will 
endanger his Athenian friends.  Socrates himself will be a fugitive, unwelcome in well-
governed cities.  He will have to live in a disordered city.  He will prove the jury correct, 
as his example of violating the law does corrupt the youth.  And what will become of all 
his talk of virtue and goodness?  Can fugitives be taken seriously when they talk of the 
good, true, and beautiful? 
 At the conclusion of the Crito, Plato writes that if Socrates in fact was wronged, 
the laws are not the guilty party, but only some men.  Athens does not stand convicted, 
only those many that comprised the jury.  Plato’s Crito does not convict and denounce a 
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city for the actions of some of its citizens.  The dialogue argues against the many, who in 
the form of juries may wrong individual citizens.  The dialogue likewise convicts 
individuals who believe their interests supersede the city.  The Crito stresses the 
importance of obedience to the city.  Athens, especially, where one has the opportunity 
of persuasion before obedience, is a city in which citizens must not destroy the law 
through selfishness.  Plato writes of Socrates that he is the consummate Athenian, and he 
above all must not destroy the city.  Not only did the city create and educate him, but the 
adult Socrates consented to live in the city according to its laws.  A city created him, and 
he accepted its rules.  Socrates is Athenian.    
The Phaedo 
 Through the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, Plato has defended Socrates as both 
a philosopher on a divine mission and a good citizen of Athens, but the citizens of 
Athens will allow no such harmony between a life of philosophy and an active political 
life.  The tragedy of these dialogues is that the philosopher who wishes to be a good 
citizen cannot be that until the laws of the city find harmony with the divine mission of 
philosophy.  Presumably, laws must educate citizens to understand or accept the 
philosopher’s presence and role in a good city.  The Phaedo veers from this account.  
Disputes continue about where to place the dialogue in Plato’s corpus.40  Is it an early, 
middle, or transitional dialogue?  Good arguments exist for all three positions, and I 
cautiously call the dialogue early and transitional.  The dialogue is early thematically: it 
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deals with the trial and execution of Socrates.  It is early philosophically as Socratic, 
psychic rationalism still reigns.  The dialogue is transitional because it begins to defend a 
conception of the soul, and what the world must be to support such a conception.   
The Phaedo is an intriguing dialogue.  It departs from earlier argumentation, both 
in style and substance, and yet the new arguments will need correction.  It begins the 
project of understanding how philosophy is the means to order the human soul through 
understanding the cosmos, but the dialogue does not argue that philosophy should 
produce a political order or find harmony within one.  The dialogue rejects political 
philosophy for contemplative, individual philosophy; it rejects general, political 
community for ascetic, philosophical community.  Whereas the Socrates of the 
Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito defended his philosophy as service to the god and good 
for the city, the Socrates of the Phaedo, practicing philosophy as it is described therein, 
would not be concerned with temporal matters at all.  He would be all philosopher and 
no citizen. 
 The argument of the Phaedo begins with Socrates stating his willingness and 
readiness to die, and that all philosophers should be prepared similarly (Phd. 61c-d).  
Plato returns to the scene of Socrates’ execution to defend the philosophy supporting his 
preparedness for death.  Cebes raises the challenge to Socrates, that as a possession of 
the gods, should he not endure in this world to continue his service (Phd. 62d-e)?  
Should he not have escaped prison to continue his divine mission elsewhere?  This time, 
the laws of Athens will not accuse Socrates.  Plato will articulate an introductory 
description of the cosmos and find the place of the human soul within it.  Once Plato 
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sketches the cosmos and soul, Socrates will be able to defend his decision to die. 
 Socrates believes that philosophy is a preparation for death, and trusts that a good 
future lies after death, at least for good men (Phd. 63c-64a).  His companions request an 
explanation of these beliefs.  The first step in this defense is to clarify what death is, the 
second is to explain philosophy.  Clarifying death proves easy, as the party agrees that 
death is only the separation of body and soul (Phd. 64c).  Philosophy as preparation for 
death means that the philosopher will despise the pleasures of the body- food, drink, sex, 
and all others (Phd. 64d-65a).  The philosopher pursues knowledge, not physical 
pleasures.  Nor can the philosopher attain knowledge through the physical senses- sight, 
touch, hearing (Phd. 65b).  The soul must become disentangled from the body to find 
true reality, for the body only deceives the soul in its pursuits (Phd. 65b-c).  Plato writes, 
“The soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by 
itself” (Phd. 65d).  Indeed, Plato conceptualizes philosophy as contemplative, “the soul 
reasons best when none of these [bodily] senses troubles it” (Phd. 65c).   
 Fine shades may separate the understanding that physical pleasures are 
unimportant and inconsequential to human life from the actual despising of them.  
Socrates in so many dialogues partakes in the physical world.  He drinks and eats at 
gatherings; he does not overturn the tables and chastise the revelers.  Furthermore, Plato 
has written Socrates to be convivial in so many dialogues.  He talks with others, sharing 
his thoughts and listening to others.  He is not a hermit in a cave with his eyes closed and 
his ears shut.  Socrates has practiced philosophy as a conversation with others, not only 
as quiet contemplation in solitude.   
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In the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, Plato defends Socrates as both a good 
philosopher and a good citizen.  Socrates engages his fellow Athenians in private to 
improve their souls and serves in public when he must.  The Phaedo appears to reject 
this.  The overt body-soul (sōma-psychē) dualism crosses a distinct line.   The previous 
dialogues certainly affirm that greater goods exist beyond the physical, but they neither 
denigrate material existence nor show Socrates abandoning general company for 
communion with elite, ascetic philosophers.  Socrates frequents symposia; he talks with 
whoever crosses his path.  He is neither ascetic nor elitist.  Philosophy is the means to 
self-improvement and the improvement of others; it therefore has a place in the physical 
world.  In the Phaedo, philosophy becomes entirely otherworldly.  The philosopher has 
no concerns for improving this world, but only for improving one’s soul (though 
sometimes pursued with select others).  It is strict preparation of the soul for death.   
 Plato continues the dialogue, explaining why a philosopher must spurn the 
physical senses to know true reality.  The true things themselves, Justice, Beauty, 
Goodness, Health, Strength, the body cannot grasp (Phd. 65e).  These things the soul 
alone can know through pure thought and reason (Phd. 66a).  Plato denigrates the body 
in its relationship to philosophy (Phd. 66a-d).  “The body confuses the soul and does not 
allow it to acquire truth and wisdom” (Phd. 66a).  The body impedes the soul’s pursuit 
in numerous ways.  Its need for nurture consumes time and effort.  It becomes diseased 
and pain overcomes the mind.  The wants, fears, illusions, and desires springing from the 
body impede philosophy.  The body’s appetites and desires for acquisition cause wars 
and civil discord.  The body appears to cause all evil and wrongdoing in the world.  
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Trapped within it, the soul can never attain true knowledge (Phd. 66e).  Life must be a 
preparation for death, for only when the soul finally separates from its physical house 
may it see true things in themselves (Phd. 66a).  The philosopher’s soul will endeavor 
“to refrain as much as possible from association with the body,” and philosophers will 
join together in this pursuit, separating themselves from those souls who remain 
anchored to the physical world (Phd. 66e-67b).41  Together, they purify the soul, 
suppress the body, and await that final separation of the two in death (Phd. 67c-d). 
 Plato has defended Socrates’ readiness to die.  At death, his soul will escape his 
body and attain true wisdom.  Being resentful or afraid is simply illogical, unless, of 
course, the soul is not eternal (Phd. 69b-e).  Cebes raises this objection to Socrates’ 
defense (Phd. 70a-b).  The new topic introduces what the soul is and from whence it 
comes.  In answering this question, Plato will set forth some principles of the cosmos to 
explain how the world works.   
 The first topic is of generation and reincarnation, and Socrates does not restrict 
the topic to humanity alone, but to all life in the physical world (Phd. 70c-d).  From 
where do souls come when they arrive in the physical world?  They are not created 
newly, but have a prior existence.  Plato details an extended analogy to defend 
generation from reincarnation (Phd. 70e-72a).  He argues that all things must come from 
their opposite, so the living must come from the dead just as the dead come from the 
living.  Cebes agrees with the conclusion.   
 The cosmology Plato sets up is one of recurrence and balance, a rejection of 
                                                          
41
 Solmsen (1983, 360) writes that Plato “vigorously asserted” the “dualism between body and soul” and 
that the ethic of the Phaedo is “wholly individualistic.”  
  
95 
linear or progressive cosmology.  Generation from reincarnation must occur in cycles 
otherwise all things would end up in the same state (Phd. 72b).  Plato reiterates that 
unless life comes from death, all things would end up dead and only dead (Phd. 72b-d).  
One may read the argument as the attempt to avoid cosmic despair.  If life is only a short 
time of material desires, and death an eternal oblivion, what point is there to anything?  
What good is either philosophy or material hedonism?  Recurrence also provides 
additional support for Plato’s conception of philosophy.  Learning in the physical world 
is recollection of the true knowledge possessed by the soul in the other world (Phd. 72e-
77a).  The soul coexists with the true things in themselves, the Forms, in death.  It 
comprehends them and knows them.  When born into the physical world, the soul 
forgets its knowledge, and physical objects and images only can spark mere recollection 
in the soul of its former state.   
 The argument for knowledge as recollection demonstrates that the soul exists 
prior to birth, but Simmias and Cebes remind Socrates that he has not proven the soul 
exists after death (Phd. 77b-c).  Plato proceeds to elaborate his concept of the soul to 
demonstrate its eternal nature.  The argument begins with the contrast of compound 
versus pure things.  A compound can be divided into its parts; a pure thing is indivisible 
(Phd. 78c).  Plato creates a comparison of tangible, physical objects with the eternal, 
invisible forms.  The speakers classify the body as a physical object, of course, and the 
soul as invisible; it is similar to the forms and therefore similar to that which is eternal 
(Phd. 77d-79e).42  In the composite human being, the body is an earthly thing that 
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naturally dissolves.  The soul, however, is a divine thing naturally existing eternally 
(Phd. 80a-d).   
 As Plato explains the process of reincarnation, he states the great purpose of 
philosophy: union with the divine.  Socrates discusses how the state of one’s soul 
determines one’s reincarnated form.  Gluttons return as donkeys.  Tyrants return as 
predators.  People who learned to control their appetites return as social animals (Phd. 
82a).  Philosophers, having purged their souls of all physical desires, “may join the 
company of the gods” (Phd. 82c).  Divine union is the reward for pure living, or better 
stated, living a life of contemplation without concern for transient, physical desires.   
 Given Plato’s account of philosophy in the Phaedo, let us examine the 
relationship between the philosopher and the city.  Plato has set the soul against the body 
and philosophy against temporal, earthly affairs.  Philosophers “do not travel the same 
road as those who do not know where they are going” (Phd. 82d).  They avoid the 
pleasures and pains that bind the soul to the body (Phd. 82e-83e).  Philosophers, then, 
must not have much of a relationship to their city or to fellow citizens.  They may 
congregate with other philosophers, but they will avoid those ignorant souls concerned 
with life’s pleasures and pains.  The philosopher in the Phaedo is not a citizen at all.  
Arguing for a cosmos in which the body is the enemy of the soul, philosophy dictates 
one must avoid physical concerns, and those concerned with physical things.  No more 
will Socrates converse with anyone he meets, but he will discuss his contemplation with 
likeminded, philosophical souls. 
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 With so much already argued, Plato continues to defend his conception of the 
soul.  Still unconvinced by the arguments for the soul’s immortality, Simmias and Cebes 
raise two further objections.  Simmias grants that the soul is an invisible harmony, but 
can it be lost when the body dies as harmony is lost when an instrument breaks (Phd. 
86a-d)?  Cebes follows, asking whether the soul may endure longer than a body but still 
not sometime degenerate and disperse, worn and battered by so many births (Phd. 87a-
88b).  Plato dispatches these arguments.  First, the interlocutors conclude that the soul is 
not a harmony within the body, a mixture of good and wicked motivations, but a ruling 
principle of good over the body (Phd. 92a-95a).  Second, the interlocutors investigate 
Cebes’ objection, finding the argument soon turns to questions of generation, 
degeneration, and the principle of order in the kosmos: Mind (Phd. 95c-97c).  Socrates 
read in a book of Anaxagoras that a first principle orders all things in the world to be for 
the best; the idea pleased him.  Upon reflection, he came to understand the materialism 
underlying the theory, much to his dismay.  Plato rejects the materialism, but not the 
idea of a prime, intelligent cause. 
 Plato’s theory is still nascent and understated, but the basic structure is evident.  
The cosmos is hierarchical.  At the apex, a perfect Mind provides order, directing all 
things to be for the best.  The soul can apprehend this order, understanding the directives 
of Mind, through philosophical contemplation.  Knowing its place and function in the 
cosmic order, the soul directs the body to order its chaotic appetites, and thus creating 
the best life for a human being, the philosophical life.   
 Granted the existence of the Forms, “Beautiful, itself by itself” (Phd. 100b), 
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Socrates argues that what is immortal could never become mortal, as a Form “could 
never become opposite to itself” (Phd. 103b).  The argument ends with Socrates and 
Cebes agreeing that the soul, that which brings bodies to life, could not admit of death to 
itself (Phd. 103b-107a).  Putting all objections to rest, Plato writes a strange, 
cosmological myth to end the Phaedo, offering a glance into what he thought the 
organization of the cosmos was, but also relaying his doubts about the value of life on 
earth.  Earth is a large sphere positioned in the center of a homogenous kosmos (Phd. 
109a-b).  The earth’s atmosphere is the cold sediment of the kosmos’s ether (Phd. 109c).  
Life in this atmosphere is not the pinnacle of existence, but a middle order between the 
lesser developed, water dwelling organisms and the more developed beings above the 
atmosphere (Phd. 109c-110b).  The myth is, of course, just a myth, not a literal truth 
(Phd. 114d).  But the lesson is clear.  The cosmos is hierarchical and humanity finds 
itself in the middle; one can ascend to a higher plane through contemplation and 
philosophical living or descend into a lower plane through bodily living.    
 The Phaedo creates an account of the soul, philosophy, and cosmos that is very 
much at odds with how Plato portrayed Socrates in the Apology and Crito.  But if the 
argument is problematic, that is no reason to turn against argumentation itself.  Plato 
issues a caution in the Phaedo not to become a misologue, a hater of reason (Phd. 89d).  
If philosophers fail to construct persuasive, coherent arguments, they ought not hate 
argumentation or reason itself, but fault themselves, never giving up the pursuit of truth 
in argument and reason.  Plato provides an initial system of philosophy and a picture of 
the cosmos in which the soul struggles to free itself of its bodily prison through pure 
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contemplation.  The soul distrusts all sensory perception; it avoids those mired in sensual 
living.  Philosophers are not political at all.  They avoid temporal affairs; they eschew 
physical concerns and those devoted to satisfying the physical appetites.  The argument 
contradicts the earlier account of Socrates who tries to reconcile his living in Athens and 
care for all people with his service to the god.  Socrates did not seek the exclusive 
company of philosophical, ascetic souls; he discussed the nature of things with whoever 
crossed his path.  The cosmos, the soul, and the life of philosophy in the Phaedo are 
incompatible with the account of Socrates in the Apology and Crito, but the Phaedo is 
not Plato’s final work on the soul, cosmology, and the relationship of philosopher and 
city. 
Conclusion 
 Plato’s early dialogues raise questions more than they provide answers. Each one 
appears discrete; connecting them provides no doctrinal coherence.  Taken in turn, and 
read as a collection, they spell out challenges to philosophy and politics, raise questions 
about the relationship between gods and humans, and compel the reader to wonder about 
the place of the philosopher in the city and of the city’s purpose in the cosmos. 
 The Euthyphro is critical of the irrational, conflicting mythology of the 
traditional gods.  Furthermore, by revealing this irrationality and contradictions within 
the mythology, the Euthyphro denies that the traditional understanding of the gods can 
support political institutions and individual political charges.  Plato’s dialogue shows 
that a simplistic or partial understanding of a divine mythology can lead a citizen to 
think he or she possesses certain knowledge of the gods, specifically about what the gods 
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consider pious and impious actions.  Of course, if one did know the gods’ thoughts on 
piety, one would apply those standards to interactions with human beings, or fellow 
citizens at least.  Plato does not challenge the notion that divine standards may guide 
humanity, but he does challenge the notion that the old myths contain those standards.  
In fact, they contain multiple and contradicting standards.  In such a mythology, a person 
may follow a divine example only to find they have pleased some gods and angered 
others.  This sort of mythology will not suffice for Plato.  Divinities ought not be in 
conflict, and divine standards should be rational and coherent.  Still, the dialogue ends 
without answering important questions.  If not the traditional ones, do divine standards 
truly exist?  How does one come to know the divine?   
 The Apology, in a way, answers the last question.  Socrates comes to know the 
divine through his own personal sign, through the Oracle’s message, and through a life 
of investigating that message.  But the Apology is about more than just Socrates’ trial.  
Can a philosopher, a servant of the divine, live in a political order?  Socrates’ 
philosophical life leads him to challenge the foundations of the city in which he lives.  
He must question his fellow citizens about what they think they know.  These 
discussions only reveal the interlocutor’s ignorance, and thus raise questions about 
whether such people are fit to rule the city.  Furthermore, these revelations stir anger and 
resentment against Socrates.  His philosophical pursuits must be private, and thus he 
cannot be a public man.  Philosophy precludes his full citizenship.  But the dialogue 
includes some curious ambivalence about this.  Certainly, Socrates will not yield his 
divine service to civic participation or civic penalty.  He is a philosopher, a servant of 
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the gods, before he is an Athenian citizen.  Yet, Socrates also expresses a deep 
connection to the city.  He is proud of his military service.  He calls himself a divine gift 
to the city.  He participates in public obligations as much as possible, but does not 
recklessly endanger his philosophical mission by speaking in the public assembly, 
thereby needlessly antagonizing fellow citizens.  Can a philosopher be a full citizen?  
Should they even want to be one?  Should servants to gods be bound to the city in which 
they were born?  Should a divine servant travel among cities, talking to all who will 
listen and avoiding all particular connections?  
 The Crito does not address these questions directly, but rather offers a different 
perspective.  First, the dialogue defends the non-traditional maxim that one must never 
do wrong, not even a wrong in return for a wrong.  Socrates has the opportunity to 
escape prison and live in another city.  Presumably, he may continue his philosophical 
life.  But the old philosopher rejects that course.  He thinks of himself as created by the 
laws of Athens.  They provided for his legal genesis with their marriage laws.  They 
provided for his education.  The laws, the city itself really, constituted him.  After 
making him, the laws allowed Socrates to leave if he found them wanting.  Socrates, 
made by Athens, remained in Athens.  To escape, besides ulterior negative 
consequences, would be to wrong the city, and one must never do wrong.   
Problems abound in connecting the lessons of Crito to the Apology.  If the 
philosopher owes obedience to the city (as in the Crito) and owes obedience to the gods 
(as in the Apology), what happens when the demands of the two authorities are not in 
harmony?  Clearly, the philosopher must tread lightly.  Socrates faced such a dilemma.  
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The public institutions of Athens (namely, speaking at the assembly) would not long 
tolerate a philosophical mission.  Socrates thus avoided this aspect of citizenship.  
Eventually, the conflict between his philosophical mission and the public duties and 
expectations of Athenian citizenship caught up to him.  The gods and city were not in 
harmony.  Socrates would run afoul of one of them sooner or later.  The philosopher 
could not be a citizen, and being a citizen would cut short the philosophical mission.  
The question remains unanswered: can the city find harmony with the divine? 
 The Phaedo does provide an answer to this question, but one that only raises 
more problems.  Plato’s body-soul dualism is an explicit denunciation of material life.  
The life of philosophy is isolated and contemplative.  The philosopher flees from the 
physical world, and the sense-perception of it, seeking to free the soul from the grips of 
the body.  By itself, the soul contemplates true reality and things in themselves.  
Practiced in this way, philosophers will not engage in politics and not dialogue with 
common ignoramuses.  Philosophers may commune with the like-minded, but that is the 
extent of their social interactions.   
 Plato defends a philosophical life in the Phaedo that rejects political pursuits.  
This rejection offers an alternative to the conflict between philosophy and politics found 
in the earlier dialogues, but at what cost?  The stark dualism betrays Socrates’ enjoyment 
of life and discussion.  Socrates (in Plato’s own dialogues and the little-known historical 
figure) is a social being.  He talks with whoever crosses his path, not strictly 
philosophical types.  Nor does the location matter.  Socrates will speak in the agora or a 
symposium; he enjoys drink and discussion.  Socrates may be ascetic, living simply, but 
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he does not appear to utterly despise material existence.  Finally, Socrates did not flee all 
material concerns.  He married, begat children, exercised, and served in the military.  
Plato defends a material, Athenian existence in the Apology and Crito.  He puts material 
existence in a proper place; he does not despise it nor flee from it.  The Phaedo divides 
the philosophical life from the material and political life.  It argues that the philosopher 
can never be truly happy if they try to be a citizen, minimally or fully.   
 Philosophy and political thought could end here.  Philosophy is care of the soul 
and politics is pursuit of the material.  Philosophy damns politics as it binds the soul to 
its inferior, temporary, and bodily prison.  Politics ridicules philosophy as a period of 
quiet at best and a life of madness at worst.  The two are separate and can never work in 
harmony.  Of course, Plato does not end here.  The middle dialogues will address 
philosophy again, and find a purpose for it in the material world.  Politics will be not the 
futile pursuit of material satisfaction, but the construction of harmony among citizens.  If 
philosophy can find the source of order in the cosmos, can and should it create a 
reflective political order? 
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CHAPTER V  
THE MIDDLE DIALOGUES 
Philosophy and the Cosmopolis  
Plato articulates the structure of a cosmopolis in the middle dialogues.  Critical to 
this project are the Phaedrus, Symposium, and Republic.  The Phaedrus and Symposium 
reveal Plato’s developing thought about the practice of philosophy, indicating crucial 
differences from the Phaedo.43  The dialogues reassess what philosophy is and what 
motivates or compels the philosopher.  Rethinking philosophy, Plato finds a necessary 
place for philosophers in the city.  They have a political function that follows from the 
motive forces and ontological hierarchy of the cosmos.  The Republic is Plato’s first 
grand dialogue; he creates his most comprehensive outline of philosophy, the cosmic 
order, and a political constitution.  The city is crafted according to the harmonized 
functioning of philosophers, soldiers, and craftsmen.  These elements are grades in a 
hierarchy that compose a functioning whole.  Philosophic love compels the philosopher 
toward universals, the standards for order in the physical world.  Loving the universals, 
the philosopher looks to recreate them in the physical world.  To do this, the philosopher 
needs a system of education.  The ideal city only exists because of philosophical 
education, and yet true philosophical education cannot exist without the ordered city. 
The completion of the ideal city requires not only a philosopher, but a legacy, the 
capacity to generate future philosophers.  Philosopher-kings rule the city, ordering it 
according to their understanding of the same source of knowledge that directs all motion 
                                                          
43
 Rowe (1993, 4) argues there is no difference in Plato’s account of philosophy from the Phaedo to the 
Phaedrus; only the interlocutors change.  The Phaedo shows philosophy among a group of equals; the 
Phaedrus depicts philosophy between a master and student.  I aim to show a more substantial difference. 
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in the cosmos.  The city and cosmos exist in the same plane of material reality, but at 
different levels in the hierarchy of being.  Cosmopolitanism, rightly understood, is the 
construction of the ordered city in the harmonious cosmos.  Both find their principles of 
order in a greater source of being.  Philosophy leads to that source, and knowledge of it 
compels the philosopher to replicate the eternal standards in the form of a polis. 
The Phaedrus 
 The Phaedrus opens with the eponymous student excitedly relating a speech to 
Socrates, one teaching deception and false love.  The opposite is the focus of the 
dialogue: how to teach true conviction and what real love is.44  To explain, Plato 
elaborates his concept of the soul.  No longer will he stress a body/soul dualism, but the 
soul will be composite and in conflict with itself.  Again differing from the Phaedo, the 
force of love that drives the philosophic soul gives the philosopher a political function, a 
necessary role in this world.45  Love motivates the elder philosophers to the education of 
philosophic youths, recreating the universal intelligibles in the minds of both student and 
teacher.46   
 The dialogue beings with the topic of education; the first lesson is the importance 
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 Bluck (1949) sees the dialogue as Plato’s attack on Isocrates’ school of rhetoric, or the use of persuasion 
without knowledge.  Griswold (1986, 2-3) argues in like fashion, that Plato begins to connect self-
knowledge to knowledge of the forms.  One of the author’s purposes is to contrast Plato’s “self-
knowledge” to modern and postmodern understandings of the term.  
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 The Phaedrus is often read without political content.  Scully (2003, vii) argues the dialogue is about 
“soul leading.”  Similarly, Rowe (1986) argues the Phaedrus concerns the relationship of teacher and 
student in an individualized pursuit of knowledge.  These interpretations fail to see how Plato connects 
souls, cities, and the knowledge of true reality reached through philosophy.  Connecting these dots is 
exactly what I mean by the term Platonic cosmopolitanism.   
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 My interpretation of the Phaedrus is comparatively brief, but shares essential agreements with White’s 
(1993) more detailed work.  Specifically, White (1993, 66-69) argues that philosophical erōs connects the 
soul to nous and the order of true reality.  However, White is analyzing the one dialogue in depth.  I aim to 
relate the dialogue to the development of Plato’s political philosophy. 
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of the teacher knowing the student.  Socrates indeed knows his student, Phaedrus, and 
sees through a veneer of bashfulness to his true, youthful enthusiasm (Phdr. 228a-c).  
Phaedrus has heard a speech about how and whom to seduce (Phdr. 227c).  He wishes to 
practice his oratory on Socrates, but the old sage is aware of the game, as he notices the 
boy clutches the speech itself under his cloak (Phdr. 228d).  The two proceed toward a 
shady grove where Phaedrus may practice the speech, discussing the unreliability of 
traditional mythology along the way (Phdr. 229a-234c).47 
 Socrates reacts to the delivered speech in an ironic, facetious manner, and 
Phaedrus calls on him to explain his feigned ecstasy (Phdr. 234d-e).  To Socrates, the 
speech is unimpressive, almost as if the author was bored with the subject itself (Phdr. 
233e-234a).  Phaedrus disagrees, arguing the speech has discussed the topic so 
thoroughly that nothing ever need be said about love again (Phdr. 235b).  The exchange 
foreshadows a major theme of the dialogue, that no written account is ever a complete 
and perfect account.  In the moment, Socrates’ argument stirs Phaedrus to defend the 
speech and he challenges Socrates to do better.  But outwitting the clever speech on its 
own terms is not Plato’s purpose.  The dialogue rethinks what love is, properly 
beginning by noticing the madness inherent in it.  At least, Phaedrus has demonstrated 
the petulance of love in his adolescent demand that Socrates give a speech (Phdr. 236-
237).       
 Instigated by Phaedrus, Socrates yields and offers a speech (Phdr. 237a-241d).  
Phaedrus had spoken on why a beautiful youth should give his favors to one not in love 
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 Ferrari (1987) attends to the setting of the dialogue, using setting as a method of orientating the reader.  
A number of authors, including White (1993) and Ferrari, have discussed the meaning of Socrates’ words 
on mythology.  The brevity of my account suits its purpose but leaves many topics unearthed.  
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with him.  Socrates mocks this speech, and issues a caution against its author.  Phaedrus’ 
speech comes from Lysias, who intends to convince the beautiful boy to favor the one 
(Lysias himself) who does not love him.  Socrates warns Phaedrus that Lysias is quite in 
love with him, and cleverly is searching for a way to win the competition for his favors.  
Socrates’ speech is a mockery of love, detailing all the harms that the adult lover will 
perpetrate upon the youth.  Erōs, that “all conquering… forceful drive,” will compel the 
adult to ruin the youth, keeping him ignorant, physically effeminate, poor, and socially 
isolated.  Eventually, the force of love on the adult will succumb to reason, and he will 
abandon the youth.  Love in this relationship caused nothing but ruin for the youth.  The 
lesson is to give favor to the one not in love; for every disadvantage the lover offers, the 
non-lover presents benefit (Phdr. 241e). 
 Something is amiss, and Socrates quickly realizes his mistake.  His divine sign 
appears to him, preventing his departure until he has undone his error (Phdr. 242c).  
Love, being divine, does not perpetrate wrongs, yet both speeches condemn it as the 
corruptor of adults and destroyer of youths (Phdr. 242d-243d).  Socrates has given 
offense to the gods with his words and must make amends.      
 Love is a kind of madness.  Speaking again on love, this time reverencing its 
divinity, Socrates argues that love can be a kind of divine madness, like that given to the 
oracles (Phdr. 244a-b).  Divine madness is the source of prophesy and purification.  
Receiving a divine message, one is not in control of themselves, but this state is not to be 
feared.  Remember that nothing evil comes from the gods.  Defending this conception of 
love, Socrates and Phaedrus will re-examine whether a youth should give favors to a 
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lover or a non-lover (Phdr. 245b-c).  The answer will hinge on the character of the love.  
If it is a divine love, then surely the youth will benefit from a relationship.  But if love is 
otherwise motivated, a youth must be wary. 
 The dialogue continues as Socrates offers an account of the soul itself, the 
cosmos, and philosophy (Phdr. 245c).  Souls are what bring life to matter.  A soul is 
immortal and eternal; it is the source of motion internal to physical beings (Phdr. 245c-
e).48  Socrates admits that to describe the soul is more of a god’s task, but a human 
account must suffice (Phdr. 246a).  Plato’s “human account” introduces a concept of the 
soul different from the one of the Phaedo, and demonstrated in the following simile: the 
soul is like “a natural union of a team of winged horse and their charioteer” (Phdr. 
246a).  The souls of gods have perfect horses and drivers, but humanity is not so well-
equipped.  The human soul is like a chariot team with one good horse and one bad 
(Phdr. 246b).  The change in concept is clear from the start.  Neither the body nor 
anything physical causes the failures and miseries of mortal life.  The soul itself is 
flawed, and in conflict within itself.49  This new concept of the soul will effect a change 
in how philosophers interact with others during their embodied life. 
 Plato develops his concept of the soul as he enters into cosmological analysis.  
Souls, Socrates tells, “look after all that lacks a soul” (Phdr. 246b).  Perfect souls look 
after the entire kosmos, but in their course through the heavens, they can “lose their 
wings.”  A soul can drift from the higher orders of reality, steadily descending until it 
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 Translations of Phdr. 245c differ.  See Hackforth (1952, 64) and Guthrie (1975, 419 n.4) for rival 
expositions.  The ambiguity of the phrase may be intentional as well, for Plato may convey that the 
concept itself is insufficient, and so he is re-conceptualizing it.  See Ferrari (1987, 124). 
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 Plato provides an extended metaphoric analysis of conflict in the soul later in the dialogue (Phdr. 253d-
254e).   
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lands upon a material thing.  The soul then animates the body upon which it has fallen; 
the two becoming a living, mortal being (Phdr. 246c-d).  At the center of the kosmos is a 
source of motion, a circular procession revolving around the forms that order lesser 
reality (Phdr. 247a).  During this procession, souls must fly to the highest orders of 
reality, but will struggle if their chariot team includes an unruly horse or lesser charioteer 
(Phdr. 247b-c).  The gods fly this path, their souls being perfect, but not all lesser souls 
may complete the circuit.     
 Some souls ascend to the heights of reality, viewing the eternal forms which 
nourish and strengthen their wings.  The eternal forms, ideals that do not partake of 
shape, color, or any sensory-based perception, exist beyond the heavens (Phdr. 247c).50  
They are the things in which intelligence finds true knowledge.  In the myth, intelligence 
is the driver in the chariot team of the soul (Phdr. 247c-e).  In the heavens, intelligence 
has its fill of knowledge before returning to lower orders of reality, where souls apply 
their knowledge to bring order to the lesser realms of reality.  The souls of gods view all 
the forms and acquire true knowledge of these things; lesser souls cannot accomplish as 
much.  
 The souls of mortals rarely reach the heights of true reality (Phdr. 248a-b).  The 
best of these souls catch merely a glimpse of the forms, but even these souls struggle 
against themselves.  Internally, the unruly horse drags even the most god-like of lesser 
souls down.  Most souls never behold even a mere glimpse of true reality, the place 
beyond the heavens.  The unruly horses within these souls struggle violently, creating a 
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 “hyperourian,” or beyond the heavens (Phdr. 247c). 
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procession of chaos and carnage.  The souls clash and collide, breaking their wings in 
the rampage.  Never in the presence of true reality, they descend upon bodies without 
knowledge, and will have only opinions as their guide to order. 
 The order of mortal lives thus depends on the amount of knowledge planted 
within the soul before it descends into a material body (Phdr. 248c-e).  Souls full of 
knowledge keep their wings in health and remain in the protected realm of the divine.  
The souls that cannot reach the heights, or become forgetful, descend into a hierarchy of 
incarnation.  A soul with a love of knowledge or beauty animates a philosophic human.  
The lesser grade of soul becomes a lawgiver, king, or military general.  Beneath this, 
souls become statesmen, then domestic or business managers, followed by physicians, 
and then priests.  Lesser souls become poets and artists, then manual laborers, and 
demagogues.  The most base souls become tyrants.51  Each soul can improve its status in 
the next incarnation by living a just life, but only the philosophic soul becomes winged 
(Phdr. 249a-c).  And there is a next life for most souls, as it takes time and just living for 
a soul to re-grow its wings and return to a purely immortal existence. 
 With this description of the soul and kosmos, Plato returns to the topic of love 
(Phdr. 249c-250b).  Souls that have seen reality recollect the form of beauty when they 
behold a beautiful object during mortal existence.  Remembering true beauty, they desire 
to return to eternal reality, growing distant from the affairs and concerns of mortal 
humanity.  In this state, a philosopher appears mad to those souls which cannot recollect 
true reality at the sight of a beautiful object.  Most souls cannot apprehend the forms 
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the Republic.  If the tyrant’s soul is so base, how can it cause such great ruin?   
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within objects through their murky, physical senses (Phdr. 250b).  A wide gap still exists 
between philosophers entranced in an ecstatic vision of eternal reality and the souls so 
bereft of knowledge they only can understand such a person as mad, rather than 
possessed by a divine vision (Phdr. 250c).   
 Returning to the dialogue, the philosophic soul pursues the beautiful youth in a 
state of madness and ecstasy.  Beholding a reminder of the beautiful, the broken wings 
of the soul begin to heal.  The process is both painful and joyful, and the philosophic 
soul must retain the company of the beautiful object to continue the soul’s healing (Phdr. 
251a-252b).  This is a key change from the Phaedo.  Individual contemplation is not 
sufficient for philosophy.  A philosophic soul needs the company of other beautiful 
souls.  They first apprehend this beauty through sight- a physical sense.  The goal is still 
to escape from mortal, material life, but the manner of escape has changed.  Plato has 
found reason for the philosopher to live a sociable existence.  Philosophers must seek 
about objects of beauty to spur the re-growth of their soul’s wings; they may not reside 
in solitary contemplation, spurning physical existence until their soul separates from its 
wicked body. 
 The philosopher being the lover, a relationship with a beautiful youth can be 
beneficial to both (Phdr. 255a-256e).  If they can maintain self-control, meaning if 
intelligence (the charioteer) keeps its rule over the physical desires (the unruly horse), 
both the philosopher and the youth will grow wings and return to higher orders of 
existence upon death.  Even if they cannot maintain strict self-control, they still benefit 
each other.  They will stimulate the wings, but fail to re-grow them.  From a non-lover, a 
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youth gains only human things (Phdr. 256e-257a).  The soul remembers nothing of 
eternal reality, the wings neither grow nor are stimulated.  Socrates concludes his ode to 
love with this: the youth should choose the lover. 
 Solving the problem of whom the youth should choose, the dialogue concludes 
with a related discussion of rhetoric and speech-writing (Phdr. 257c).  The concern is 
whether speeches, orated and written, convey good or ill (Phdr. 258d).  For a speech to 
be good, the composer must possess the truth of the subject (Phdr. 259e).  Using 
knowledge of a particular subject and the soul, the art of rhetoric will produce persuasion 
in a soul ignorant of true knowledge (Phdr. 270a-271a).  This is the crux: rhetoricians of 
the era know nothing of the soul and only the preliminaries of any given subject (Phdr. 
267a-269e).  They do not persuade souls to knowledge.  True rhetoric adjusts the style of 
speech to the soul receiving the words (Phdr. 271d-272b).  The discussion includes this 
important note: interpersonal dialogue is superior to the written word in transmitting 
truth from soul to soul (Phdr. 276a-b).  Thus, philosophy itself needs living philosophers 
to maintain its rigorous standards; a philosophical text is only a second-level good 
(Phdr. 277d-278b). 
The Symposium 
 The Symposium recounts a celebration at the house of Agathon, the winner in a 
dramatic competition.  The guests, still suffering from the previous day’s drinking of 
spirits, decide not to imbibe for the night.  For amusement they will give speeches in 
praise of Love.  Four speakers take their turns before Agathon himself praises divine 
Love, and the guests applaud his efforts with great approval.  Socrates, of course, is less 
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laudatory, and unimpressed with all the efforts.  Socrates engages in a brief dialectical 
exercise before his companions request a speech from him.  Socrates obliges, recounting 
a lesson he once learned from the philosophical Diotima.  Like the Phaedrus, Plato 
addresses the idea of love in the Symposium.  He explains what it is, meaning both the 
compelling force of it and what actions it fosters among people and animals.  The force 
of love will explain why philosophers have a purpose in the material world above merely 
waiting for the mortal release of death.   
 Following four of his guests, Agathon speaks every praise imaginable to love and 
receives a loud ovation for his efforts (Smp. 194e-198a).  Love is delicate and fluid, so it 
can encompass the entire soul.  It is just and good, never doing violence.  Love is 
moderate and brave; love inspires all crafts.  Of all things, Love is best and beautiful! 
Socrates spoils Agathon’s tribute with a cutting remark.  In short, Socrates thought the 
art of praise meant telling the beautiful truths about a thing, but apparently Agathon 
found a different approach (Smp. 198d).  Agathon simply applied the most beautiful 
truths to the object, whether it possesses them or not (Smp. 198e).  The preceding 
speeches have not revealed the true nature of Love, but only relayed old myths, comedic 
stories, and flattery. 
 Socrates, rather than conjuring flattery, asks a basic question of Agathon, “Is 
Love such as to be a love of something or of nothing” (Smp. 199d)?  The exchange 
serves to point out that love is a desire for things; it is not the possession of those things 
(Smp. 199d-200b).  Love is the force that motivates people to possess the necessary 
things they do not have, or to want in perpetuity the necessary things they have in the 
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moment (Smp. 200c-d).  Defining love this way, it is neither beautiful nor good, as 
Agathon described it, but it is a desire for beauty and goodness (Smp. 201a-c).  Socrates 
has refuted Agathon’s method of praise with simple definition, and the simple definition 
carries significant philosophical importance.   
 Now that Agathon’s great praise is reduced to muddle, the guests clamor for 
Socrates to give a speech.  He obliges in his way, retelling a conversation about love he 
had with another philosopher, Diotima.  Like Agathon, Socrates was once stumped about 
the nature of love.  He thought if it is not beautiful, must it be ugly (Smp. 201e)?  No, 
love is not ugly, nor strictly beautiful.  Diotima introduced him to the category of in-
between things (Smp. 202a).  Correct judgment (to ortha doxazein), knowing without 
being able to give complete reasoning, is a state between ignorance and wisdom, so why 
can there not be a state between the beautiful and the ugly (Smp. 202a-b)?  Thus, love is 
not beautiful and good, but the desire for these things.  It is an intermediary being or a 
great spirit (daimōn megas) residing between divinity and mortality (Smp. 202c-e).  
Love is a messenger spirit between the divine and mortals.   
 Among human beings, everyone is in love with something, but some people are 
in love in a peculiar way.  Love compels the pursuit of good and beautiful things.  
Satisfying that love, one reaches a state of well-guided fulfillment, or eudaimonia (Smp. 
204e-205a).  Plato writes that people pursue the good in many ways, but these pursuits 
are not the true ideal of love (Smp. 205b-d).  What love compels is giving birth in both 
body and soul (Smp. 206b).  The phrase mystifies Socrates as Diotima speaks it (Smp. 
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206c).52  What Plato means is that love motivates reproduction in all its forms.  The 
common expression of love for mortals is physical reproduction (Smp. 206c-d).  This 
form of reproduction is beautiful and good as the avenue of immortality to mortals (Smp. 
207a).  Reproduction, from the genesis of new mortals to the simple act of studying to 
replace lost knowledge, is the outcome of love’s desire. 
 However, some human beings pursue immortality through means other than 
physical reproduction.  Love inspires heroism and great deeds, so that one may be 
remembered forever (Smp. 208c-e).  Love inspires some people, pregnant in their souls 
(en tais psychais kuousin), to give birth in all the virtues; for some this means giving 
birth in wisdom.  With regard to the virtue of wisdom or prudence (phronēsis) the 
highest, most beautiful genesis is that of the lawgivers (Smp. 209a).  Love inspires 
lawgivers to establish a political constitution for others.  This constitution includes more 
than the institutional form of government.  The laws regulate the whole of the culture, 
education, religion, and government.  In effect, lawgivers become the fathers of citizens 
rather than bodies. 
 Plato ends the conversation between Socrates and Diotima with a few thoughts 
on education, or how to raise a philosophical soul.53  Always needing direction toward 
what is beautiful, young students first need beautiful companions.  Initially, the students 
will see only the physical beauty of their companion, but soon they progress to see the 
beauty within the soul (Smp. 210a-c).  The students graduate to study customs and laws, 
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and then theories of knowledge (Smp. 210c-d).  Finally, these full-fledged lovers of 
wisdom will come to know beauty itself (Smp. 210e-211c).  Never changing, never a 
particular thing, a form is always purely itself.  Beholding such a vision is what love 
compels within a philosophical soul.           
 Tracing the argument from the end to the beginning, we see a nascent but 
complete cosmopolitan philosophy.  A good city needs a lover of wisdom to write its 
laws.  Lovers of wisdom need proper education to attain true knowledge.  The force of 
love that compels the desire for true knowledge also compels the desire for reproduction.  
The very force that motivates philosophical contemplation also motivates political 
thought.  Love is the intermediary spirit, communicating the eternal forms of the 
cosmos, truth, beauty, and goodness, to the mortal realm.  Knowing these things, 
philosophers reproduce the physical, political world in the image of the cosmos.   
The Republic 
 Plato’s Republic is a classic work of literature, philosophy, and political theory.  
Analyses of the dialogue can lose their way in its intricacies if the author is not careful.  
For the purposes of this project, I am focusing on three interlocked conceptual levels of 
the dialogue.  Plato gives an integrated account of the individual soul, the city, and the 
cosmos.54  The soul is famously tripartite, the city has three classes, and the cosmos 
follows from the good itself.  The Republic contains a cosmopolis, a political design that 
follows from the inherent and eternal order of being and harmony within hierarchical 
reality.  The highest level of earthly fulfillment is only possible when the individual soul 
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is ordered and when that individual lives in the well-ordered city.  Each individual must 
attain harmony among the competing motivations within their composite soul.  As a 
citizen, each individual must fulfill his or her function, whether as a craftsman, soldier, 
or philosopher.  Finally, the city itself, when consisting of well-ordered souls and 
political classes, will reflect the principles of good, beauty, and truth.  After a brief 
introduction to the dialogue, analysis of the Republic will focus on the interwoven 
concepts of individual, city, and cosmos to better reveal the cosmopolitan structure of 
the argument. 
 Book I of the Republic introduces the topic of justice.55  Thrasymachus, 
following Polemarchus and Cephalus, all introduce different conceptions of justice (tēn 
dikaiosunēn, R. 331c).  For Cephalus, justice is not having to cheat, lie, or steal to 
acquire and secure his wealth (R. 331b).  The old man is happy to have been wealthy 
through his life, since money has precluded him from situations of deception and debt.  
In his old age, he begins to worry about the stories of Hades, particularly those that say 
the unjust must pay for their misdeeds (R. 330d-331c).  Polemarchus clarifies his father’s 
conception, arguing that justice is giving what is owed, and one owes good things to 
friends and bad things to enemies (R. 332a-b).  The father and son present traditional 
conceptions of justice: Cephalus supplies the business ethic (deal straightly and pay your 
debts) and Polemarchus provides the clan ethic (treat your relations well, outsiders 
cautiously, and enemies poorly).  Plato wrote in other dialogues on how traditional ideas 
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had broken down.56  Similarly in the Republic, traditional conceptions of justice do not 
withstand Socrates’ logical interrogation.   
 Unlike the earlier interlocutors, Thrasymachus rejects the traditional, 
conventional accounts of justice.  Thrasymachus declares what anyone might conclude 
in an era of traditional breakdown: justice is nothing at all or the interest of the stronger 
(R. 338c-339a).  Rulers establish codes of law, “the justice system,” to secure desired 
advantages for themselves.  Thrasymachus’ answer represents one possible conclusion to 
what justice is, and a shrewd, empirical one at that.  An observer of Greek cities may 
realize the laws are not divine, not ancient, and not ideal.  Is it coincidence that 
democracies establish laws to the benefit of the demos?  Or that oligarchies establish 
laws consistent with their class preferences?  Clearly, tyrants erect laws to preserve their 
own power and pursue their desired ends.  Thrasymachus’ argument is clear, observable, 
and conventional.  Governments make laws for the benefit of those in the government 
and its supporters.  One need not look to the gods, to tradition, nor to philosophers for 
some idealized conception of what justice is.           
 Thrasymachus’ view of government and law is one of exploitation (R. 343b-
344c).  Rulers attend the ruled as shepherds attend their sheep; rulers maintain some of 
their flock as a store of resources and fatten a portion for slaughter.  Of course, this view 
turns the ideal of justice upside-down.  The just person, the law-abiding citizen, 
complies with his or her own exploitation.  The just citizens are the sheep that provide 
material advantages to their rulers, all the while ignorantly thinking they are acting 
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according to some greater standard.  The just are ignorant and exploited, Thrasymachus 
contends; the unjust, if they gain power, are wise, happy, and live virtuously, meaning 
they exhibit “the qualities of excellence” that lead to a fulfilled life.57  Without an ideal 
conception of justice, Thrasymachus’ conventionalism, if unpalatable, stands as a solid 
description of government.  
 Socrates ultimately refutes Thrasymachus’ claim that injustice is more profitable 
than justice and that the unjust live happily while the just are miserable, but the victory is 
logical and formal rather than convincing.58  The unresolved nature of justice, whether 
virtue or vice, permeates the atmosphere.  Glaucon raises his voice to articulate the 
challenge to Socrates: prove that justice is good in itself, not only for the rewards it 
provides (R. 357b-358a).  Glaucon echoes a common defense of injustice and common 
complaints about justice.  Injustice, if one can get away with it, is good for the 
individual.  If one could kill the king, marry the queen, usurp the kingdom, and not pay 
any penalty or suffer any loss, why not reap these advantages (R. 359d-360d)?  Justice is 
a kind of mean, Glaucon argues.  Individuals who are too weak to commit injustice with 
impunity prefer to reach a mutual agreement not to commit injustice at all.  No one will 
commit injustice, nor suffer it.  They establish laws as guarantors of the agreement and 
to punish those who commit injustice.  However, these people still would prefer to 
commit injustice with impunity if they could escape punishment (R. 359b-c).  Justice, 
commonly understood, is an arduous and second-best choice. 
 Ideally, Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is desirable in itself 
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even if the just person faces persecution and torture, mistakenly believed by fellow 
citizens to be unjust (R.361e).  After heaping praise and benefit upon the unjust life, and 
curses and pains upon the just life, Glaucon completes his challenge.  His brother, 
Adeimantus, adds a final touch by introducing the divine (R. 362d-363b).  Through their 
justice, the pious accrue all sorts of benefits from the gods (R. 363d).  The impious suffer 
eternal labors and punishments in Hades (R. 363e).  However, Adeimantus notes that 
some priests and prophets persuade individuals and whole cities that certain rites can 
absolve or purify the living or the dead of their injustice (R. 364e-365a).  Adeimantus 
challenges Socrates to address the ambiguous relationship of the divine, the just, and 
excellence.  If one can bribe the gods to remove the stain of injustice, then the successful 
practitioner of injustice will have the resources to secure their absolution- vice may be 
an excellence!  Adeimantus inquires into the nature of the gods and the just.  He even 
questions their existence (R. 365a-366b).  How does the divine relate to justice? 
 Socrates himself completes the challenge.  Justice exists in both the individual 
and in the city as a whole (R. 368d-369).  As a city is larger than a single person, civic 
justice ought to be larger and more visible than individual, psychic justice.  Socrates and 
his interlocutors will create a city, watch it come to be in theory, and hopefully find 
where justice exists within it.59  Three levels have been set and interrelated.  First, what 
is justice in the individual soul?  Is it good in itself?  Does justice motivate the individual 
to good things, or does the reputation of justice yield conventional honors?  Second, 
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more than just speech; it means reasoned speech.  The phrase conveys that the interlocutors are going to 
discuss rationally why human beings create cities in the first place, and then decipher what part justice 
plays in civic construction.  “City in speech” is not the only possibly translation; city in reason is equally 
plausible.   
  
121 
what is interpersonal, meaning political, justice?  How does justice come to be in the city 
and what is its function there?  Third, if divinities exist, how do they view the just and 
unjust?  Can sacrifice and ritual purge the stain of unjust deeds?  If Plato cannot answer 
these questions coherently, then justice may be as Glaucon or Thrasymachus described 
it.     
The Cosmos  
 The dialogue within the Republic constructs the city from its human foundation, 
beginning with individual need before reaching to the heavens.  To facilitate the 
exposition of the cosmopolitanism theory within the dialogue, I divide from the dialogue 
three broad sections, one of the cosmos, another on the individual, and final one on the 
city itself.  Assumptions, axioms, and understandings of the heavens intertwine with 
individual psychology and political order.  Plato’s dualistic understanding of the cosmos, 
that the physical world exists along with an immaterial world, is the foundation of his 
political philosophy, or least that understanding is what his philosophy has found to 
counter the conventionalism of Thrasymachus and Glaucon. 
 The word kosmos and its derivatives relate to a state of order or of putting things 
into order.60  The kosmos is the totality of the material world and the principles and 
forces that order it.  Substantively, the kosmos is a material thing.  However, thinking 
through the concept, the kosmos must include those non-material things from which it 
finds its very order.  To discuss the material structure of the kosmos without reference to 
its non-material sources of order would make little sense.  The examination of Plato’s 
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cosmology will focus on the non-material sources of order in the discussion of the 
kosmos, and how the polis is an integral component of the kosmos.  
 Plato’s first axiom about the kosmos is that contrary to popular mythology, the 
divine is good (agathos) and only good (R. 379a-c).61  The divine is the cause of good 
things.  Nothing evil comes from the divine.  The gods do not quarrel, fight, or hate each 
other, as some of their stories tell (R. 378c).  The divine, broadly understood,62 is the 
source of order for the material world; it is not a source of disorder or chaos.  Since the 
divine is good, and nothing bad comes from something good, then people must cease 
blaming the divine for their troubles in the material world (R. 379c).  The source of 
goodness and order in the world cannot be the source of troubles and disorder. 
 Second, what is good is resistant to change (R. 380d-381b).  As nothing evil 
comes from the divine, so neither is the divine shape-shifting, deceptive, or deceitful.63  
Again, Plato contradicts popular myths and posits that true order is unchanging.  
Relating back to accounts in the Phaedrus and Symposium, principles of the kosmos 
remain consistent.  The gods and the daimonia are the communicators between the 
highest levels of reality and human beings.  They exist near the unchanging eternals, the 
source of order for material things.  Goodness in the material world depends on 
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 Plato is denouncing the myths that portray the gods as taking human or animal shapes to satisfy their 
desires.  If the gods are superior to humans and animals, they would not mimic their shape, both lowering 
themselves in appearance and perpetrating deception.  Of course, this implies that the gods would not do 
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replication of these eternals.  Plato’s revision of traditional religion, from 
anthropomorphic gods to the eternal, unchanging order, is evident.  The gods are not 
filled with the base desires and chaotic motions characteristic of human beings.   
 Third, there exist the Forms, eternal, unchanging, and intelligible models for 
physical reality (R. 474c-476a).  The Forms do not take material existence, but all 
particulars in material existence are instantiations of the ideal Forms.  The material 
world is one of change, flux, and opinion; one can have knowledge only of the 
unchanging Forms. 
 Fourth, the highest aspiration of love is to know true order and beauty with 
prudence or temperance.  Physical desire is not the apex of love’s motivation (R. 403a).  
Rightly, love desires order and temperance, rather physical pleasures.  The context of the 
discussion concerns the relationship between erastēs and erōmenos, or an adult lover and 
his younger beloved.  Plato explains that higher love directs one toward true, ordered 
being, not toward physical pleasure.  Right or higher love leads a person to know true 
reality and become truly aware.  A life without this awareness is like living in a 
permanent sleep (R. 476c-e).  Lesser types of love only entangle a person in a fluctuating 
world of maddening, material desires.64              
 Fifth, only a strict education and upbringing can lead a person to knowledge.  
Throughout childhood, a philosophical soul must see order and never encounter anything 
unjust or evil (R. 409a-e).  Such a soul must be trained in music and gymnastics to 
strengthen the spirit (to thumoeidēs), but to keep it moderate as well (R. 410c-411e).  
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When a promising student begins to mature, he or she will embark on a course of study 
designed to turn the soul toward true being- that which always is.  In the very nature of 
their souls, philosophical youths are not satisfied to study generation and decay, but their 
souls desire eternal things (R. 485a-b).  Subjects that lead the mind to abstractions, 
eternals, and unchanging reality comprise the curriculum, including arithmetic, 
geometry, three-dimensional solids, astronomy, and dialectical reasoning.  Philosophers 
will consort with the eternal Forms, becoming ordered and godlike in themselves (R. 
500c-d).  Attaining knowledge, they can discern a well-ordered instantiation from an ill-
ordered one, and order instantiations into harmony with one another.    
 The ontology of the kosmos is one half of the foundation of Plato’s middle 
cosmopolitanism.  The second foundational pillar, the tripartite soul, concerns Plato’s 
account of the individual.  Plato explains that the human soul contains three separate 
components: appetite, spirit, and reason.  Each one is a motive force that desires a 
particular good.  The appetitive force desires material satisfaction, the spirited force 
desires victory and honor, and the rational force desires knowledge.  Of the composite 
whole, one force inherently rules the total soul, and that soul can be well-educated or ill-
educated within itself.  The proper education of any soul will require political 
relationships.  For any individual to live the best way possible, he or she must live in 
harmony with others in the ordered, ideal city.   
The Citizen 
 Individuals are not self-sufficient in Plato’s calculation.  No craftsman can 
produce enough individually to satisfy his or her wants (R. 369b-c).  The quality and 
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quantity of goods will suffer if a craftsman attempts to learn multiple skills to satisfy all 
desires.  The principle of specialization appears to be the solution; one individual learns 
the craft at which he or she excels and produces a surplus for trade.  Soldiers and 
philosophers are not self-sufficient as well.  No soldier can win a battle alone.  No 
philosophical soul can come to know true reality in isolation.  Especially for the ancient 
Greeks, soldiers are not self-sufficient- a phalanx of one is not an intimidating sight!  
Philosophers also need assistance in material provision, security, and education.  In 
Plato’s reckoning, the kosmos determines that individuals are not self-sufficient.     
 That individuals have an inherent and unmixed nature (phusis) is a primary 
axiom in constructing the city (R. 370a-c, 394d-398b).  One is born a craftsman, soldier, 
or philosopher, and will not lead a fulfilled life attempting to be something else.  
Craftsmen possess a nature that leads them to work at specific a station, or technē.  
Blacksmiths are born to work the furnace, farmers born to till the soil, and so forth.  
Similarly, soldiers possess a soul attuned to war and philosophical souls desire to 
contemplate all that truly is.  Attempts to perform multiple crafts, for a blacksmith to be 
a soldier as well, preclude that individual from eudaimonia or living a fulfilled life. 
 To defend this separation of humanity into three classes, Plato conceives of the 
tripartite soul.  Three motive forces exist within the composite soul, competing for 
primary rule.  Appetites, spirit, and reason impel people in different degrees.  Within 
craftsmen, the appetitive drive rules the soul.  Within soldiers, honor or spirit primarily 
motivates the soul.  Finally, reason rules the philosopher’s soul.   
 Ignorance and lower motivations lead to a disordered world.  Well-ordered, each 
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soul lives the best way possible.  Craftsmen will produce material goods and distribute 
them through trade.  They will provide for soldiers, who in turn defend the city from 
external threats and domestic turmoil.  Philosophers, similarly receiving provision from 
the craftsmen, create and enforce a system of education for the whole city.  Yet, 
individuals and cities often go awry.65  Soldiers enslave and plunder their city’s 
craftsmen.  They grow rich and turn into money-lovers.  Still plundering the many, these 
oligarchs grow weak.  The many overthrow them and establish a democracy in which 
everyone is free to pursue a self-identified conception of the good.  The absence of true 
philosophers allowed ignorance to enter the city and began its decline.  In a democracy, 
a philosophical youth receives an education in luxury, freedom, and indulgence, and may 
develop into the tyrant who enslaves the whole city.  Each of Plato’s souls can be well-
ordered or ill-ordered.  An appetitive soul can work as craftsman in an ordered city or a 
slave in a disordered city.  A spirited soul can become a guardian soldier or a plundering 
one.  And a philosophical soul can grow into a just king or an unjust tyrant.  For each 
individual to live a fulfilled life, they must reside in an ordered city. 
The Cosmopolis 
 The polis was the basic Greek form of society and government.  Distilling an 
idealized concept from the Republic, the true polis is the harmony of the three classes of 
humanity.  In the ideal city, the members of each class live in eudaimonia and contribute 
to the other classes’ eudaimonia; each class owes the others a debt.   In a polis without 
this comprehensive harmony, without the confluence of three ordered classes, no type of 
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soul will achieve eudaimonia. 
 Plato described the ideal city as a union of individuals who call each other fellow 
citizens, or politas (R. 463a).  Since individuals alone are unable to satisfy their needs, 
they share their production amongst each other (R. 369c-370a).  To satisfy material 
needs, the city must include an assortment of craftsmen, including farmers, builders, 
cowherds, merchants, sailors, wage laborers, and more (R. 369d-371a).  A simple city is 
not sufficient to satisfy necessities.  Craftsmen need luxuries, and so the city will need 
hunters, actors, beauticians, and more (R. 373b-c).  Such a city will need to conquer land 
to secure these luxuries, and in turn will become a tempting prize for conquest.  The city 
will need a body of soldiers to provide martial defense (R. 373d-374a).  Recall that an 
individual soul has only one nature, so craftsmen cannot function as soldiers as well.  
The city needs another class of humanity, a group of soldiers.   
 The spirited souls of nature’s soldiers are complex compared to appetitive souls.  
Spirited souls need proper training to grow into protective guard dogs rather than 
ravenous wolves.  All soldiers must acquire a measure of philosophy necessary to 
compliment their spirited nature, or thumoeidēs (R. 376c-d).  Music, poetry, and physical 
education are necessary (R. 376e).  Courses in poetry convey the true stories of gods, 
heroes, and virtues (R. 376e-377, especially 377b-c).  The city will teach stories that are 
true, fine, and beautiful and discard the false ones, like Hesiod’s tales of Uranus, Kronos, 
and Zeus (R. 377e-378a).  The task of creating this educational program falls to 
philosophers.66  Here the soldiers find themselves indebted to philosophical souls.  They 
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will not live a fulfilled life if, being ill-educated, they are either cowardly in defense of 
their city or cruel in its plunder. 
 Education is the central pillar of the city and the heart of Plato’s political 
organization (R. 423e).  Education instills moderation (sōphrosunēn) within the classes 
and harmony (homonoian) among them (R. 432a).67  The education program has three 
prongs: leading the soldiers to courage, instilling moderation in the craftsmen, and 
raising the next generation of philosophers to know the good.  Awakening courage in the 
souls of soldiers requires purging certain elements from poetry.  Anything that teaches 
the young to fear death, the afterlife, or Hades and the underworld must be censored (R. 
386a-387c).  Stories portraying the gods as deceptive or committing vile deeds must not 
be told (R. 380d, 381d-e).  The education young soldiers receive must foster the control 
of their emotions, especially fear of death.  However, all the elements of the spirited soul 
need educating; therefore, soldiers must learn neither to lament nor laugh in excess (R. 
387c-389a).  Soldiers train physically, but receive an education for their souls.  
Gymnastics, music, and poetry order the tripartite soul, awakening reason to temper the 
spirit, and controlling the appetites.  Fear of death, desire of luxury, and cruelty to fellow 
citizens are the soldier’s vices.  Proper education turns the spirited soul to virtue instead.  
Without the guidance of philosophers, soldiers would not receive a proper education, 
and their souls may remain ignorant and turned to vice instead of virtue. 
 Craftsmen require an education from philosophers as well.  Programs of 
gymnastics and poetry teach the craftsmen to regulate their appetites and avoid gluttony 
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(R. 410a-c), and they will need philosophical guidance in other matters (R. 389d).  
Despite their technē, craftsmen need the supervision of philosophers over their items of 
production to prevent the release of inferior or damaging works into the city (R. 401a-
402c).68  Well-educated in the city and well-ordered in their souls, craftsmen work their 
technē, distribute goods, and enjoy material satisfaction.  It is a simple routine, and the 
proper life for the appetitive class of soul.   
 The city owes much to the philosophers for their program of education, but do 
the philosophers in turn owe anything to the city?  Philosophers order the souls of 
craftsmen and soldiers, and that internal ordering also creates harmony between those 
classes. Harmony and moderation are necessary for the education of young, 
philosophical souls as well.  A young philosopher’s worst possible fate is to live among 
a collection of disordered, poorly-educated, appetitive and spirited souls (R. 492e).  A 
mob instead of a city, this collection of disordered souls will mislead a philosophical 
soul, twisting all of that individual’s potential advantages (beauty, intelligence, and 
strength) into pitfalls (R. 491b-c).  A philosophical soul, when ill-educated in a 
disordered city, may grow into a tyrant.  Living in these conditions, a desire for the 
crowd’s favor overwhelms the young philosopher (R. 492e).  Sophists, peddling their 
“knack” of persuasion, imbue contempt for the crowd even as they convey the tricks of 
persuasion, only deepening the ill-education and further twisting the soul’s motivation 
(R. 493a-c).  An ill-educated philosophical soul in a disordered city can cause great evils, 
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ruining the city and the souls of its inhabitants (R. 491d-e).  In the subsequent chaos, the 
philosopher’s own fate is worst of all.  Should the young philosopher develop into a 
tyrant, he or she will experience the worst of all possible lives.69  To avoid this fate, 
philosophers must grow up in a city that exhibits internally ordered and mutually 
harmonious craftsmen and soldiers.  In addition, when they reach maturity, young 
philosophers will need older philosophers to guide their higher education.          
 The city’s educational structure establishes the foundation for young 
philosophers in the examples of moderation and harmony among the craftsmen and 
soldiers.  A philosopher’s education continues into soldierly training.  Philosophers 
receive the same education in music and gymnastics as the soldiers.  Again, such 
education is not for the body, but for the soul.  Music and gymnastics rouse and temper 
the spirit, so that philosophers strengthen the spirited part of the soul (R. 410c-411e).  
The education of the philosophers aims to order the tripartite soul to its highest 
functioning.  To this end, spirit must tame the appetites without overwhelming reason.   
 Awakening the rational component of the soul requires a specialized curriculum 
at the highest levels of education.  Philosophers must love learning itself, love the whole 
of wisdom, and possess a desire to learn everything (R. 475b-c).  True philosophers do 
not love beautiful examples, but love the beautiful itself.  They must see in empirical 
examples only reminders of the eternal forms (R. 475e-476d).  Their education moves 
philosophers to love the thing in itself, not instantiations of the thing (R. 480a).70  They 
must be able to grasp what is always the same in all respects, to love the kind of learning 
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associated with being.  Philosophy aims at what always is, not the lower things that 
change (R. 484b-485b).   
 After their service as soldiers and junior political officers, philosophical souls 
will study an advanced curriculum (R. 498a-b).  Arithmetic, geometry, the study of three 
dimensional solids, and astronomy are courses of study that prime the soul for dialectical 
reasoning (R. 522c-530b).  In addition to practical and military applications, these primer 
courses deal with abstractions rather than sense data.  The curriculum turns the soul 
toward what is: true being, not temporary examples of things.  However, they do not 
reach true being, but only lead the soul to understanding based on hypotheses. Dialectic 
reasoning alone leads a soul from a position of understanding to knowledge of the forms 
themselves (R. 531d-532b).  After awakening true knowledge in the soul and beholding 
a vision of the good (to agathon auto), a philosopher returns to the city to use the good 
itself as the ideal (paradeigmata) of right-ordering (kosmein, R. 540a-b).    
 In the course of the dialogue, Adeimantus objects that philosophers, as he has 
observed them, tend to be good for nothing (R. 487b-e).  Socrates has affirmed that 
properly educated, philosophers will contribute to the city by giving birth in mind and 
truth (R. 490a-b).71  What does Plato mean by this act of genesis?  Having apprehended 
the Good itself, a philosopher returns to the city to resume a political station.  With 
knowledge of the Forms, a philosopher-king censors the poetry and musical practices, 
revises the educational code, oversees the procreation of the soldier class, and guides the 
next generation of philosophical souls to true knowledge.  A philosopher translates 
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knowledge of the Good into political revision.  When the term of service expires, the 
elderly philosophers leave the city, rejoin the practice of dialectical contemplation, and 
return to the “Isle of the Blessed” (R. 540b-c).  Most people, including Adeimantus, are 
ignorant of what true philosophers are.  Living in disordered cities, the many see only 
the corrupted philosophical souls, not properly educated ones.  Knowing the Good, a 
philosopher-king would be the greatest advantage to a city.   
 Why must philosophers abandon dialectical philosophy for kingship?  This 
demotion from the Isle of the Blessed to a city of mere humanity appears to be unjust.  
Indeed, Plato writes that philosophers must be compelled or persuaded to return to the 
city (R. 519-520e).  What could persuade someone to leave the divine to dwell with the 
mortal?  Echoing an argument from the Crito, Plato writes that the philosophers will be 
persuaded to return because the city made them and they owe obedience to their superior 
(R. 520b-c).  The city itself is superior to any individual within it, as no individual can 
live as best as possible outside an ordered political association- even philosophers.  
Plato’s argument in the text is not convincing.72  Looking back at the Phaedrus and 
Symposium, Plato has a better answer.  Philosophers become kings because they desire 
reproduction, like all mortal things.  Their acts of reproduction (they give birth in mind 
and truth) are not physical procreation necessarily, but the replication of the Forms in the 
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minds of philosophical youths and in the political structure itself.  Creating future 
philosophers and establishing the ideal city is a positive good for mature philosophers.  
This must be true to defend the political function of philosophers as kings, and it is true 
according to Plato’s understanding of how philosophy, knowledge, and the Forms instill 
order in physical reality.   
 Ultimately, Plato is ambiguous on the topic in the Republic, but he is not unclear 
or uncertain.  The problem is that he defends both sides too strongly.  In theory, putting 
the city in order is the technē of philosophy.  Eudaimonia for a philosopher, like every 
other citizen, ought to consist in practicing their technē.  Therefore, returning to the city 
and restoring order to it should be a good thing.  Yet, Plato specifically says 
philosophers will not consider this political task a good thing, but a necessity (R. 540b).  
This ambivalence at least shows that Plato is unable or unwilling to wholly reconcile the 
philosopher’s soul with his or her temporary, physical life.   
The Philosopher-Citizen 
 Until philosophers rule as kings, or political and philosophical power coincide, 
cities will face misrule and humanity will suffer.  The ideal city will never be 
instantiated until philosophers rule as kings (R. 473d-e).  Such is the doctrine of the 
Republic.  Political justice requires philosophers, those who possess true knowledge of 
the eternal things, the Forms.  Those without knowledge of the true models cannot make 
reference to real standards when judging instantiated things; they judge by opinion alone 
(R. 484c-d).  Without Forms, and philosophers who know them, the city is merely a 
collection of clashing, opinionated individuals.  By nature, opinions about the Good are 
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bound to differ.  Soldiers will say victory is the highest good and craftsmen will say 
material satisfaction is the best; absent knowledge, nothing can harmonize the two.  A 
polis will not exist, but only a collection of geographically-proximate individuals.  This 
chaotic group of human beings will exhibit disagreement and conflict about what is good 
and just.  Why call them citizens or a city?  Do they work together toward the Good?  
Does the collection of individuals represent any coherence?  No, only the ideal city is a 
polis in the proper sense; all other “cities” are in conflict with themselves.  In all cities 
save the true polis, the strongest faction or individual will rule, and any collection of 
opinionated individuals can become the strongest under changing circumstances.  In fact, 
“the strongest” becomes a continuously changing concept, for whatever quality vaults a 
faction into power is the thing that makes it “strongest.”      
 On the contrary, the best city is ordered and divine- a cosmopolis, not a mere 
collection of human factions (R. 497c).  Plato maintains the ideal city exists as a Form, 
thus knowable to philosophers.  Philosopher kings are necessary for the instantiation of 
the ideal city, only they can apprehend the Form and translate the true being of the 
abstraction into a physical reality.  Philosophers as kings will always be necessary to 
maintain the imitation of physical reality to the ideal Form (R. 412a-b, 497d).  The 
philosopher will be a citizen in the ideal city or none at all, because only in that city can 
they harmonize the life of philosophy with the duty of citizen (R. 591c-592b).     
Epilogue 
 Do the middle dialogues defend the idea of worldly order, a kosmos?  Does Plato 
create a political order, a polis, in harmony with the kosmos?  What is the status of 
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citizenship in the cosmopolis?  Is the philosopher a citizen in the ideal city? 
 Philosophy and cosmology unfold in the middle dialogues, especially in the 
Phaedrus, Symposium, and Republic.  Plato defends an orderly world, and the source of 
order is knowable through philosophy.  The Phaedrus and Symposium tell of the force of 
divine love, or Erōs.  This force compels whomever it possesses toward the beautiful.  
What is beautiful?  Permanence, unchanging, and the eternal are Plato’s qualities of truly 
beautiful things.  The beautiful itself is the ideal of changelessness, of eternal being.  
Erōs compels a philosopher to knowledge of the ideal, raising him or her to behold the 
form.  However, a philosopher cannot remain in that enthusiastic state permanently, for 
nothing is ideal in the changing, material reality.  Signs of the beautiful in the material 
world awaken philosophers to that eternal ideal.  A prominent cue is the beautiful soul of 
a young philosopher.  In this way, Erōs compels mature philosophers to educate young 
philosophers toward true ideals, continuing the practice of philosophy and the knowing 
of true reality in the changing material world. 
 The Republic expands on cosmology and ontology, detailing what reality truly is, 
distinguishing knowledge from understanding, opinion, and imagination, and explaining 
how education leads a philosopher to knowledge.73  One will never learn what truly is 
through sense-perception alone.  The kosmos is material and immaterial, but the source 
of order for material, observable things is strictly intelligible.  True education must 
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 Solmsen (1940) explains the importance of education, especially Plato’s unified approach to the 
sciences, in leading the philosophical souls to knowledge.  Shorey (1889) argued the Republic as a 
dialogue is primarily concerned with politics and ethics.  Ontology is only a secondary aid to the 
discussion of philosophy and political rule.  Compared to a dialogue like the Timaeus, Shorey is right.   
Ontology in the Republic is more understated than later dialogues, but that does not mean it is unimportant 
to politics and philosophy.  
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stimulate the mind to think abstractly and reason dialectically.  Subjects like arithmetic 
teach about number, forcing students to confront the idea of a number itself: what is one 
or two in itself?  Study in geometry and three-dimensional solids trains students in 
logical deduction from axioms.  Astronomy moves students to think about the orderly 
motion of the kosmos, not merely to observe the motion of planets.  All of these subjects 
deal with unchanging abstractions- the number one never changes, a triangle always has 
three angles equal to one hundred eighty degrees, and the motions of the planets were 
assumed to be fixed and eternal.  Finally, a student of philosophy trains in dialectic, 
discussing things not from axioms or hypotheses, but beginning with true being.  
Philosophers come to know that the material world follows a source of true, eternal 
order. 
 Standards exist for material things, though material things do not perfectly 
accord with ideals.  No triangle drawn in the sand will be perfect.  But like the triangle, 
an ideal standard exists for the polis.  In changing, imperfect reality, the just city is 
reflection of the ideal.  The Republic details the just city, and Plato bases its composition 
on three classes of citizens (craftsmen, soldiers, and philosophers) and three virtues 
(moderation, courage, and wisdom).  Craftsmen provide for the material goods of the 
city.  They work only at their crafts, and do not participate in martial training, lawgiving, 
or law enforcement.  Craftsmen know their purpose in the city and have the ability to 
control their appetites, preventing the city from lurching toward the pitfalls of luxury.  
The soldiers live a common, barracks lifestyle, exclusively preparing for the defense of 
the city.  They know to fear only dishonor, not death, and so they are courageous in 
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protection of the city.  Finally, philosophers rule the city, keeping each class working 
toward its particular civic contribution and educating the next generation of 
philosophers.  Knowing the Good, the philosophers can order the city according to the 
eternal Forms.  The just city, the cosmopolis, is moderate in its appetites, courageous in 
spirit, wise in reason, and in harmony with itself.    
 Chapter IV addressed problems in the early dialogues of the relationship between 
philosophy and citizenship.  In the Apology and Crito, Socrates was a dedicated 
philosopher, and would not relinquish that divine duty to be a full citizen, yet he also 
acknowledged the city as superior to the individual.  His city created him and he felt 
obligated to obey its commands.  However, in the Phaedo, the description of a 
philosopher’s life makes citizenship an irrelevant, insignificant pursuit of material 
things.  The middle dialogues address these problems, arguing for a conception of 
philosophy compatible with citizenship.  Erōs drives philosophers to recreate the 
otherworldly Forms in this reality; more accurately, philosophers order material reality 
according to the Forms.  Furthermore, Erōs compels mature philosophers to educate 
young, philosophical souls.  The young souls present a vision of beauty to the elders, and 
awakening knowledge within them provides a source of fulfillment to mature 
philosophers.  With these two compulsions, Plato has found reason for philosophers to 
participate in the material world, and thereby finds a place for them in the city.  The 
ideal city raises and educates its young, philosophical souls as citizens.  As children, 
they witness the harmony of virtues in their fellow citizens and the just order of the city.  
As youths and young adults, they train as soldiers and fight in defense of the city.  In 
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adulthood, they study the curriculum of philosophy and serve as officers of the law.  
Finally, after a retreat to study in dialectic, they return to the city to rule as kings.  
Philosophers live in the city and contribute to its harmony through the application of 
their skill.  Throughout their lives, the practice of philosophy does not impede their 
function as citizens; rather, citizen-philosophers are a civic necessity.  And yet, Plato 
writes at the conclusion of Book IX that a philosopher’s true city is the ideal one, not 
necessarily the one into which he or she is born (R. 592a-b).  Socrates as philosopher and 
citizen has found his harmony, but Plato has not reconciled Socrates and Athens 
specifically.  Only if Athens conforms to the ideal polis will Socrates be its philosopher-
citizen.  
 On a final note, a paradox does exist in the Republic concerning citizenship and 
the possibility of the ideal city.  The existence of an ideal city is a prerequisite for the 
proper education of philosophers.  In their childhood, young philosophers need to see 
order, beauty, and harmony among all classes of the city.  Examples of disorder and vice 
can turn their souls away from philosophy.  Raised in disorderly cities, philosophers 
become the perpetrators of great evils.  A true philosopher seems to exist only in the 
ideal city.  Yet, the dialogue implies that a philosopher is necessary to construct the ideal 
city in the first place.  How does the philosopher necessary for the creation of the ideal 
city come into being before the city necessary for the creation of philosophers?  The 
question finds no apparent resolution through the middle dialogues, and points to deeper 
problems with Plato’s philosophy.  Truly, the paradox is confounding.   
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 CHAPTER VI  
THE LATE DIALOGUES 
Cosmological and Political Reform  
The Republic stands as the apex of the middle dialogues.  Plato has written a 
grand work of philosophy, examining the structure of the polis and inquiring into the 
origins of world order.  Its conclusion is worth restatement: only philosophers possess 
the knowledge to bring political order into harmony with true principles of good.  Only 
if philosophers rule will the polis be in harmony with the kosmos.  In this best of cities, 
philosophers live as full citizens.  They have a function in the city and the city raises 
them from birth to fulfill that function.  These philosophers are citizens not only in 
function, but in belonging.  They feel attached to the city and their fellow citizens.  
Believing the myth of metals, every citizen will think of the earth upon which they live 
as their mother and their fellow citizens as family.  They will feel attached to a specific 
place and to a definite group of people.  And the city’s philosopher-kings will create 
their future replacements, the generation and education of philosophical souls a prime 
concern.  The city is a unity where each citizen, whether philosopher or farmer, lives and 
works in harmony and justice. 
 In the late dialogues, I argue that Plato shifts the calculus and divides the 
philosopher-king into two separate and hierarchical functions: that of the lawgiver and 
the citizen.74  The lawgiver represents the political function of a fully-developed and 
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 Steinberger (1989) made the argument that in the Republic the functions of the philosopher and the 
guardian should be independent.  A philosopher’s work is to contemplate order only; the guardian applies 
that knowledge through hand-on ruling.  I disagree with the argument applied to the Republic, but it can be 
applied to the later dialogues. 
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truly philosophical soul.  Having knowledge of the essential unity of the Good, the 
philosopher functions as a lawgiver over a political community; they bestow a code of 
law that best organizes a group of individuals.  Through their political act of lawgiving, 
they create a polis from a chaotic, motley group of human beings.  The citizen is a fully-
developed soul, but lesser in inherent capability than the lawgiver.  The citizen may 
possess one or more of the political virtues, but does not have the philosophical ability to 
understand how these seemingly distinct virtues find a harmony.  To harmonize a group 
of differently-skilled individuals is the function of a lawgiver; to effect the plan is the 
function of citizens.  
The division of philosopher-kings into lawgivers and citizens initially occurs in 
the Statesman and with more clarity in the Laws.  The division especially accords with 
Plato’s late cosmology, specifically his understanding of philosophers as more rare and 
otherworldly than in the middle dialogues.  The late dialogues turn away from the 
Republic’s proposal that a city raise its philosophers one generation after another and 
that those philosophers should live in the political community and among its citizens.75  
If the ideal city of the Republic is impossible, then Plato must draft a new political 
design that does not rely upon the continual generation of philosopher-kings.  In the new 
political design, philosophical souls will not rule as kings or live as citizens.  In the late 
dialogues, philosophers write law codes for a group of citizens to follow.  The citizens of 
such a polis strictly implement and administer the law code; they refrain as much as 
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 A prolific literature debates whether the ideal city of the Republic is a serious design or a farce, and if 
serious, whether that ideal model can serve as the basis of political reform.  Strauss (1964) famously 
argued the city is not a true model of reform.  I read the design as serious, following the old orthodoxy and 
the more recent arguments of Reeve (1988 and  Klosko (1981; 1983).  Though serious, the plan is not 
perfect, but subject to revision.  
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possible from interpretation or alteration.  The philosopher-lawgiver who writes the law 
code is above the citizenry; the citizenry who administer the law code are not capable of 
the highest levels of philosophy.  In the hierarchy of human types, the citizens are 
beneath the lawgiver.  Indeed, the law code brings the city into being and generates the 
citizenry themselves from the broader mass of chaotic humanity.  The political thought 
of philosopher-lawgiver and citizen is parallel to Plato’s cosmological thought. As the 
philosopher instills order into a group of humanity to create citizens, the dēmiourgos 
instills order on chaotic material to create the kosmos.  As the lawgiver brings the city 
into being through the law code, the dēmiourgos ordered the kosmos through the creation 
of the world-soul.    
 The division of the philosopher-king is congruent with Plato’s revised thoughts 
on the cosmic order.  In the Timaeus, Plato delves into cosmology to determine how 
order came to be in the material world.  He writes of a divine craftsman, the dēmiourgos, 
who shapes and orders the material world according to eternal standards.  This 
dēmiourgos creates the kosmos, the highest being of physical reality.  The kosmos is the 
living union of perfect soul and imperfect material; the kosmos is all material things 
united in one whole entity.  Within the kosmos itself, lesser souls instill order in more 
delimited areas of reality.  Plato understands reality as a hierarchy of being and order.  
Both the Statesman and Laws follow in this line of thought.  In the realm of political 
order, the philosopher is like the cosmic dēmiourgos.  The philosopher rules over the 
whole of the city, and is therefore above civic life within it.  A lesser class of soul, the 
citizen, follows, implements, and administers the philosopher’s laws as best it can.  
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Plato’s attempt to understand the cosmos leads to his rethinking the polis.  The result is a 
second cosmopolis, Magnesia of the Laws.  According to my interpretation, the late 
dialogues investigate similar questions of political order and philosophy, but produce an 
answer different from the middle dialogues. 
The Timaeus 
 Through the middle dialogues, Plato’s cosmology is the least clarified component 
of his political philosophy.  The Forms and the Good are clearly important to the 
education of philosophers, and to how those philosopher-kings will rule in their city, but 
what exactly are they?  Plato memorably ends the discussion between Socrates and 
Glaucon prior to reaching the Good, as Socrates does not think poor Glaucon will 
understand the lesson any further (R. 533a).  Of course, this leaves the audience in the 
same state as Glaucon, lacking a true understanding of the highest levels of reality.  The 
Timaeus offers a resolution to this abrupt ending and an account of all levels of existence 
in hierarchical reality, or the chain of states from perfect being to absolute becoming.  
Plato tells a tale of cosmic genesis to portray the levels of reality and how they come into 
being.76  Perfect being, eternal and unchanging, exists as the highest plane of existence.  
Matter, the totality of all material things, exists in a state of chaos, change, and 
becoming.  Timaeus’ story examines how certain entities, spirits or forces, span the 
distance between these levels of reality to bring order and being to the chaotic world of 
material becoming.  The Timaeus is a dialogue concerning the creation of order in the 
cosmos, and contains important parallels to acts of political creation and order. 
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 Of course, one could argue that Plato’s telling the tale of cosmic origins is different than leading an 
interlocutor on a dialectical journey.  At this point, I am not such a one. 
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 The Timaeus begins almost as a sequel to the Republic, recapitulating the 
structure of an ideal city (Ti. 17-19).77  The dialogue forges its own path when Critias 
admits of the historical ignorance of Athenian civilization (Ti. 20e).  The Greeks, he 
tells, are forgetful of their past.  They think themselves a young race and are unaware of 
the great deeds of their ancestors (Ti. 22b-c).  Equally, they are ignorant of the essential 
truth within myths (Ti. 22e-23d).  The earth is the scene of recurrent, cataclysmic events 
which destroy civilizations and limit the historical memory of peoples.  To the modern, 
progressive mindset, this point is intriguing in its own right.78  The statement reflects a 
cyclical worldview; notice how such a cycle allows for the continual regeneration and 
re-founding of civilization.  Cities destroyed by human or environmental catastrophe can 
be rebuilt; cities are built in reality just as a city was built by words (logōi, R. 369a) in 
the Republic (Ti. 26b-e). 
 The Timaeus is not about the construction of a city, however.79  Timaeus will 
address the hierarchical structure of reality and explain the origin of the kosmos and the 
human being (Ti. 27a).  At least, he will give a likely account of such things (Ti. 28c-d).  
The first thing Plato clarifies is the difference between the heavens (ouranos) and 
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 Voeglin (1947) reads the Timaeus and Critias as following the Republic, and adding to it.  Taylor (1936, 
437-38) reads the Timaeus as following after the Republic, both in a dramatic sense and philosophically.  
The interlocutors will continue the previous day’s discussion, i.e., the discussion from the Republic.  
Cornford (1937, 4-5) argues against reading the Timaeus as following the Republic or correcting it; the 
Timaeus stands as the first dialogue in a new trilogy.  My understanding of the Timaeus follows with 
Cornford (1937), Taylor (1936; 1938), and Shorey (1888; 1889) but does not attempt to resolve their 
differences of interpretation.  Such a project is outside the scope of this work. 
78
 Naddaf (1994) places the Atlantis myth of cataclysm at the center of his interpretation of the late 
dialogues.  Taylor (1936, 472) argues that Plato shows a sober understanding of mankind’s long pre-
history, and of the need for myth and poetry to fill in those gaps.   
79
 The interlocutors establish that they will require three speeches to analyze the ideal city.  Timaeus will 
discuss the creation of the cosmos, Critias will speak of ancient Athens, and Hermocrates will detail a 
contemporary constitution.  Of course, the Critias famously ends in mid-sentence, forever incomplete.  
Cornford (1937) argues that the Laws may include much of the material intended for the Hermocrates.   
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kosmos (Ti. 28b).  In earlier dialogues, he equivocated the two (the terms seemingly 
were interchangeable) but Timaeus points out that the kosmos has a body.80  
Furthermore, having a body, something external must have set the kosmos in motion, as 
material things are not the causes (aitia) of their own motion (Ti. 28b-c).81  Timaeus 
begins with the proposition that the kosmos is a physical thing set in motion by 
something external.  A superior, external force acting according to a hierarchical 
standard must have instilled order in the physical kosmos. 
 To account for the external cause, Plato introduces the concept of the divine 
craftsman, the dēmiourgos.  Deciphering the place of the dēmiourgos in the hierarchy of 
being is not easy.  Plato initial writes that the dēmiourgos is the best of causes (Ti. 29a).  
It looks to the Eternal (aïdion) to imbue beauty and order in the kosmos.  This suggests 
that the dēmiourgos is beneath the eternals in the hierarchy of reality, yet equally good, 
beautiful, true, and eternal.82  The dēmiourgos orders matter because it desires all things 
to be like itself, and it will order matter as best as it is able (Ti. 29e-30a).  The 
dēmiourgos acts like a universal principle of identity; it desires all things to be as similar 
to itself as possible.  However, the dēmiourgos is not omnipotent, and cannot instill 
perfect order into chaotic matter.  To order material things, the dēmiourgos crafts a 
world-soul by fashioning reason (logismos) into soul (psuchē) and soul into body (sōma) 
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 In the Phaedrus (247c.), ouranos and hyperouranos refer to the heavens, or the eternal reality that exists 
different from mortal reality.  In the Symposium (189a, 209a), Plato uses a variant (diakosmesis) of the 
root word kosmos to express the act of putting things into order, or the internal order a body should have. 
81
 Strictly speaking, the kosmos is both its soul and body.  At this juncture, the separation is an explanatory 
device, not a statement that the kosmos pre-existed its soul.  The issue of cosmic creation, and the 
controversy over the interpretation of the passage, will arise later in the dialogue.  See notes 83-86. 
82
 Robinson (1967, 61) reads the hierarchy this way.  Taylor (1936, 442) separates the dēmiourgos from 
the forms by differentiating soul from forms.  Perhaps Shorey (1888, 411) captures Plato’s dēmiourgos 
best: it is “the embodiment of artistic purpose as opposed to lawless chance or arbitrary convention.”  
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(Ti. 30b-c).   
 The kosmos is a living thing and a unity within itself (Ti. 31a-b).  The 
dēmiourgos unites all matter, every piece of chaotic material, and crafts it into a 
harmony and friendship (Ti. 31c-33b).  The kosmos is a physical thing, so it must have a 
body.83  The act of creation entails ordering the elements into a proper proportion.84  
Again, every piece of matter is contained in the kosmos; no matter exists outside its 
body.  The kosmos is one, self-sufficient, and self-contained (Ti. 33c-d).  Nothing within 
it can dissolve the unity of the kosmos; nothing external can be added to improve it.  
Plato conceives of the cosmic body as a three-dimensional sphere which encompasses all 
matter and spins on its own axis (Ti. 34a).  Physically, the kosmos is the totality of all 
material things, and psychically, it is the most rational soul joined to a material body. 
 Timaeus’ story continues to elucidate the soul of the kosmos.  The dēmiourgos 
creates the soul of the kosmos as the most divine thing to exist in physical reality (Ti. 
34b).  Imbued with mathematical principles to instill reason and harmony, the cosmic 
soul is the greatest and most perfect of all created things (Ti. 35a-37a).  However, Plato’s 
account is confusing when he tries to determine if the soul is older than matter and 
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 The cosmic body raises debate in the literature, notably in Taylor (1936, 442-444) and Cornford (1937, 
24-26), concerning whether the dēmiourgos generated the body in time, and therefore chaotic material 
exists prior to the cosmic body, or if Plato uses the verb “to become” not in the sense of an event in time, 
but a continuous process of becoming.   Pre-existing matter would create problems for Plato’s hierarchy of 
being. 
84
 Language is a sticky problem when discussing cosmology.  The above “act of creation” is a disputable 
phrase.  If the kosmos is always in a state of becoming, there was no “act of creation,” but an eternal 
process of becoming.  However, if chaotic material existed in disorderly motion, which the demiurge acted 
upon, then one can speak of an act of generation, at least.  The dēmiourgos creates the kosmos through this 
act of generation.  Cornford’s (1937, 163-210) discussion of this issue stretches across his commentary, 
and reaches no clear conclusion.  Taylor (1936, 443-444) relies on the authority of Aristotle to argue for a 
moment of creation, the demiurge as a “Creator,” and no previous era of primordial disorder.  Still, he 
admits the world is a generated thing and not a perfect, eternal thing.  Shorey (1888, 400-401) supersedes 
these debates with the contention that the Timaeus is less of a “metaphysical masterpiece” than Plato’s 
“hymn of the universe.”  The doctrine is less important than the method of philosophy.  
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when/how time came into existence.85  The soul cannot be younger than the body, for the 
younger should not rule the older (Ti. 34c).  Yet, physical reality appears to exist in a 
primordial state of chaos, thus necessitating the forging of the cosmic soul.  Telling 
stories can be difficult, especially in matters of chronology, and Plato admits as much in 
dealing with the order of creation and the coming-into-existence of the kosmos and time 
(Ti. 34c, 38b).  Plato’s description of the kosmos as both soul and matter is fraught with 
difficulties that continue to instigate disagreement among his readers.86 
 The kosmos, a union of divine soul and fashioned body, is not immortal by its 
own work, but the dēmiourgos grants and preserves it from “the fate of death” (thanatou 
moiras, Ti. 41a-b).  As the dēmiourgos creates the kosmos in its image, the kosmos 
creates lesser divinities in its own image (Ti. 41c-d).  Descending this hierarchy of 
reality, each level will contain entities less perfect, eternal, and immortal.  Continuing 
down the hierarchy, each level grows more susceptible to death and exhibits more 
change in itself.  One set of lesser divinities within the kosmos are the planets.  Despite 
the literal meaning of their name (the wanderers), the planets traverse the kosmos in an 
orderly pattern.  Though they appear to wander, their paths have a mathematical 
rationality to them (Ti. 39b-c).  Lesser divinities such as these are responsible for the 
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 Cornford (1937, 57-59) argues the soul and body of the cosmos are coeval and eternal, despite Plato’s 
description that soul is prior to body.  The argument about a literal versus non-literal reading of this 
passage continues with Cherniss’s (1944) non-literal interpretation against Vlastos’s (1965) literalist 
reading.  The non-literalists argue for an eternal relationship between body and world-soul; the literalists 
argue for the existence of pre-ordered matter.  Both sides present excellent cases, and the difficulty in 
determining a winner may hint at flaw within Plato’s philosophy rather than a failure of interpretation.  
86
 The problem generally revolves around the origin of disorder.  Why is necessity sometimes persuaded 
by reason to come to order and other time not?  There is no consensus on Plato’s understanding of 
disorder/evil, or the place of disorder in Plato’s comprehensive philosophy.  See Mohr (1978a; 1980), 
Robinson (1967), Hackforth (1959; 1946; 1936), Miller (1957), Cherniss (1954), Vlastos (1939), Hoffleit 
(1937), Boodin (1930), Chilcott (1923), and Shorey (1889, 48-49).  
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creation of the last and lowest of the created divinities: the human being. 
 Plato absolves the divine kosmos for the creation of the grossly imperfect human 
being (Ti. 42d).  The kosmos brings into being orderly things like the planets.  Though 
imperfect, the planets contain a soul that moves them in mathematical, ordered patterns.  
Lesser divinities, those beneath the kosmos in perfection, create the human being.  
Distant from the perfection of the kosmos, the human being is a disorderly thing.  
Composite in soul, the human being struggles within itself because it contains both 
rational and irrational forces (Ti. 43a-44c).  The head of the human being contains the 
rational part of the soul which struggles toward the higher levels of reality against baser, 
physical desires (Ti. 44d-e).  At this point, Plato explains the purpose of the physical 
senses.87  Senses exist to facilitate the understanding of order.  Sight, for example, 
functions to bring an image of the orderly motions of the kosmos to the rational mind (Ti. 
45-46c).  The human being can observe an orderly event like the motions of the planets 
across the sky, and be lead to think about order itself and the hierarchy of orderly things 
(Ti. 47b-c).  Hearing similarly exists to lead the soul to musical harmonies (Ti. 47d-e).  
The kosmos exhibits sensible patterns of order and harmony accessible to human senses, 
facilitating the faculty of understanding.  
 Timaeus appears near the completion of his tale when he realizes he must qualify 
his speech to such a degree that a new beginning is required.  Timaeus begins anew to 
explain how mind and necessity (anankē) interact in “errant” or “wandering” material 
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 In Phaedo, for example, the senses are a distraction and hindrance to philosophy.  In the educational 
system of the Republic, they are early facilitators of learning, but ultimately must be put aside in favor of 
pure thought. 
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becoming (Ti. 48a).88  Plato is attempting to elucidate how the forms and matter interact 
(Ti. 50b).  He starts by relaying that true being and chaotic matter existed prior to the 
creation of the kosmos (Ti. 52a-d).  Matter existed in a state of becoming under the 
influence of necessity.  Material things existed in a state of unreason until the divine 
being ordered (kosmeisthai) these elements according to forms (eidesi) and number 
(arithmois) so that the material world would be as best (kallista arista) as was possible 
(dunaton) (Ti. 53a-b).  Plato explains how geometric shape is the means of ordering 
different physical elements, how shape determines the physical properties of the 
elements (Ti. 53c-67c).  Geometry being the premier abstract science of the time, Plato 
based his understanding of the physical world in this discipline (Taylor 1936, 457-458).  
If his geometrical physics is obsolete, bear in mind that Timaeus has not changed the 
argument of the dialogue, but merely attempted to explain in more depth the hierarchy of 
reality, the underlying causes of physical motion, and the properties of elements 
(Cornford 1937, 210-239).  He reaffirms that the dēmiourgos created the kosmos as a 
unity and perpetually secures its immortality and perfection- at least the highest degree 
of perfection attainable by a material thing (Ti. 69b-c). 
 The dialogue has one final section discussing the human being.  In the narrative, 
the Timaeus initially appears to differ from the tripartite soul of the Republic.  Plato 
writes that the kosmos itself created the immortal and rational human soul, but the lesser 
gods created the mortal body to encase it along with a mortal soul to motivate the body 
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 to tēs planōmenēs eidos aitias (Ti. 48a).  Taylor (1936, 456-457) reads the “receptacle” or “matrix” as 
unordered becoming, a purely chaotic realm but only a hypothetical construct, as the matrix is coterminous 
with ordered generation.  Shorey (1889, 67-68) long ago argued Plato’s relation of being to becoming in 
the receptacle admits of no easy translation.  
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(Ti. 69c-e).  Of course, these divinities wanted to keep the rational and immortal separate 
from the irrational and mortal; thus, the rational soul resides in the head and the 
irrational soul resides in the body, with the neck providing a measure of separation 
between the two (Ti. 69e).  However, Plato does divide the soul into three after this first 
division of two.  The mortal soul has two components that correspond to spirit (thumos) 
and appetite (epithumia), as in the Republic (Ti. 70a-b).89  Dividing the rational, 
immortal soul from its irrational, mortal parts actually raises some disturbing problems 
for Plato.  Do most people (all non-philosophers) simply lack a rational soul?  Are they 
totally mortal?  Is there no transmigration of the soul for them?  Or is the case that 
reason is a weak force in most people?  If the latter, then Plato must concede that the 
mortal and inferior souls of the body can rule despite the presence of the rational, 
immortal, and superior soul of the head.  Such an admission would be ruinous to Plato’s 
hierarchical structure of command and reality.  Otherwise, to preserve the philosophical 
system, Plato would have to utterly debase the worth of most human beings.  Most 
people would not possess a rational, immortal soul.  Parts of the Timaeus (86b-90d) even 
suggest that the physical body is responsible for moral failures (Taylor 1936, 459; 
Cornford 1937, 243-247).90  That cannot mean the physical material, as material is 
lifeless without a soul.  The mortal soul must lead the immortal soul into vice.  But that, 
too, violates Plato’s hierarchy.  Again, the late dialogues are not free of problems, but 
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 What exactly is a mortal soul?  Cornford (1937, 39, 146) mentions it without further comment.  This is a 
strange new element in Plato.  Compare this soul to the charioteer and horses of the Phaedrus or the 
tripartite soul of the Republic; they are not identical.  These newly mortal elements are present in the 
eternal soul of those middle dialogues.  
90
 Taylor (1936, 491-492) later recants this suggestion.  Many souls do cause motion in the world, and 
some are more disordered than others.  All disorder is caused by these imperfect souls, not body. 
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what is clear is that this cosmological exposition has importance for Plato’s political 
designs.91        
 The Timaeus is an account of how the divine brought order to chaotic material.  
Souls imbued with reason bring matter to order as far as it is in the souls’ power to 
command and matter’s nature to obey.  The dēmiourgos, a divinity connected to the 
eternals, crafted the kosmos, a union of physical body and intangible soul, to make every 
piece of disorderly matter into a rational unity.  The kosmos, a living animal itself, 
fashioned souls and formed bodies for smaller packets of matter, bringing the lesser 
divinities into existence.  The lowest of these soul-and-body-beings is the human being.  
The soul of this peculiar and imperfect animal is composite, with a rational part crafted 
by the cosmic deity and an irrational, mortal part crafted by lesser divinities.  A 
composite being, the human animal struggles internally.  The rational soul desires to 
comprehend true reality and ascend to higher levels of being.  The irrational parts of the 
soul lower the animal to an earthly existence.92  The hierarchy is complete.  The divine 
instills high order in matter, generating the kosmos.  Lesser divinities order matter within 
the kosmos, creating lesser, rational beings- humanity.  Some human beings will devolve 
into lower forms of life, generating the irrational animals.  All reality is a chain, a 
hierarchy from eternal being to chaotic becoming.       
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 A separate inquiry is necessary to answer the questions above.  For this project, I only aim to show that 
Plato’s late cosmology, however logical or flawed, corresponds to a rethinking of his political designs.  
92
 Plato’s theory of evolution is fascinating and brief.  Animal species are generated from the struggle 
within the souls of humans.  The lower parts of the soul, if they succeed in ruling over the rational part, 
will bend the body to the ground, first forcing the animal to walk on all fours, then slithering on its belly.  
Evolution is really devolution, as all the animals of the world descend from human beings (Ti. 91e).  One 
must wonder: how do the lower, inferior parts of the soul come to rule over the higher, superior part?  In a 
hierarchical world, it does not make sense. 
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The Statesman    
 The Statesman famously represents an example of the method of division; 
pertinently, Plato divides the skills of the philosopher-king into two separate political 
functions.93  The division broaches two important differences with the ideal city of the 
Republic.  First, the singular philosopher-king is separated into two distinct human souls 
and political functions.  In this dialogue, the two types correspond to the philosophical 
and the administrative.  The philosophical soul has the knowledge to harmonize 
individuals with various virtues.  These virtuous individuals do not have the broader 
philosophical knowledge to integrate their individual talent with the talent of others.  
The philosopher no longer rules as a king, but becomes a lawgiver, one who organizes 
and directs the activities of the citizenry.  The citizens, possessing a discrete virtue or 
virtues, become the administrators of the polis.  Effectively, Plato separates the 
philosopher from citizenship.  Second, the Statesman reveals Plato’s concern that a city 
cannot expect to be ruled by generations of philosophers.  A truly philosophical soul is 
more of a rarity than Plato anticipated when constructing the ideal city of the Republic.  
Philosopher-kings will not do as a political archetype; the Statesman begins a new path.   
The Statesman begins the transformation of philosopher-kings that Plato will 
complete in the Laws.  This transformation will see philosopher-kings replaced by 
philosophical lawgivers and dutiful citizens.  The function of lawgiver elevates the 
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 Reading the Statesman, I focus my argument as much as possible on the separation of the philosopher-
king into two, distinct functions.  The dialogue, in itself, in its period, and in the broader corpus, is 
fascinatingly complex.  One can find a number of lengthy and thorough interpretations of the dialogue, for 
example Castoriadis (2002), Annas and Waterfield (1995), Rowe (1995), Miller (1980), and Skemp 
(1952).  These interpretations have sparked additional commentary and interpretation in Merrill (2003). 
Stern (1997), and McCabe (1997).  
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philosopher above those who live in the polis as equal citizens.  The philosopher-
lawgiver drafts the law code for a city, but does not live in the polis.  Citizens of the 
polis cooperate in administering the city with a broad measure of equality, as all exist 
under the law and are responsible for its enforcement.  The life and political function of 
citizenship is fundamentally different from the life and function of a philosopher.  
Whereas the philosopher-kings possessed both abstract knowledge and practical skills of 
political order, lawgivers and citizens do not.94  The lawgiver still possesses the 
knowledge of true political principles, but does not engage in daily political life.  The 
citizens only possess the disparate skills of political life without the knowledge of how 
to best integrate them.  Individual citizens do not know how to bring their particular 
skills into a harmony for the city’s best interest.  Thus, citizens must follow the law code 
strictly because it provides the only stable guidance for their city.  Plato divides the 
philosopher-king into two political functions, the lawgiver and the citizen.  The citizens 
live in the city as implementers and managers of a law code; the lawgiver creates that 
law code.  In consequence, the philosopher is the law itself.    
 Plato explicitly wrote in the Republic that a well-ordered city would not need an 
extensive law code to regulate all facets of life (R. 425b-e).  Good citizens, well-
educated and minding their own craft, would not need such a detailed prescription of 
proper behavior.  Raised to work at their craft, citizens know, understand, and believe 
only the good.  Accordingly, they will act well.  So why would Plato write a dialogue 
about philosophical lawgivers and citizen administrators?  A likely answer is that Plato 
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 Is the lawgiver merely an old philosopher-king set out to rule another city?  No, they would have 
returned to the Isle of the Blessed rather than engage in a new political project. 
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found the truly philosophical soul is an exceedingly rare creature.  Given the rarity, a 
city cannot expect to raise generation after generation of philosophers to rule as kings.  
Plato still maintains that the best government for a city is rule by one possessing a king’s 
wisdom (Stm. 294a).95  However, he notes that a wise king will possess the knowledge 
of law-making (nomothetikē, Stm. 294a).  Though a king best serves the city through 
direct, person-to-person rule (better yet, soul-to-soul), a law code can establish a good 
government as well (Stm. 294b-c).  A wise king can write a set of general principles that 
will be good for most citizens, most of the time (Stm. 294e-295a).  The point should not 
be overlooked: a good city need not have living, ruling philosophers as kings.     
 Plato expresses doubt that enough philosophers will exist to direct each citizen 
individually.  First, he admits that only a few people will ever possess kingly knowledge 
(Stm. 297c, 300e).  Given that admission, a form of government reliant on a cadre of 
philosophers is unlikely to exist.  Second, even if a city came to be ruled by a 
philosopher-king, one individual cannot tell every other citizen how to live (Stm. 295a-
b).  This problem is one of logistics and administration; one philosopher-king can talk 
only to so many citizens in a day.  No generation will yield enough philosophic souls to 
rule the city as kings.  If there cannot be philosopher-kings, then the alternative is a 
philosopher’s written law code.96 
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 phronēseōs basilikon (Stm. 294a). 
96
 The division of the philosopher-king suggests that the concept is not impractical, but utterly untenable.  
This means that the ideal city of the Republic is not too impractical to be realized, but utterly impossible.  
The city of philosopher-kings is not too difficult to achieve.  It based on a flawed estimation of the 
quantity of philosophers, which stems from a faulty understanding of the cosmos itself.  If the cosmos 
produces too few philosophers for them to rule generation after generation, then such a city is impossible, 
not impractical.  That city being impossible, the next best design would be, in fact and theory, the ideal 
city, not a second best city.  The semantics of “second-best” can obscure that Plato has made the ideal city 
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 After the philosopher writes the law code, the citizens must implement it and 
adhere to it.  Plato explains what skills the citizenry must possess to maintain the 
excellence of their city (Stm. 304b-c).  Specifically, rhetoric, generalship, and judgment 
are the key political skills, but the citizens’ expertise does not include knowing when to 
deploy their skills or how to harmonize the three together (Stm. 304e-305c).97  Only 
kingly wisdom knows how to harmonize the particular political skills of individual 
citizens (Stm. 305e).  The philosopher weaves these skills together, integrating and 
harmonizing the different skills so they will function for the best of the city (Stm. 306a).  
Like the virtues in the soul, these skills may come into conflict if they are not in balance; 
therefore, something greater must instill harmony and generate order (Stm. 306b-c).  The 
philosopher’s law code is that source of order and harmony; it provides the standards to 
guide the citizenry in their administration and maintenance of the city. 
 The Statesman is an intricate dialogue, and it suggests that Plato is rethinking his 
political philosophy.98  In the Statesman, the interlocutors doubt that a city can raise 
successive generations of philosophers.  Recall that the ideal city of Republic is 
contingent on the education of philosophers in every generation.  But what if 
philosophers are not in such great supply?  The alternative is to persuade the rare 
philosopher who does live to write a constitution, a code of laws, for a city.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of the Republic impossible, and not a design with which others can compare. 
97
 The citizens resemble the craftsmen in the ideal city of the Republic in some respect.  Those craftsmen 
needed the supervision of philosophers over their work.  These citizens need supervision over their skills, 
further clarifying the separation of political skills and the art of lawmaking, and degrading the faculty of 
reason in the soul of the citizen. 
98
 My analysis of the Statesman need not venture into the dialogue’s intriguing, perplexing myth.  Many 
scholars have attempted to illuminate the myth and its meaning, especially Carone (2004), Nightingale 
(1996), Mohr (1978b; 1981), and Robinson (1967).  The main problem in understanding it is that the myth 
implies the cosmos spins out of control.  In the Timaeus, the kosmos is guaranteed perfect motion by the 
dēmiourgos.  The myth may be more of thought experiment than a vehicle for cosmology.   
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citizenry (who do not possess the wisdom to rule themselves) must adhere strictly to the 
code to live as best they can.  Instead of philosopher-kings, the city will have a 
philosopher’s law code as the highest authority.  Citizens, skilled in the lesser political 
arts of generalship, rhetoric, and judgment, will act according to the laws, administering 
them without true wisdom of political harmony.  Not a second-best city or the only 
practical city, the city of laws is the only logical city given the Plato’s later thoughts on 
philosophers, citizens, and the cosmos.   
The Laws 
 What type of constitution do the interlocutors create for Magnesia, the colonial 
city established in the Laws?  How does the city’s constitution make sense as the final 
political design in Plato’s corpus?  If Magnesia is consistent with the ideal city of the 
Republic, merely a later elaboration of an earlier idea, then Plato’s political philosophy is 
unitary and self-consistent.  The debate between the unitary and developmental schools 
is somewhat pedantic, as some unitarists tend to acknowledge there is “development” in 
how Plato presents and defends his philosophy, and some development interpretations 
cohere around certain, fundamental consistencies.  I argue that Plato’s philosophy shows 
consistency in the questions he asks and some fundamental assumptions about reality 
and human beings, but how these basics blossom into a full political philosophy shows 
development.  Klosko (1986, 18-20) succinctly captures the essence of the unity and 
development within Plato’s corpus.  With more depth, Prior (1985) demonstrates the 
flaws in the strict unitarianism of Taylor (1936) or Shorey (1903) and the radical 
revisionism of Ryle (1939) and Owen (1953).  Against these, Prior argues that the 
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Platonic Corpus shows critical development in answering difficult questions of 
metaphysics and epistemology.  Again, I agree with this assessment.    
And still, the unitary-development debate is something of a let down.  Even 
Taylor’s (1936) so-called unitarian reading shows development.  For example, though he 
reads the Laws as consistent with the Republic, he calls it more practical (472) and calls 
its detailed education program a development (482-485).  The debate continues, with 
Lewis (1998a) more recently arguing that Plato’s dialogues are unitary in doctrine but 
plural in perspective.  The debate between unitary or development does tend to hinge on 
how one interprets the political design of Magnesia.  Is it consistent with the ideal city of 
the Republic or not?    
Magnesia may be a “second best city,” less ideal but more practical in some 
respect.99  One can read the Laws as consistent with the earlier political philosophy in 
two ways.  First, the Laws represents a longer, more practical version of the ideal.  
Second, Plato drafted a defense of the second best city, an educated timocracy.  In both 
estimations, the constitution of Magnesia coheres with Plato’s earlier political thought.  
More frustrating is an argument that defies easy classification.  For example, Vlastos 
(1968, 292) casually refers to Morrow’s interpretation of Magnesia as a “second best 
city.”  However, Morrow (1960), in Plato’s Cretan City, reads the Laws as Plato 
translating his ideal city into a practical one; the two are consistent, only crossing the 
barrier of ideal into real.  Yet, this transition requires a significant rewriting of the city, 
including the reinstatement of private property, the installation of a mixed-system of 
                                                          
99
 See Bobonich (2004), Lewis (1998a), Kochin (1998), and Bruell (1994).  Neiman (2007) traces 
divergence from the rule of philosophy to the rule of law back to the Statesman.  
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government, and the rejection of rule by philosopher-kings.  Indeed, the bulk of 
Morrow’s work supports the main point that Magnesia is a new city which integrates 
administrative practicality, historical tradition, and political philosophy.  Yet Morrow 
does not consider these significant variations.  Morrow’s (1960, 591-593) conclusion 
especially supports Magnesia as a new ideal city.  Such differences reflect more than the 
transition from ideal to real, as I will argue. 
The potential for inconsistency and confusion exists across these interpretations, 
but semantics may conceal it.  If Plato is arguing that the ideal city of the Republic 
cannot be established, and Magnesia is the only good constitution that can be realized, 
then this rejection of the ideal city constitutes a fundamental alteration of his political 
philosophy.  The ideal city is not merely impractical, and therefore a more practical city 
should be designed, but the city itself is non-existent.  If the reality is impossible then the 
theory utterly collapses and must be replaced.  The new formulation of a “second-best” 
city is in fact the new ideal.  Of course, if Magnesia is a thorough defense of a more 
educated timocracy, then Plato’s corpus is not inconsistent, but merely circumspect.  The 
third possibility is that Magnesia is not consistent with the design of the ideal city; it is 
neither a retelling of the ideal city nor a more an educated timocracy.  Magnesia, the city 
of laws, is a second cosmopolis.100   
Read closely, Magnesia bears similarities to both the ideal city and the timocracy 
of Plato’s middle dialogues, but is in total neither.  The crux of making sense of this 
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 Bobonich (2008, 329-331; 2002) briefly reads the Laws as offering a new ideal city, and rather than 
revealing an old man’s pessimism, the new city is based on the education of all citizens to understand 
rationally the laws that are for the best.  Carone (2005) interprets the Laws within Plato’s later cosmology 
as constructing a new cosmopolis as well, but a more equitable and imperial political regime, not a Greek 
polis and certainly not the ideal city of the Republic.   
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political system hinges on one’s interpretation of the Nocturnal Council.  Up to the late 
introduction of this institution in Book X (L. 908a), Magnesia is a mixed-government 
system of democracy and aristocracy.  It certainly lacks that utopian vision of 
philosopher-kings found in the Republic.  Thus, some readers (Barker 1947; Sabine 
1937) of Plato find the introduction of the Nocturnal Council as contradicting the spirit 
and design of the preceding work. Morrow (1960) attempted to bridge this divide, and 
his work is lauded (Marquez forthcoming; Lewis 1998b; Kahn 1961).  In Morrow’s 
(1960, 500-515) interpretation, the guardians of the law in Magnesia are akin to the 
philosopher-kings of the ideal city.  The guardians are the educated elite who perform 
two functions in the city: understand the broad law code as a rational totality so they can 
tinker with its application; and, to educate their fellow citizens in the law.  These 
guardians do not rule openly, but exert influence through the practice of philosophy on 
an individual level.  They study and discuss amongst themselves the grand design of the 
law, and they question their fellow citizens to expand the political awareness of the 
citizenry.  Not all readers of Plato have accepted Morrow’s interpretation of the 
Nocturnal Council. 
Klosko (2008; 1988) has challenged Morrow’s interpretation of the Nocturnal 
Council and his overall reading of the Laws.  Klosko (1988, 75) dubs Morrow’s thesis 
“the informal view.”  The Nocturnal Council is an informal power in the state.  It is a 
kind of super-institution above the ordinary functioning government.  However, Plato (L. 
969b) writes in the Laws that if such a council of well-educated philosophers were ever 
established, then the city should hand over political power to it.  Klosko (1988, 79) 
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argues that this conditional means that the established Nocturnal Council would be a 
formal institution of government endowed with supreme power.  There is nothing 
informal about it.  Furthermore, the function of the Nocturnal Council as an informal, 
advisory/revision board is inconsistent with the purpose of the law code.  Plato stresses 
that the laws are to be followed rigidly (Klosko 2008; 1988, 82).101  Finally, Klosko 
(1988, 83-84) points out something Plato (Stm. 293e) has made clear: the rule of 
philosophical wisdom is superior to the rule of law.  When a contingent of philosophers 
rules the city, it will not resort to the promulgation of a rigid law code.  The purpose of a 
law code is to provide general guidelines for political organization in the absence of true 
wisdom.   
If the Nocturnal Council is not an informal body of philosopher to advise the 
citizenry and adjust the law code, what is it?  Klosko (1988, 84-85) argues that the 
introduction of the Nocturnal Council represents a change in Plato’s argument 
inconsistent with the earlier Books of the Laws.  Had Plato completed the Laws, he 
would have revised this divergence into a coherent dialogue, but alas, he did not.  
Klosko (2008, 466-469; 1988, 86-87) cites numerous discrepancies in the Laws as 
evidence of its incompleteness, and argues the best method of interpretation is to read 
the Laws as incomplete.  This is obviously not a satisfying conclusion, but Klosko 
recognizes it as the most logical and only acceptable one.  Let us continue the 
investigation to determine if Klosko is correct.  
 If Plato maintains a consistent political philosophy, the city in the Laws must be 
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 See note 104 for a further discussion. 
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either fundamentally similar to the ideal city of the Republic or one of the lesser 
constitutions.  Is Magnesia the ideal city of the Republic?  The main evidence for this 
understanding is in Magnesia’s educational and political structure, particularly with the 
guardians of the laws (nomophulakes).  These guardians receive a similar education to 
those in the Republic.  Plato briefly describes their education, as if to remind the reader 
of the program constructed in the Republic (L. 809c-d, 817e-818a).102  The guardians 
will study arithmetic, literature, music, geometry, and astronomy, the disciplines 
necessary to understand right-order in the kosmos and in the polis.  The guardians in 
Magnesia will become as knowledgeable as the lawgiver of the dialogue and the 
philosopher-kings of the Republic (L. 964b-c).  They will possess reason in their soul 
awakening knowledge of the virtues (L. 963e-964b).  They will know the Good and 
Beautiful.  They will be students of true theology.  In terms of education and knowledge, 
the guardians of Magnesia appear consistent with the guardians of the ideal city.  
Institutionally, the guardians exercise their political rule in the Nocturnal Council.  Plato 
has described their education and placed them in power.  These guardians appear to be 
identical to those in the Republic.      
 If Plato is being consistent in his political philosophy, then the Laws will contain 
either an elaboration of the ideal city or an exposition of a lesser city.  Interpreting 
Magnesia as the ideal city, one reads the Laws as Plato’s detailed explanation of the 
general laws necessary to instill the proper moderation in the guardian class.  The 
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 If this reminder is insufficient, Taylor (1936, 497-501) reads the Epinomis as the crown of the Laws.  It 
details the education of the guardians of Magnesia.  However, the authorship of the Epinomis is suspect.  
On the other hand, Stalley (1983, 3) shrugs off the Epinomis, indifferent to its authenticity and 
unimpressed with its contents.  I am inclined to agree with Taylor that the Epinomis shows no break with 
the Laws, but I do not think the Guardians of Magnesia are identical to those of the Republic.   
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guardians, trained as philosophers, will defend the law code and amend individual laws, 
if necessary, according to their rational understanding of political order.  Ultimately, a 
thorough reading of the Laws will not reach this conclusion.   
 The main argument against the equivalence of the cities in the Laws and Republic 
is very promulgation of a detailed law code (Klosko 2008).  Plato wrote in both the 
Republic and the Laws that the rule of knowledge, however rare and unlikely, is superior 
to the rule of laws (R. 425a-e; L. 874d-875d).  Philosopher-kings (living, breathing, 
ruling philosophers) provide the rule of knowledge, as they have knowledge in their soul 
which they can communicate to others.  As long as they exist, generation after 
generation, the best political order is the ideal city of the Republic, the rule of knowledge 
provided by living philosopher-kings.  Magnesia obfuscates this issue, and Plato’s 
thought is unclear.  He states definitively that knowledge is superior to law and writes a 
detailed law code for the city.  The logical conclusion is that Magnesia is not a city ruled 
by philosopher-kings; it is not the ideal city of the Republic. 
 A second argument against the equivalence of the philosopher-kings to the 
citizens of Magnesia is the possession of private property.  The city will have five 
thousand forty citizens, as in the Republic, but each citizen will be responsible for a plot 
of land (L. 740a).  The land ultimately belongs to the city itself, but each citizen will act 
as steward and manager of an individual estate.  And the division into plots is sacred and 
permanent (L. 741b-e).  The difference between Magnesia and ideal city is evident.  
Plato specifically denied the auxiliaries and guardians private estates in the Republic.  
They were to share the city as a common enterprise and rule the whole as a whole.  
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Magnesia’s division of its lands into privately-managed plots changes this.  Each of the 
five thousand forty citizens exclusively bears responsibility for a delimited part of the 
city.  Each citizen’s prime responsibility will be to administer the law to a personal 
estate, keeping careful watch on the private plot to prevent disorder (L. 758a-e).  
Administering the law to the city as whole is the responsibility of elected officials, who 
must guard the city in addition to their individual plots of land.  Interestingly, these 
private estates require many laws, and the interlocutors return to this topic multiple times 
(L. 842e, 846c, 913a, 915e).  The profusion of laws in Magnesia and the private estates 
of its citizens suggest that this city is not identical to the ideal city of the Republic.  In 
the middle dialogues, philosophers needed neither laws nor lands. 
 Indeed, the Laws is ambivalent about what the citizen-guardians are.  The 
description of these guardians sometimes accords with a philosophical nature, but other 
times it does not.  One argument is the guardians are timocrats and Magnesia is the 
timocracy, the second best city in the Republic.  Some evidence does support this 
conclusion.  As argued in the previous paragraph, the citizens administer private estates.  
This administration includes ruling over the craftsmen, laborers, and slaves of that 
property (L. 742a-c, 777d-778a, 806d-e, 846d-848b).  The productive crafts must not 
interfere with each citizen’s physical and mental training (L. 807d).  Individually, these 
land-holding citizens rule over those engaged in productive work, and distribute the 
fruits of their production.  Like the timocrat of the Republic, the citizens of Magnesia are 
the exclusive practitioners of martial discipline in the city.  Unlike the guardians in the 
ideal city, the citizens in Magnesia own individual lands and exclusively rule the set of 
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workers on that property. 
  The case for Magnesia being a timocracy gains credence from the fact that two of 
the three interlocutors are timocrats.  Clinias the Cretan and Megillus the Spartan both 
hail from timocratic cities and the characters’ words reflect their martial values.  When 
the Athenian asks Clinias what is good in life, the Cretan responds, “to subdue the 
inferior” (L. 627a).  When the Athenian asks about the purpose of laws, Clinias answers, 
“to train good soldiers, for war never ends” (L. 625c-626b).  Megillus agrees, and 
explains the activities that instill discipline in a Spartan (L. 633a-d).  These two 
characters are not dissuaded from their beliefs easily.  They adhere to their conception of 
the good as their Athenian interlocutor promotes contrary and more complex ideas of 
virtue, education, and justice (L. 662a).    
 Analyzing Magnesia’s law code, the city is clearly not a timocracy.  The citizens 
will receive a rigorous and realistic education in warfare, but the city is more than a 
militarized city (L. 829a-831a, 833a-834d).  The law code does not establish a 
timocracy, but attempts to convince the representatives of two timocratic cities to 
embrace a government of knowledge and a system of education to inculcate all the 
virtues, not simply courage.  The Athenian argues that courage alone will lead to a city’s 
eventual destruction, as ancient timocracies themselves were destroyed (L. 684a-685a).  
A city needs wisdom for its long-term well-being.  A city that enshrines only a part of 
virtue will be undone by its limited vision (L. 688c-e, 705d-e).  In brief, one part of 
virtue is not enough to provide a vision of the whole, and without knowledge of the 
whole, one may inadvertently pursue a disastrous course (L. 687a-688b).  Recalling the 
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non-military education the citizens receive, and weighing the Athenian’s invocation of 
the unity of the virtues, the law code clearly aims at a political system different from the 
simple timocracy.   
 The guardians appear too philosophical to be timocrats, and yet are not 
philosophical enough to be philosopher-kings.  And if they are philosophical, why is 
there a detailed, comprehensive law code?  What is this city of Magnesia?  In total, the 
Laws is an ambivalent dialogue.  Literally, Plato gives valence to two different positions 
of the argument.  The guardians do resemble philosopher-kings in certain respects, and 
Magnesia, with its wise constitution, is an ideal city.  Yet, the guardians in the Laws are 
not identical to the philosopher-kings in the Republic, nor is Magnesia identical to the 
ideal city of the Republic.  The Laws contains a surplus of frustrating evidence to 
support these contrary positions.  To break the impasse, one might read the Laws in light 
of the Statesman and Timaeus.  Read together, the Timaeus, Statesman, and Laws reflect 
a political philosophy different from the middle dialogues.103  Magnesia is ideal in 
Plato’s later understanding of humanity’s place in the cosmos. 
The Philosopher-Lawgiver 
 In the Statesman, Plato separated the function of law-creating from law-
administering.  In the Laws, Plato continues the distinction.  In the dialogue, the 
Athenian actually writes a law code for a colony, following the theory that the lawgiver 
creates the code that generates and rules a city.  The lawgiver possesses knowledge 
above the capability of the citizens who will live in the new city.  The terms lawgiver 
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 Morrow (1954, 8-9) suggested a version of this path, but his (1960) later interpretation of the Laws 
differs greatly from mine and he takes the dēmiourgos-lawgiver parallel less seriously.  
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(nomothetēs) and statesman (politikos) represent two different human types, and both 
have specific functions in the polis (L. 693a).   
 Recalling the Statesman, Plato uses the analogy of the weaver and the art of 
weaving to illustrate the lawgiver’s function.  In the Laws, human beings are a varied 
sort, specifically in their skills.  The good lawgiver (agathos nomothetēs) molds these 
human materials into the best form using music and song (L. 671c).  Plato returns to this 
analogy again.  When plotting the colony, Plato writes that the lawgiver will weave the 
different types of citizen together, the strong type to preserve the laws and the weaker 
type to live under them (L. 734e-735a).  The meaning of the analogy is clear.  A 
lawgiver is a different class of human being than those who comprise the citizenry.  
Lawgivers have insight into the human soul; they know the internal nature of the 
material with which they construct a city.  In addition, they know how to arrange these 
different materials to create a functioning city.  The lawgiver’s skill is the integration of 
different, chaotic materials into a harmony, constructing order in the form of a whole 
city from the chaos of individuals.  These individuals will find order in themselves as 
well.  Citizens cannot do these things, else they would be lawgivers.  However, the laws 
can shape citizens into a prosperous city if they adhere to the code. 
 Lawgivers write the constitution that properly orders a citizen’s soul and best 
arranges the citizens as a political unity- and the city is not lacking in laws.  The 
lawgiver bequeaths an extensive code for the citizens (L. 746b-c).  For their benefit, the 
citizenry must adhere to the code (L. 746d-747b).  Plato repeats this point throughout the 
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Laws: the citizens must obey the law code and preserve it from change.104  The laws will 
explain all political duties, relations, and education (L. 718a-b, 820e).  The law code will 
demand little independent thought of the citizens, and in confusing circumstances they 
are to ask the lawgiver for assistance (L. 631e, 752a-c).  The number and 
comprehensiveness of the laws is a strong piece of evidence that Magnesia is not the 
ideal city of the Republic.  
 The distinction between lawgiver and citizen has a precedent in the Timaeus.  
Recall the hierarchical structure of reality in that dialogue.  The dēmiourgos orders the 
whole kosmos; the kosmos creates lesser divinities to order the matter within itself.  
Magnesia follows the pattern of this cosmology in its own genesis.  The lawgiver is 
analogous to the dēmiourgos and the city like the kosmos.  Before the lawgiver brings a 
city into existence, human beings are the chaotic material awaiting order.  As the 
dēmiourgos crafted a soul for the whole kosmos, instilling order on it, the lawgiver 
fashions a code for the whole city, transforming a set of chaotic human beings into an 
ordered polis.  Lawgivers are the best and most rational of human beings.  They are 
superior, meaning closer to the divine, than the lot of humanity that lacks the internal 
rule of a rational soul.  Like the kosmos, a city only is a city when a rational law code 
puts a formerly chaotic set of human materials in order.  Such a city is not the ideal one 
of the Republic, but a new design, ideal in its own right.  
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 Egypt is praised for adhering to its nearly-eternal standards (L. 656d-e), Sparta for strictly enforcing a 
long-held law code (L. 683a-685a).  Citizens living in voluntary slavery to the laws are good (L. 700a-b). 
The Athenian stranger disapproves of the chaos and anarchy of changing laws and governments (L. 701b-
c, 711b-d).  In Magnesia, the citizens must obey the laws and strive to preserve them from change (L. 
715b-d, 762e, 874d).  Popper’s Open Society (2002), with emphatic condemnation, details Plato’s 
antipathy to change.  Klosko (2008) stresses the point without the antipathy.  
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 In the Timaeus, the dēmiourgos fashions a rational soul for the kosmos, imbuing 
the whole body with order.  In the Laws, the lawgiver fashions a law code for a new city, 
likewise imbuing it with order.  The law code is the container for reason (nous) and 
reason becomes the chief virtue of the laws and the ruling principle of the city (L. 632c, 
963a).  Similar to how the dēmiourgos functions in the Timaeus, the lawgiver’s work is 
the creation of good motion in the raw materials.  To organize the city into a harmony, 
the lawgiver uses music, song, and dance as the primary form of education (L. 653d-
654a, 658e-659c).  And the lawgiver must have knowledge of the good and beautiful, 
because music is an imitation of true standards (L. 668b-669b).  The human material of 
the city is not rational, but chaotic.  The lawgiver must rely on imitations of reason, not 
pure reason itself, to bring the materials to order.  The lawgiver possesses knowledge 
and embodies reason in a law code according to true standards that bring harmony to 
chaotic, human material.  However, reality is a hierarchy, thus the lawgiver’s product 
will be inferior to the work of the dēmiourgos.  The polis is an inferior copy of the 
kosmos, as the lawgiver can succeed only through the rare confluence of divine 
guidance, luck (tuchē) and skill (L. 709a-c).  The law code is sufficient for its purpose, 
but not perfect or eternal.  Over time, necessity and chaos will prevail over the rational 
code.  Plato displays a farsighted view of the human condition, and the cosmic one, 
when he notes that civilizations face an inevitable cycle of destruction and rebirth (L. 
676a-679c).105  
 Magnesia is not identical to the ideal city of Republic, but it is still an ideal city.  
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 Indeed, the Timaeus in part and the Critias in its unfinished whole included accounts of such a 
cataclysm: the destruction of Atlantis.   
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Magnesia is Plato’s second cosmopolis.  The philosopher acts upon human material as 
the dēmiourgos acts upon the whole kosmos, forging a city and citizens from empty 
lands and disordered (or at least pre-ordered) human beings.  Plato does retain an 
important feature of the ideal city, that the number of citizens will be five thousand forty.  
The number is not a coincidence, and Plato explains its significance in practical terms 
(L. 737e-738b).  The number has many divisors (including 2-10 and 12), which allows 
the lawgiver to divide the city into administrative sections.  Citizens will know everyone 
in their group, and by knowing only one person from another group, they will know the 
character of all citizens in that group.  The divisions function as both facilitators of 
government administration and social familiarity (L. 738b-e).  But the number has more 
than practical purpose to Plato.  The number is a mathematical standard inherent in 
reality; a city must adhere to the standard to be well-organized- to be a city at all (L. 
746d-e).  The lawgiver must maintain the standard for the health of the city (L. 747a-b).  
Indeed, Plato sanctifies the number to preserve it from change (L. 771a-d). 
 Plato completes the cosmopolis in the later books of the Laws.  Instituting the 
city’s religion, he recapitulates for a last time his cosmology, psychology, and theology.  
Discussing theism and atheism, the interlocutors defend a specific view of the world that 
ultimately is one of perspective.  Clinias scoffs at those who cannot see the order of 
nature.  “Just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe in general; look 
at the wonderful procession of the seasons and its articulation into years and months” (L. 
886a)!  The world has an order to it.  Plato argues that living according to that order will 
result in a fulfilled life.  His cosmology is a theistic naturalism, and very much opposed 
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to atheist naturalism, those scientific naturalists who believed matter moves according to 
internal properties.106  Plato’s cosmopolitanism is one of order, harmony, and 
fulfillment.  He fears that atheist naturalism will render political organization subject to 
rule of the strong or the rule of tuchē, meaning random chance (L. 888e, 889e-890a).   
 Plato relies on the concept of the soul to differentiate his cosmology from 
atheistic naturalism (L. 892a).  His first principle is that matter does not move itself.  
Something is responsible for motion in the physical matter that moves all across the 
kosmos.  Ultimately, something must have set matter in motion; this first principle of 
motion is the soul (L. 896a-b).  Soul is self-generated motion that imparts motion to 
physical objects (L. 894-895a, 896a).  Plato examines the many kinds of observable 
motions (L. 893c-e), and concludes that a soul will move an object depending on 
whether it clings to mind or mindlessness (nous and anous, L. 897a-b).  Observing the 
motions of the sun, the stars, and moon, everyone will see these bodies travel in an 
orderly fashion and give evidence that reason rules the kosmos (L. 899b). Unless those 
who do not recognize the gods can produce a more beautiful, convincing argument, Plato 
suggests they accept his (L. 899c-d).   
Epilogue  
Contrary to the ideal city of the Republic, the cosmopolis of Magnesia 
incorporates a cosmology that rejects the possibility of philosophers living as citizens.  
Philosophers are not the native sons and daughters raised in the city and educated to be 
kings.  They are lawgivers above the law they construct and outside the city they 
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 Plato summarizes the natural materialists (L. 889a-e), and criticizes their contention that the gods are 
merely conventional and contrived fictions. 
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establish.  This model yields another answer to the dilemma of Socrates caught between 
his divine service and political attachment.  In fact, Plato ends the dilemma by devaluing 
Socrates’ attachment to Athens.  Philosophers no longer owe their allegiance to a 
particular polis, but may act as the creators of poleis.  Neither kings nor citizens, 
philosophers become lawgivers and founders.  They live outside the city and supervise 
its operation.  Should the citizens become confused with the application of a law to a 
particular circumstance, the philosopher will intervene.  In times of normalcy, however, 
the lawgiver does not participate in daily politics.  Plato has explained the soul of the 
kosmos and found the source of its orderly motion in the work of a divine craftsman.  In 
parallel, Plato seeks to impart order into the polis through the philosopher’s law code.  
Lost is the binding connection of the philosopher, Socrates, to the city, Athens. 
The contrast between the Republic and Laws is most clear when studying the role 
of the philosopher in each of the political designs.  In the Republic, philosophers are 
indigenous to the polis.  Adult, native philosophers select for martial education the 
youths who exhibit the nature of a guardian.  If these youths excel, they continue to 
study in the philosophic program.  Finally, the few who attain true knowledge will 
function in their city as those who educated them; one generation raises the next in 
continuity.  In the Laws, the philosopher is already fully formed, possessing the highest 
knowledge, and unattached to the polis of his or her origin.  The legal code stresses 
equality and homogeneity among the citizenry.  The home cities of the colonists are 
unimportant.  Terrain and geography are factors, but the lawgiver selects these not from 
any sentimental attachment, but to cultivate virtue.  Any land that possesses certain traits 
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will do.  Where the city of the Republic harmonizes the skills among a certain people, 
the city of the Laws creates a certain kind of citizen and equality among those citizens.  
The pattern of lawgiving should be transferable to any set of people, not only Athenians.  
The Laws is more universal than the Republic.  The Republic speaks to the Socratic 
dilemma of how the philosopher also can be the citizen.  The Laws, reflecting on a 
complete cosmology, declines that possibility to show how the philosopher can create 
the polis and must reside outside it.  Socrates becomes a wandering philosopher and 
potentially the founder of a new city, but not the martyr of Athens. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation is an investigation into the idea of cosmopolitanism, especially 
its constitutive concepts of “cosmos” and “polis.”  Reading contemporary 
cosmopolitanism, one is hard-pressed to find an examination of the cosmos, the polis, or 
their interrelation.  Modern cosmopolitans are secure in their foundational principles, 
whether universal morality, economic liberty and equality, democracy, or 
constitutionalism. Cosmopolitanism is then merely the functional work of expanding a 
favored principle across the globe.  Typically, the project is institutional: what is the best 
institutional structure to support the favored principle?  Postmodernism is different, of 
course.  It travels the past of least resistance, that there is no cosmos (not a beautiful, 
natural order) nor should there be a polis (a limited, sovereign community).  Such a state 
of thought is unbecoming of cosmopolitanism’s long tradition of inquiry into the nature 
of the cosmos, the order of the polis, and the harmony of latter in the former.  As a 
remedy to this state, I have investigated the development of Platonic cosmopolitanism 
across the Plato’s dialogues within the context of broader Greek cosmopolitanism.  
Greek cosmopolitanism reached various conclusions about the cosmic order and its 
implications for political association.  Plato’s is distinct in arguing for a truly Greek polis 
that reflects the order of the whole kosmos.  Ultimately, there is no one true 
cosmopolitanism, but any meaningful cosmopolitan thought must include the study of 
the natural world, political association, and the subsequent implications for human 
existence.     
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Contemporary Cosmopolitanism 
What does one make of contemporary cosmopolitan thought?  Clearly, most 
branches are not cosmopolitan in any meaningful sense of studying the cosmos and 
applying natural standards to political association.  Liberalism looks to expand a just 
distribution of resources across the global economy.  Though it endorses a magnanimous 
materialism, it still only materialism.  Why is material comfort the good?  If it is the 
good, why should a wealthy individual relinquish resources to less advantaged 
individuals?  Why should the developed world sacrifice its high affluence to raise the 
developing world?  It is even natural to relinquish one’s hold on resources to facilitate 
the material comforts of others?  Is that what evolution teaches us?  Overall, liberal, 
democratic, and constitutional branches of cosmopolitan thought are globalism losing 
touch with the foundation of their theories even as they expand them across the world.   
Postmodernism does apply an understanding of the cosmos to political thought, 
but it understands the cosmos as unordered.  Postmodern cosmopolitanism is anti-
cosmopolitan.  Since there is no order in the cosmos, there ought to be no order in the 
polis.  As in the cosmos, let political elements collide, comingle, and fuse.  Let authority 
be fluid and principles be hybrid.  Postmodern cosmopolitanism embraces the forces of 
globalization without elevating any particular driving motive.  It is a global theory, like 
its contemporaries, but does not endorse an overarching principle to dominate the globe.  
Fluidity and hybridization are the key concepts, and postmodernism welcomes a world 
of fluctuating values and political authorities. 
Little of ancient Greek cosmopolitanism persists in contemporary 
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cosmopolitanism.  Even when a cosmopolitan, like Martha Nussbaum, harkens back to 
Diogenes the Cynic, the message is misinterpreted.  Contemporary cosmopolitanism 
does not study nature and does not defend an idea of the world as a cosmos, a beautiful 
order.  It certainly does not look for political principles in the physical laws of the world.  
Why contemporary cosmopolitanism has reached this nadir requires another, longer 
investigation.  Discussion of such fundamentals is utterly absent in contemporary 
cosmopolitanism. 
Ancient Greek Cosmopolitanism 
Recalling ancient Greek cosmopolitanism, we find a philosophy invested in the 
study of nature as a cosmos and of humanity as a part of that cosmos.  The world as a 
cosmos means that the physical material of reality interacts according to fixed laws 
instituted by a superior intelligence for the best.  There is no gap or division between 
scientific fact and normative value in Greek cosmopolitanism.  The same intelligence 
superior to causative physical laws also yields laws of human association, political laws.  
Greek cosmopolitans were not a unified bloc of thinkers, but they agreed that 
conventional laws tended toward irrationality, and being against reason, they were not 
best.  Greek cosmopolitanism, more than anything else, is a more universalistic 
movement against conventional laws and the assumption of unexamined, conventional 
principles.  Cosmopolitan universalism took different shapes, from Diogenes’ ascetic 
renunciation of human pretense and conventional civility to the Stoic pursuit of a 
rational, worldwide society of sages, but it always looked to a natural order of things as 
the foundation for human interaction and association. 
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 The literature on Greek cosmopolitanism is surprisingly thin.  Research traces the 
beginnings of universalism back to Homer and the actual terms “citizen of the world” to 
Diogenes of Sinope, but the details of cosmopolitanism are far less lucid.  The influence 
of Pythagoreanism and Orphism, both regularly acknowledged as critically important to 
the development of the Greek ideas of the psuchē and kosmos, is frustratingly vague.  
For example, most research cannot disentangle Pythagoreanism from Orphism.  The 
evidence for each is so opaque and the doctrines appear so similar at times that there is 
no convincing means of separating them.  Indeed, the most abundant source for 
Pythagoreanism is Plato himself!  The confusion and lack of clarity within cosmopolitan 
thought extends even to more popular philosophies. Scholars often have difficulty in 
distinguishing the figures of Cynicism from Stoicism, and the efforts at differentiating 
do not reach agreement.  The historical record simply lacks the evidence, the actual texts 
written by the authors, for researchers to conduct thorough analyses of Greek 
cosmopolitanism.   
Research into Greek cosmopolitanism, despite the limited evidence, reveals a 
distinct school of philosophy that organized human associations according to rational, 
natural order.  Cynicism and Stoicism rejected the irrationality of convention and 
affirmed the rationality of natural order.  Their different understandings of reason and 
order led to different forms of association, none of which are particularly Greek or 
political.  Diogenean Cynicism is an ascetic detachment from convention and civility.  
The Cynic lives according to strict, natural imperatives and in friendship with all who 
live similarly.  Political association is thoroughly rejected.  A Cynic is a “citizen” of the 
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cosmos, meaning he or she follows the natural laws across the whole world.  Dutifully 
adhering to cosmic law, the Cynic is “home” anywhere in the world.  Stoicism is not 
strictly ascetic, but affirms that nature obeys the consistent, universal laws instituted by a 
superior force of intelligence.  From its understanding of intelligence and the natural 
world, Stoic philosophy reaches a few conclusions about human society, ranging from 
the social detachment of the wise from the ignorant, to the more utopian prognosis that 
all humanity may live rationally in a polis that extends across the world.  Cynic and 
Stoic cosmopolitanism do base their ideal human society on their understanding of the 
cosmos, but their societies hardly resemble the traditional Greek polis.  
Of course, we should not be surprised, as cosmopolitanism grew as a revolt 
against the irrationality of the conventional polis.  Yet Cynic and Stoic societies are 
exceptionally rational, perhaps exceedingly so.  Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitanism either 
endorse the separation of the wise from the ignorant or look forward to the ultimate 
triumph of reason over ignorance.  They do not attempt to bring the wise and ignorant 
together in a community; they do not unite the many different types of human beings 
into a political harmony.  That is what I mean by an association of differently-skilled 
individuals, or a truly Greek polis. 
Platonic Cosmopolitanism 
Plato’s dialogues, from the early through the late, reflect a concern for the 
cosmos, polis, and citizen, particularly revolving around the place of the philosopher in 
the world and in the city.  The early dialogues probe into the political conditions of 
Athens and the fate of one of its citizen, Socrates.  What has this citizen done to merit 
  
177 
execution?  Is the citizen at fault for some transgression or is the city’s law itself out of 
step with the life of a dedicated citizen?  The middle dialogues address these questions in 
a more positive way, explaining the practice of philosophy and its necessary role in the 
construction of an ordered city.  Philosophy leads to the knowledge of true things which 
stand as the basis for political organization.  Only in a city arranged according to 
philosophical standards will good citizens live according to good laws; only in such a 
city can a philosopher be a true citizen.  The late dialogues continue Plato’s thought 
about the standards which philosophy discovers for the purpose of ordering cities.  
Constructing a more definitive account of the cosmos, Plato accordingly revises his 
political law code.  Throughout, the dialogues pursue an understanding of the cosmos, 
the ordered world, to provide the basis for the Greek polis, the best political 
organization. 
 The early dialogues, especially Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, 
explicitly portray the conflict of Socrates and the city of Athens.  Fellow citizens charge 
Socrates with impiety and misleading the city’s youth.  Socrates defends himself as 
acting in the service of the Oracle of Delphi and for the best interest of Athens itself.  
The conflict demonstrates a breakdown in the rationality of the laws and the public 
religion.  How could this Oracle send Socrates on a mission that causes his conviction 
and execution?  Why would the city execute a citizen for investigating the meaning of 
the divine Oracle?  Socrates’ philosophic pursuit would be service to both the Oracle and 
Athens, but the laws of the city and its democratic citizens will not tolerate such a 
combination.  The Phaedo interestingly suggests that the problem may be with politics 
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itself, that the philosopher must retreat from public action into the private sphere of 
philosophical introspection and exclusive conversation.  Such a conclusion would 
separate philosophy from citizenship, and implicitly chastise Socrates for his dutiful 
service to Athens.  A philosopher rightly would hold no political affiliation, but privately 
search for the truth in any city. 
 The middle dialogues, especially, Phaedrus, Symposium, and Republic, 
reevaluate the life of philosophy and political association, arguing that the philosopher 
rightly will rule the city which raises them properly.  The life of philosophy differs in the 
Phaedrus and Symposium from the Phaedo in a key respect: the former dialogues find a 
place for the philosopher in the world.  The philosophical life is more than the ascetic, 
contemplative preparation for death.  Older philosophers find pleasure in engaging in 
inquiry with younger philosophical souls.  Philosophy is the love of the truth, not the 
immanent possession of it.  Pursuit requires assistance, and so older philosophers act as 
mentors to younger philosophical souls.  The relationship provides mutual benefit.  The 
elders ascend to behold truth, beauty, and goodness; the youths are initiated into 
philosophy and the “wings of their souls” are guided toward truth, beauty, and goodness.  
Politically, this education in philosophy is the function of philosophers.  Philosopher-
kings educate the non-philosophical classes by means of rational mythology to inculcate 
and maintain virtuous habits.  Most important, the philosopher-kings educate the 
philosophical youths, who become the true threats to a political association when they 
are ill-educated.  Raised from youth to maturity in the polis, serving as soldiers, political 
officers, and kings, philosophers are full and true citizens in the polis that embodies the 
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virtues and reflects the divine forms. 
 The late dialogues show the development of Plato’s cosmology, and his elaborate 
understanding of the cosmos fosters political reorganization.  The Timaeus presents a 
story of the cosmos as a living being, meaning an ensouled totality.  All reality is a 
hierarchy in Plato’s cosmology, with the cosmos itself one gradation removed from the 
eternal, unchanging, and divine.  Human beings exist as the lowest of divinities, created 
with both immortal and mortal elements.  The Statesman and Laws reflect this influence 
of cosmology on Plato’s political thought.  Plato illustrates a grand parallel between the 
cosmos and the city and the dēmiourgos and the philosopher.  As the cosmos was 
created by supreme intelligence, so the city is created by the philosopher’s intelligence.  
The Statesman clarifies political organization; the city divides into the citizen who lives 
within the political association and administers its laws and the lawgiver who crafts the 
founding law code.  The Laws continues in this vein, showing the actual drafting of a 
constitution by a philosopher.  The relationship of the philosopher to the city appears to 
change in the Laws, but the dialogue is ambiguous.  I am convinced that the Laws 
removes the philosopher from citizenship and establishes philosophers, rare as they are, 
as the writers of law codes and the founders of cities.  Philosophers will not be raised as 
citizens dedicated to a particular city, as Socrates was in Athens, but will be committed 
to the eternal, universal standards of virtue wherever they legislate.   
 Platonic cosmopolitanism offers two cosmopoleis, two cities constructed 
according to the standards of divine intelligence.  In the Republic, the ideal city 
integrates an assortment of skilled individuals melding into a harmony of virtues.  
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Craftsmen exhibit their talents and produce the economic goods for all citizens.  Soldiers 
practice their martial discipline and provide protection and security for the polis.  
Philosophers, beholding the eternal true, good, and beauty, establish the initial order of 
the city and use their talents in education to maintain a political harmony reflective of 
eternal standards.  The three classes mutually contribute to the whole; all are productive 
citizens offering their talents for the good and harmony of the city. 
 The Laws puts forth a different city according to a more developed cosmology.  
The citizens in the colonial city of Magnesia are largely equals.  They hold equal estates 
of private property and hold equal responsibilities for the care of their city.  Though 
essentially equal in political stature, some citizens will be elected to positions of greater 
responsibility and authority.  These are not class differences, but distinctions of ability.  
However, this political association of equals does not establish itself, but is established 
by an external individual.  A roving philosopher acts as lawgiver to the colonial city.  
Having apprehended the forms, the philosopher is akin to the divine intelligence which 
orders the whole cosmos.  For his or her part, the philosopher only orders a group of 
individuals, arranging them into a well-order political association through a law code.  
The philosopher instills intelligence into the law code, and thus puts order into what was 
merely chaotic, human material.  However, the lawgiver is not a citizen in the city.  
Possessing intelligence in their souls, philosophers are above political association, which 
is only a means of providing order to chaos.   
 In both the middle and late dialogues, Plato affirms that the polis is a legitimate 
organization.  Indeed, the polis is the best form of human organization according to the 
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very standards of the cosmos.  Understanding the cosmos as an ordered totality, and all 
reality as a hierarchy, Plato constructs cities in the likeness of order.  Smaller, less 
perfect, and not including the totality of all humanity, the polis is a lesser image of the 
cosmos.  This is Platonic cosmopolitanism: the creation of the polis according the 
standards of the cosmos. 
The Future of Cosmopolitanism  
 Contemporary cosmopolitanism is not looking to the cosmos for the standards of 
political association.  It does posit a facet of idealist individualism as the first principle 
of a global regime.  Where do these facets originate?  What is the basis of their 
legitimacy as a ruling principle?  Are these principles fit for global expansion?  I cannot 
claim to answer such questions here.  I will delay to consider whether Platonic 
cosmopolitanism must appear as a historical curiosity in the contemporary milieu of 
political theory.  I only urge readers to consider whether Platonic cosmopolitanism is so 
far-fetched in itself, or only in comparison to contemporary cosmopolitan theory.  Which 
is a more meaningful cosmopolitanism: the creation of a political association according 
to the standards of the cosmos, or a global regime of liberty, or equality, or 
republicanism, or postmodernism, or any singular facet of individualism? 
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